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Executive Summary 
ifteen years after its launch, the impact of the Barcelona process on the Palestinian 
Territories (PT) is in need of a reassessment, especially in light of the two critical 
junctures that have taken place, around which EU foreign policy has changed 
dramatically: the second intifada (2000) and the election win by the Hamas Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) (2006).  
The first 10 years, under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (1995–2005), proved 
ineffective in significantly changing the situation on the ground. Despite some initial progress in 
changing some structures (political and economic) at some levels (state and inter-state), the 
EU’s structurally-oriented foreign policy alone failed to anchor a peace deal between Israel and 
the Palestinians – in need of a traditional conflict-resolution strategy as well. The outbreak of 
the second intifada was coupled with an increased level of terrorism and marked the EU’s 
switch from development assistance to humanitarian aid, while neglecting civil society and 
peace-building projects.  
The end of the EMP witnessed a foreign policy renaissance. European voices called for 
substantial reforms and civil society engagement in the PT. Thus, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) was set up to bring a number of previously existing instruments and regional 
approaches together under the same umbrella and to improve their implementation through 
Action Plans. The PT witnessed substantial reforms in 2003–05, while the EU balanced its 
financial support between humanitarian and development aid, and started paying more attention 
to civil society. But before the PT could get back to where it was prior to the second intifada, 
Hamas won the PLC elections, bringing a halt to the EU’s aid and diplomacy. This boycott 
proved detrimental as it worsened the humanitarian situation in the PT and widened the rift 
between Hamas and Fatah to the point of no reconciliation. Since Hamas has taken over, the EU 
has backed the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority – leading by a presidential decree but lacking in 
legitimacy, while previously achieved economic, democratic and human rights reforms have 
been reversed. 
In sum, the Barcelona process is still affected by a quintessential gap between the EU’s own 
interests, the goals it sets and the expectations it raises, on the one hand, and the instruments it is 
willing to use and outcomes it can deliver, on the other. 
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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU 
IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 328/MAY 2010 
ROUBA AL-FATTAL
* 
1. Introduction 
It has been contended that the foreign policy of the EU directed at assisting the Palestinian 
Territory (PT)
1 in its transition to an independent, democratic and stable state is failing because 
of an omniscient gap between rhetoric and political will, which has consistently dogged the EU 
and reduced its credibility to fulfil the goals that its rhetoric typically inspires. In essence, the 
image of the EU as a genuine and influential actor in the peace and democratisation processes in 
the PT has been typically inflated, while the political will and unity of its actors remain severely 
dwarfed and constrained by their conflicting interests or ideologies.  
The nadir of the EU’s failure to fulfil its declarations was particularly evident in its dealing with 
Hamas after they assured themselves a clear majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(PLC) elections, in 2006. Not only did the US immediately withdraw its financial and political 
support from the democratically-elected body, but so did the EU, despite its “self-comfortingly 
superior moral identity”,
2 boasting about democracy and hailing the success of the process of 
the elections. This reaction has deepened the humanitarian and political crises, particularly in 
the Gaza Strip, and widened the rift between Fatah and Hamas to the extent of making a 
national unity government impractical and almost unfeasible.  
After the end of the cold war (1991), politics have been defined by the “victory of democracy”, 
which has been seen as the panacea for failed states.
3 Thus, since the mid-1990s the EU has 
been emphasising, in its speeches and through its partnership programmes in the Mediterranean, 
the dire need to restore peace, stability, democracy and good governance in the PT. The EU has 
seemed to understand that a comprehensive foreign policy approach is needed to promote peace 
and stability in the region, given that foreign policy is typically “directed at external actors and 
                                                      
* Rouba Al-Fattal is a PhD candidate at the Institute for International and European Policy at the 
University of Leuven (KUL) in Belgium, and the co-founder of the Euro-Arab Forum (EAF), a Brussels-
based NGO encouraging innovative ideas and open exchange between Europe and the Arab world. She 
can be contacted at rouba.al-fattal@mail.mcgill.ca. 
1 The Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) – and not ‘Territories’ – is the term officially used by the 
majority of the international community, including the EU and the UN (but not by the US or Israel). It 
will be used interchangeably in this text with the Palestine Territory (PT). (Information on the 
nomenclature is available from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/occupied_palestinian_territory/ 
index_en.htm and http://www.ochaopt.org.) Strictly speaking, the term PT refers to the areas falling 
behind the Green Line (or outside of the pre-4
th June 1967 borders), including East Jerusalem and the 
West Bank (with all of its zones, A, B and C). Although the Gaza Strip has not been under Israel’s 
“permanent military presence” since September 2005, the Strip is included under the rubric of the OPT 
because Israel still retains control of the airspace, seafront, cross points and all vehicle access – including 
deliveries of food and other goods. Thus, under international law the Gaza Strip, since its capture from 
the Egyptians during the 1967 war, until today has been considered under Israeli occupation.  
2 Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, The 
European Union Series (Houndmills: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008): 153. 
3 Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity, 2003): Ch. 6. 2 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
their environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other 
actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals”.
4 Therefore, the so-called ‘three 
baskets’ proposed under the umbrella of the Barcelona process (1995), which are focused on the 
political, economic and cultural dimensions, have been long-standing important elements of EU 
foreign policy. Security, democracy, economic development, institutional reforms, rule of law, 
human rights, civil society and gender equality as well as freedom of the press, expression and 
association in the PT have been continuously emphasised by European policy-makers, 
presenting these elements as EU foreign policy priorities.  
Notwithstanding this emphasis on the aforementioned elements, perceived by European 
politicians and elites as crucial in paving the way for peace and stability, the EU has acted in a 
manner demoting rather than promoting progress and democracy on the ground. Not only has 
the Barcelona process failed to deliver to the Palestinians what it promised 15 years ago (i.e. 
peace, prosperity and an autonomous state), but also, coupled with the failure of the Oslo 
Agreement (1993), it has left Palestinians pessimistic about the future and untrusting of the EU 
as an honest or even effective peace and democracy promoter. The EU is not the only one to 
blame, however; a combination of different external and internal factors has led to the 
deterioration of the situation in the PT.  
This publication analyses the evolution of the EU’s role in the PT by looking at the situation 
before the ongoing Barcelona process and while it has been underway. It tries to draw insights 
and propose solutions to help improve the credibility of the EU in the region, and in turn 
conditions on the ground. It also highlights the two critical junctures
5 in the history of the PT 
around which EU policies have switched dramatically – namely the second intifada (or Al-Aqsa 
intifada) in 2000 and the PLC electoral victory of Hamas in 2006 (see Figure 1).
6  
Figure 1. EU–MEPP and critical junctures timeline 
 
 
                                                      
4 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: 19. 
5 A term utilised by Ruth and David Collier indicating periods in history of fundamental political 
reorientation, in which actors make contingent choices that set on distinct trajectories of institutional 
developments and changes that are difficult to reverse.  
6 Ruth Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement 
and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORY | 3 
In doing so, this work gives concrete examples for each of the dimensions in which the EU has 
attempted to accomplish its goals in the PT (be it political, economic or cultural), in order to 
demonstrate not only the policy switches but also the shortcomings in new policies from the 
EU. Lastly, since the Israeli–Palestinian conflict tends to cast its heavy shadow on most EU 
relations with partners in the Mediterranean region, the EU’s policies in the PT are examined 
simultaneously through the prisms of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the EU’s approach to 
the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).  
2. Historical  Background  of the EU–PT Relations  
Overview 
Through the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG-RELEX), the European 
Commission carries out the common EU positions and joint actions agreed upon under the 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) pillar. Prior to the establishment of the EU/CFSP in 
1992, at the 1969 summit meeting in The Hague the European Economic Community (EEC) 
launched the European Political Cooperation, which lasted until 1993 and dealt with foreign 
affairs among European Community (EC) member states.
7 Today, the CFSP is the organised 
and agreed foreign policy of the EU, primarily for security and defence matters. It is decided 
upon through unanimity among EU member states in the Council of the European Union, in 
coordination with the General Affairs and External Relations Council – one of the oldest 
configurations of the Council – and the Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS), an 
advisory body to the Council.
8  
The Commission has so far addressed the EU’s strategic objectives with its neighbouring 
countries mainly through two consecutive yet complementary frameworks. The first is the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)/Barcelona process, which was established in 1995, and re-
launched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). This programme is funded by the 
EC budget and loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB), which are coordinated through 
Mediterranean Assistance (MEDA)
9 – an EU financial instrument created specifically for the 
southern neighbours.
10 The second is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its 
accompanying countries’ Action Plans, which was developed in 2004 “with the objective of 
avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and [its] neighbours”.
11 
Until 2006, the assistance funds of the EC and the EIB for this initiative were still coordinated 
by MEDA and TACIS, but these instruments were reformed and replaced by a single European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).
12 Hence, the EMP “essentially became the 
multilateral forum of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners”, 
with complementary bilateral relations “managed mainly under the ENP and through 
                                                      
7 Christopher Hill and Karen Elizabeth Smith, European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (London: 
Routledge, 2000): 71-119. 
8 European Commission, “How the European Union Works: Your Guide to the EU Institutions”, ed. 
Directorate General for Press and Communication (2005): 5, 16, 19. 
9 MEDA is the counterpart of the Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States 
(TACIS), an EU financial instrument for its eastern neighbours and Central Asia. 
10 Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-How in the Water Sector (EMWIS), About MEDA 
[cited 20 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://www.emwis.org/MEDA/about_meda.htm. 
11 European Commission External Relations, European Neighbourhood Policy – Overview [cited 20 Oct. 
2009]. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/enp/index_en.htm. 
12 European Commission External Relations, European Neighbourhood Policy: Funding [cited 17 Oct. 
2009]. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/funding_en.htm. 4 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
Association Agreements signed with each partner country”.
13 Other specific, thematic funding 
programmes were also introduced to help the Mediterranean region, such as the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which was created by an initiative of the 
European Parliament and lasted from 2000 to 2006. This was replaced by the financial 
instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide for 2007-13.
14  
The European Commission Technical Assistance Office (ECTAO), operating in East Jerusalem 
since 1994, oversees the implementation of the EMP, ENP, UfM and the Commission’s 
EuropeAid External Cooperation Programmes. The EuropeAid office, on the other hand, lays 
out strategies for cooperation with the PT and manages the EU’s external aid to the PT (totalling 
more than €4 billion since 1994). Since 2008, financial assistance has been channelled to and 
through the Palestinian Authority (PA) to help build the institutions of the future Palestinian 
state, in the context of the MEPP. ECTAO also supports Palestinian civil society and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in fields such as health care, education, human rights and 
democracy building, peace building and culture. Assistance to Palestinian refugees, on the other 
hand, is channelled through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Socio-
economic development of the PT is channelled through the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), while humanitarian assistance to Palestinians is managed through the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (DG-ECHO), which has 
been open in East Jerusalem since the end of 2002.  
Evolution of EU–PT relations 
It is not an easy task to define the EU’s interests in the Middle East in general, and the PT in 
particular, when the EU is an inter-governmental body made up of 27 member states with, to a 
certain extent, distinct histories, cultures and foreign policy objectives in the region. 
Nonetheless, over time the EU became interested in peace and stability in its neighbouring 
region “motivated by geographic proximity and geopolitical considerations – chiefly, the fear of 
security threats emanating from Europe’s [backyard] (a spillover of conflict in the form of 
terrorism, organised crime, migration, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), 
Israel’s security, and access to energy resources”.
15 Also, the Middle East is an important region 
for its oil resources and what happens there has global ramifications, as was the case when the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to raise oil prices in the 
mid-1970s, sparking a global wave of recession. Moreover, the EU is made up of nations with 
multi-ethnic backgrounds through waves of immigration mostly from the Mediterranean region, 
a fact European decision-makers take into consideration as they fear their ethnic communities 
might import regional conflicts into Europe. Hence, there is an implicit assumption that an 
environment of peace between Palestinians and Israelis is most conducive for reconciling 
Europe’s different interests, while pleasing Israel and appeasing the Arab states by providing 
their populations some decent living conditions.  
Yet decision-makers do not operate in a political vacuum. Therefore, it is very important to 
draw a close link between the historical evolution of EU–PT relations and developments in the 
                                                      
13 European Commission External Relations, The Barcelona Process [cited 20 Oct. 2009]. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/barcelona_en.htm. 
14 Europa, Summaries of EU Legislation, European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (2000-
2006)  [cited 20 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/ 
human_rights_in_third_countries/r10110_en.htm. 
15 Muriel Asseburg, “European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective 
Approach” (Berlin: Carnegie Endowment, February 2009): 1. Available from http://www.swp-
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MEPP, especially since peace and stability are the highlights of the EU’s interests in the region. 
Indeed, European presence in that area dates long before the launch of the EU itself, in the early 
1950s, or even the creation of the state of Israel in 1948,
16 owing to the special status of 
Jerusalem and Bethlehem to the Christian world. Some European consulates, like those of 
France, Britain, Belgium, Spain, Sweden and Italy, opened their doors in Jerusalem (particularly 
in what we today refer to as East Jerusalem) between 1900 and 1950. During that period, 
Jerusalem was transferring from Ottoman rule to the British Mandate followed by Jordanian 
patronage. Not long after that we saw the creation of Fatah (1958) followed by the rise of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964.
17 Shortly afterwards, the six-day war took 
place (1967), in which Israel captured East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – areas 
referred to since then by the United Nations (UN)
18 and the EU as the PT.
19  
At the Palestinian National Congress of 1969, Fatah, the largest Palestinian political faction at 
the time, gained control of the executive body of the PLO, and its leader Yasser Arafat (Abu 
Ammar) was appointed the chairman of the PLO, a position he held until his death in 2004. By 
the mid-1970s most of the international community, except for Israel and the US, came to 
understand that the PLO is the “legitimate national representative of the Palestinians”.
20 For 
instance, in 1974, the UN General Assembly granted the PLO observer status (Resolution 
3236);
21 in 1976, the PLO became a full member in its own right of the League of Arab States.
22 
The European Council officially reiterated in its 1980 Venice Declaration the “legitimate rights” 
of Palestinians to existence and security,
23 in accordance with the previously issued UN Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolutions 242
24 and 338.
25 
International aid to the PLO and the Palestinian people has always played an important role in 
the MEPP, but the financial statistics cannot be specified since the PLO does not circulate its 
budget. What is known, however, is that during the 1970s and 1980s aid came mostly from 
                                                      
16 Europa, History of the European Union [cited 17 Oct. 2009]. Available from 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm. 
17 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York; 
Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1997): 2. 
18 United Nations Official Documents System, UN Security Council Resolution 242: On the Situation in 
the Middle East, November 1967 [cited 17 Oct. 2009]. Available from 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement. 
19 European Commission External Relations, Occupied Palestinian Territory [cited 18 Oct. 2009]. 
Available from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/occupied_palestinian_territory/index_en.htm. 
20 Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza 
(Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press, 2005). Available from 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/ucal051/2004005278.html  
21 United Nations Department of Public Information, Growing Recognition of Palestinian Right by the 
General Assembly [cited 19 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch5.pdf. 
22 League of Arab States, Palestine  [cited 17 Oct. 2009]. Available from 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=3349&level_id=61. 
23 Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, Documents on European Union (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1997): 207. 
24 Resolution 242 was approved unanimously on 22 November 1967 in response to the six-day war. It 
refers to the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East in which every state in the area can live in security”. 
25 Resolution 338 was approved on 22 October 1973. It called for the immediate ceasefire in the Yom 
Kippur war and the start of negotiations between parties in line with UNSC Resolution 242.  6 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
Arab (oil-rich) states
26 – either directly to the PLO or to charitable Palestinian NGOs.
27 The first 
EC financial assistance to Palestinians dates from 1971 when the Community channelled its 
contributions through the budget of UN bodies such as UNRWA (e.g. for refugee assistance) 
and the UNDP from 1978 (e.g. for humanitarian relief and socio-economic development).
28 
Rising anger against Israeli rule in the PT lead to the first intifada, which started in the Jabalya 
refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip and quickly spread through the rest of Gaza, the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem.
29 The uprising lasted for four years from its start in December 1987, 
which also marked the birth of Hamas, as an Islamic resistance movement and the Palestinian 
wing of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.
30 By February 1991, the first Gulf war had ended with a 
big loss to Iraq and the PLO, which had sided with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, thus 
angering Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – the PLO’s biggest financial contributors at the time. US 
President George H.W. Bush (1989-93), eager to patch rifts with Arab states and aware of the 
vulnerability of the PLO (whose aid money had been cut off), decided to co-sponsor the Madrid 
conference with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in October of 1991. This 
early attempt to begin the peace process through negotiations involving Palestinians, Israel and 
Arab states proved fruitful in the international atmosphere prevailing at the time, with a weak 
PLO and USSR. Indeed, within a couple of months of this meeting the world witnessed the total 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of the PLO’s name from the US list of 
terrorist groups.
31 
Where was Europe during all of this, aside from hosting the conference in Spain in 1991? 
Through the European Political Cooperation, which lasted between 1970 and 1993, European 
states carried out discussions on the Middle East and the Palestinian question, which helped 
“put the Palestinian case on the international agenda” and advance “the fight for self-
determination of the Palestinian people”.
32 In addition, the EEC “first granted preferential 
access for products originating from the Occupied Territories in 1986”.
33 But despite Europe’s 
efforts, the prevailing consensus of most players at the time was that the US “held 99 percent of 
                                                      
26 Giacomo Luciani, The Arab State (London: Routledge, 1990): 96. 
27 Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters (London: Hurst & Co., 2007): 37-38. 
28 On UN support to the Palestinians, see http://www.undp.ps/en/aboutundp/aboutpapp.html and 
http://www.un.org/unrwa/overview/index.html.  
29 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters: 14. 
30 Many Palestinians (whether independents or Fatah sympathisers) with whom this author spoke in the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem during a research visit in summer of 2009, were strongly convinced that 
Israel’s intelligence (the Mossad) and the government facilitated the creation and growth of Hamas in 
order to curb the PLO’s power. Yet that is not to say they believe Hamas was or still is working for an 
Israeli agenda. This view is also shared by some Israeli academics and elites (such as Zeev Sternell, 
historian at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), but was not confirmed by Hamas officials or 
sympathisers, or by Israeli officials.  
31 United States Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism Report of 1994” (National Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2005): 34. Available from 
http://terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/1994pogt.pdf. 
32 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: 47, 282. 
33 European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Interim 
Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation [cited 21 Oct. 2009]. Available from 
http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_palestine/ec_plo.htm. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORY | 7 
the cards for settling the Israeli–Arab conflict”;
34 and that notion does not seem to have changed 
much over the past two decades.  
Prior to the Treaty of the European Union signed in Maastricht, which established the EU and 
the CFSP in 1992 (the second of the EU’s three pillars),
35 there was some EU participation in 
Middle Eastern affairs.
36 Still, these efforts were considered ineffective either because the EU 
was pushed out of the game by Washington, which wanted to monopolise the outcomes, or 
because individual European countries were involved in this part of the world on an ad-hoc 
basis, serving their own specific interests mostly through bilateral relations. There was no ‘made 
in the EU’ foreign policy, but after the Treaty of the European Union was ratified – a sort of a 
watershed in terms of EU global involvement – it became easier to talk of a common ‘EU 
foreign policy’ and formulate an agreed diplomatic view of the EU with regard to the Middle 
East and the peace process. In reality, common positions remain uneasy to reach because 
decisions on foreign affairs (even with the Lisbon Treaty) continue to require a unanimous vote 
among representatives from all the member states at the Council of the European Union (also 
referred to here as the Council of Ministers). 
On 9 September 1993, through letters exchanged between Arafat and Israel’s newly elected 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Labour Party), the PLO renounced violence and recognised 
Israel, and the latter responded on the same day by officially recognising the PLO. Yet the so-
called ‘Oslo process’ did not start until four days later when the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Declaration of Principles or DOP) between Israel 
(Shimon Peres) and the Palestinians (Mahmoud Abbas) was signed in Washington, D.C. – with 
then US President Bill Clinton as witness and Arafat and Rabin shaking hands. The agreement 
provided a window of opportunity and paved the way for the EU to provide the necessary 
instruments for structural (political, economic, legal and cultural) changes to take place in the 
region at all levels.  
After the signing of the Oslo Accords, the economic role of Europe in the MEPP increased 
dramatically, while in comparison its diplomatic involvement remained dwarfed. Through its 
declarations within the framework of the CFSP – the successor of European Political 
Cooperation – the EU reiterated to a certain extent the same principles published more than a 
decade earlier in Venice. Nevertheless, within this new context, Europe actually translated its 
willingness to be a part of the new political Middle Eastern scene through its commitment to 
financially assist the peace process. This role was not only needed but also welcomed by all 
parties. For their part, the Palestinians were in dire need of assistance to kick-start their 
economic activities, whereas the Israelis and Americans were happy that the ‘Old Continent’ 
would pay the bill while being alienated from further political aspirations in the region. To 
begin this process of change, the EU established, and continues to co-chair, an international 
donor mechanism: the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC),
37 which coordinates financial 
assistance to the Palestinians. In the first donor conference for the PA in 1993, donors pledged 
more than $2 billion to the development of the PT (although donor pledges are usually more 
                                                      
34 Barry Rubin, U.S. Policy in the Intifadah Era, 1988-1990, Middle East Review of International Affairs 
[cited 20 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://meria.idc.ac.il/us-policy/data1988.html. 
35 The other two pillars being the EEC and justice and home affairs (JHA). 
36 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: 47-48. 
37 European Commission External Relations: Occupied Palestinian Territory, EC Assistance to the 
Palestinians  [cited 21 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
occupied_palestinian_territory/ec_assistance/index_en.htm. 8 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
than actual disbursements).
38 On 29 September 1993, the European Commission presented its 
Communication to the Council concerning its support for the MEPP, in which it proposed a 
total amount of 500 million ecus
39 to be defrayed to the Palestinian people from 1994 to 1998 in 
the form of grants and long-term loans.
40 “Politically overridden from the Madrid conference, 
Europe had to find an alternative way to stay active in the MEPP. Its economic involvement was 
materialised through its participation in the multilateral track of the peace process, and the 
resumption of the presidency of the Regional Economic Development Working Group 
(REDWG).” In November 1993, “the group adopted the Copenhagen Action Plan, comprising 
35 projects in various fields: communications, transportation, energy, tourism, agriculture, 
financial markets and investment, trade, training, and regional networks”.
41 A few months later, 
for the first time, an EU office (ECTAO) opened its doors in East Jerusalem to help coordinate 
efforts with Brussels on the ground. Simultaneously, on the Israeli side, in its December 1994 
Essen Declaration, the EU expressed the “expectation that Israel would enjoy special relations 
with the EU on the basis of reciprocity and common interests. This has translated [over the 
years] into stronger relations between Israel and the EU in trade, exchange between people, 
culture, research, and other fields than with any other eastern or southern Mediterranean 
partner.”
42 Equally significant, on 1 January 1995, the EU went through its fourth enlargement, 
which brought the EU from 12 to 15 member states for the next nine years, by adding Austria, 
Finland and Sweden, the latter being perceived as a pro-Palestinian country.
43  
Parallel to the EU’s efforts, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or the PA) was established 
in 1994 by the Oslo I Agreement (also referred to as the Gaza–Jericho Autonomy Agreement) 
as a transitional administrative unit with restricted powers that would govern parts  of the 
Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PA was founded on the basis of the 
DOP on Interim Self-Government Authority, “under which it was given temporary civil 
responsibilities” for a period of five years (1994-99).
44 Final status negotiations were expected 
to take place after three years in 1997, but never did.
45 PA mandates excluded issues left for the 
final status negotiations, such as Israeli settlements in the PT, and left the PA with “no control 
over its borders, overall security, currency, fiscal or monitory policy [or taxation], natural 
resources, or [de jure] foreign policy. It did not determine citizenship and its trade is either with 
Israel or passed through its ports.”
46 
                                                      
38 Palestinian National Authority: Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, “International 
Assistance to the Palestinian People (2005-2007)” (hard copy only, May 2008). 
39 Ecu refers tor European Currency Unit(s), predecessor of the euro. 
40 European Commission, Communication on EC Support to the Middle East Peace Process, COM(93) 
458 final, Brussels, 29 September 1993 [cited 22 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://aei.pitt.edu/4300/. 
41 Maria Gianniou, “The European Union’s Involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: An Active 
Paradigm of European Foreign Policy?” (paper presented at the European Consortium for Political 
Research: 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Bilgi University: Istanbul, 21-23 September 
2006): 8. Available from http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-istanbul/virtualpaperroom/045.pdf. 
42 Asseburg, “European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach”: 
5. 
43 NGO MONITOR Reports, A Clouded EU Presidency: Swedish Funding for NGO Rejectionism. 29 
June 2009 [cited 27 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/ 
a_clouded_eu_presidency_swedish_funding_for_radical_ngos. 
44 PASSIA, Diary (Jerusalem: 2009): 383. 
45 PLO Negotiations Affairs Department: Fact Sheets, Israel’s Violations of the Oslo Agreements [cited 
23 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=facts_nego_f16p. 
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A year later, on 24 September 1995, the Oslo II Agreement (aka Taba or Interim Agreement of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) was signed in Washington D.C. by Arafat and Rabin and 
witnessed by President Clinton as well as by representatives from Russia, the EU, Norway, 
Egypt and Jordan. The Agreement called for the creation of the PLC – which would consist of 
88 members
47 – and the launch of the Palestinian general election process (presidential and 
PLC), which would be staged 22 days after Israeli withdrawal from a selected number of areas 
in 1996.
48 Oslo II deliberately postponed issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli 
settlements, security, water and borders for the final status negotiations expected to start by 
1997. What it did, instead, was outline “the second stage of Palestinian Autonomy”
49 by 
dividing the West Bank into three zones (and Hebron into two zones) and extending the PA’s 
responsibilities in certain areas to cover both civilian and security-related issues, in what could 
be outlined as below.
50 
•  Area A, with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security control, mounting to 4% 
of the West Bank.
51 It includes Gaza and Jericho and major Palestinian populated centres – 
Nablus, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin and Hebron;
52 
•  Area B, with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction, but overriding Israeli internal security. There 
are 450 Palestinian towns and villages that fall into this zone, which makes up 25% of the 
West Bank;
53 
•  Area C, with Israeli civil and overall security control over the remaining 71% of the West 
Bank, including uninhabited locations, Israeli settlements, military installations, the Jordan 
Valley and bypass roads between Palestinian parts (see Figure 2); and 
•  Hebron, which is split into two security zones, H1 and H2. Palestinian police controls the 
smaller area, H1, while Israel remains in control of the larger area, H2, where Jewish 
settlements and many historic sites important to both Jews and Muslims are located.
54  
Shortly after signing the Agreement, Prime Minister Rabin, an agent of change in the peace 
process, was assassinated by an Israeli Jewish extremist on 4 November 1995, an event that 
shocked the world and marked an end to an era of regional cooperation. 
                                                      
47 Central Elections Commission – Palestine, Results and Statistics: 1996 General Elections [cited 24 
Oct. 2009]. Available from http://www.elections.ps/template.aspx?id=54&sndx=5. 
48 Set up in 1995, at the time of the first elections in 1996 the PLC consisted of 88 members, which were 
further expanded to 132 members at the time of the second elections in 2006. 
49 PASSIA, Diary: 337. 
50 MEDEA (European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation), Oslo Peace 
Process [27 Feb. 2010]. Available from http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=155. 
51 William Zartman and Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremeniuk, Peace Versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- 
and Backward-Looking Outcomes (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 130. Available from 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip054/2004028743.html . 
52 Since 1997, there has been a Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH). This is a 
civilian observer mission, made up of six states (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Italy, Denmark and 
Sweden). It has a mandate renewable every six months with the agreement of both parties. Its reports are 
not public but rather conveyed to the Palestinian police forces and the Israel Defence Force with 
questions requesting clarifications. 
53 Zartman and Kremeniuk, Peace Versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking 
Outcomes: 130. 
54 Sari Hanafi, “Spacio-Cide: Colonial Politics, Invisibility and Rezoning in Palestinian Territory”, 
Contemporary Arab Affairs 2, no. 1 (January–March 2009). Available from 
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/50605__908133156.pdf. 10 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
Figure 2. Map of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
 
Source: OCHA (United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Reference Map WB and Gaza 2006, October 2005 [cited 30 Nov. 2009] Available from 
http://www.ochaopt.org/?module=displaysection&section_id=109&static=0&edition_id=&format=html. 
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3.  EU Foreign Policy towards the PT over 15 Years 
3.1  The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995 to 2004) 
Ten years of the Barcelona process has not taken us very far down the road to a 
common area of peace and prosperity. Despite 3 billion euros a year of 
community investment through MEDA and EIB loans, Europe’s border with the 
Mediterranean remains the most unequal border in the world. No other has 
differences of income levels so great in such proximity. 
Extract from European Parliament president’s speech at the 
Euro-Mediterranean summit in Barcelona.
55  
 
Following the aforementioned Oslo II Agreement and in the aftermath of Rabin’s assassination 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona process) was born at the Euro-
Mediterranean Conference on 27-28 November 1995 in Barcelona, under the Spanish EU 
presidency of foreign minister Javier Solana (the Spanish foreign minister at the time as well as 
EU presidency representative). Since its inception, the EMP has been “the EU’s central 
framework in which Euro-Mediterranean relations have been conducted”.
56 Undoubtedly, it has 
also been the EU’s most ambitious, comprehensive, complex and long-term foreign policy.
57  
At the onset of the Barcelona process, the EMP comprised 28 member countries: 15 EU 
member states, and 13 non-EU partners. The partners consisted of 11 Mediterranean members 
(Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, as well as 
the PT), and two non-Mediterranean states (Jordan and Mauritania, the latter being part of the 
Arab Maghreb Union). Among the participating countries, 9 belong to the Arab League 
(excluding Israel, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, with the latter two becoming EU member states in 
the 2004 enlargement). Libya was invited to join but was absent from the initiative, which 
proved adverse for the realisation of the EMP objectives and the establishment of north–south 
good neighbourly relations. While it declined a more recent invitation to join the EMP in 1999, 
Libya has retained its observer status since that time, although that might change in the near 
future. The Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union also participated in the conference.
58 
(See Table 1.) 
 
                                                      
55 EUROMED, 10th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process: President’s Euromed Visits – Tenth 
Anniversary Summit, 27-28 November 2005 [cited 25 Nov. 2009]. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/president/Presidents_old/president_borrell/euromed/en/default.htm#C. 
56 Asseburg, “European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach”, 
4. 
57 Stephen Larrabee et al., “The Barcelona Process and Other Mediterranean Initiatives”, in NATO’s 
Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas (RAND, 1998): 24-26. Available from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR957/MR957.ch2.pdf. 
58 Europa, Summaries of EU Legislation, Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
[cited 27 Oct. 2009]. Available from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ 
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Table 1. EMP, ENP and UfM 
EMP (1995)  ENP (2004)
 d)  UfM (2008) 
EUMS 
a) (15)  NE 
b) (13)*  EUMS (25)  NE (16)**  EUMS (27)  NE (16 + Libya) *** 
Austria  Algeria 
 (AL) 
i)  Austria  Algeria (AL) Austria  Albania (EUPC)
 k) 
Belgium  Cyprus
 e) 
(EUCC)
 j)  Belgium  Armenia Belgium  Algeria (AL) 
Denmark  Egypt (AL)  Cyprus  Azerbaijan Bulgaria  Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(EUPC) 
Finland  Israel  Czech 
Republic  Belarus
 f)  Cyprus Croatia  (EUCC) 
France 
c)  Jordan (AL)  Denmark  Egypt (AL)  Czech 
Republic  Egypt (AL) 
Germany  Lebanon (AL) Estonia  Georgia  Denmark  Israel 
Greece  Malta (EUCC)
 
e)  Finland  Israel  Estonia Jordan  (AL) 
Italy  Mauritania 
(AL)  France  Jordan (AL)  Finland  Lebanon (AL) 
Ireland  Morocco (AL) Germany Lebanon (AL) France  (Libya) (AL)
 f), g) 
Luxembourg  PT (AL)  Greece  Libya (AL)
 g)   Germany Mauritania  (AL) 
Netherlands  Syria (AL) Hungary  Moldova  Greece Monaco 
Portugal  Tunisia (AL)  Italy Morocco  (AL)  Hungary  Montenegro (EUPC) 
Spain Turkey  Ireland  PT (AL) Italy  Morocco  (AL) 
Sweden    Latvia  Syria (AL)
 f)  Ireland  PT (AL) 
UK 
h)   Lithuania  Tunisia (AL)  Latvia  Syria (AL) 
    Luxembourg Ukraine  Lithuania  Tunisia (AL) 
   Malta    Luxembourg  Turkey (EUCC) 
    Netherland    Malta   
   Poland    Netherland   
    Portugal    Poland   
    Slovakia    Portugal   
    Slovenia    Romania   
    Spain    Slovakia   
    Sweden    Slovenia   
    UK    Spain   
        Sweden   
        UK 
h)   
a) EUMS = EU member states 
b) NE = Non-EU partners 
c) Italics are used for actors who are on/close to the Mediterranean Sea 
d) Unlike the EMP & UfM, the ENP does not have to do with proximity to the Mediterranean Sea 
e) Two EMP-NEs: Cyprus and Malta, which became EUMS in 2004 
f) Shaded areas: ENPs for Belarus, Syria and Libya are not yet ‘activated’ (i.e. no Association Agreement in force), 
but that might change in the near future 
g) Libya has only been an observer since 1999 
h) The UK is considered on the Mediterranean because of its overseas territory, Gibraltar, in the Sea 
i) Members of the EMP/ENP and 10 of the UfM are also members in the Arab League (AL) 
j) EUCC = EU candidate country 
k) EUPC = EU potential candidate country 
* Europa, Summaries of EU Legislation, “Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” [cited 27 Oct. 2009] 
Available from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_ 
partner_countries/r15001_en.htm.  
** European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy, “Documents: Who Participates?” [cited 27 Oct. 2009] 
Available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/index_en.htm.  
*** European Commission, External Relations, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” [cited 27 Oct. 2009] Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm. 
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This “ground-breaking Euro-Mediterranean Conference for the first time brought together 
foreign ministers of the EU member states with their colleagues from the Maghreb, the Middle 
East and Cyprus, Malta and Turkey”.
59 The conference “established the EMP and laid the 
foundations of a process designed to build a comprehensive multilateral framework for dialogue 
and cooperation in the three dimensions [or baskets] of the partnership”:
60  
•  the political partnership, which comprises boosting security and stability, supporting 
democracy and good governance, encouraging the rule of law and human rights;  
•  the economic and financial partnership, which includes development and infrastructures, 
reforming fiscal policies, managing (free) trade, taxation and investments; and  
•  the partnership in cultural affairs, which encompasses supporting civil society and the 
media, empowering women and youth, fostering peace education and cultural exchanges.
61  
To assess the success and effectiveness of the EMP, each of these ‘baskets’ is examined in 
detail in the following sections. 
3.1.1  Political dimension  
The first objective of the EMP has been to establish a common area of peace and stability 
underpinned by sustainable development, democracy, rule of law and human rights, through a 
reinforcement of political, security and societal dialogue and a set of financial and structural 
instruments.
62 The Partnership is multilateral in nature but also entails a complementary, ‘loose’ 
bilateral dimension, unlike the strictly bilateral aspect of the ENP that followed it. In fact, the 
Union has agreements in force with most of the countries that were invited to join, particularly 
Association Agreements with most of the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries 
individually.
63 These agreements reflect the general principles governing the   
new Euro-Mediterranean relationship, although they each contain characteristics specific to the 
relations between the EU and each Mediterranean country.”
64 
Under the EMP, an Association Agreement has been concluded with three Maghreb countries 
(Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria) and three Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon) (see 
Table 1 above).
65 In addition, the ‘preferential’ arrangements for Israel, introduced by the 1975 
agreement, were upgraded and incorporated into the 1994 Association Agreement. This resulted 
in a steady growth in trade relations between the Community and Israel; at the same time, it 
provided space for the EU – under the framework of the CFSP – to have an increasing role in 
                                                      
59 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: 275. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 European Commission External Relations, The Barcelona Process.  
63 The Association Agreement is the equivalent of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Cotonou Agreement with African Caribbean and 
Pacific countries (ACP). 
64 Europedia, EU’s Relations with Mediterranean and Middle East’s Countries [cited 20 Nov. 2009]. 
Available from http://europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/7/25/05/index.tkl?term=association%20 
agreement&s=1&e=20&pos=9. 
65 Among the five other EMPs, Algeria extracted itself from the Association Agreement after it entered 
into force, Syria did not activate its Association Agreement, Mauritania has signed the Cotonou 
Agreement instead as an ACP, and Turkey switched and joined Cyprus and Malta in the Stabilisation and 
Association Process catered for EU candidate countries. The latter two countries joined the EU in 2004.  14 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
the peace process.
66 Likewise, an Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation 
(1997) was also been signed with the ‘interim’ PA, which is still in force.
67 
According to the EU, “these Agreements are meant to provide for a regular political dialogue, 
the step-by-step establishment of a free trade area, provisions on the right of establishment, 
services, competition rules and free movement of capital, strengthening of economic 
cooperation on the broadest possible front complemented by social, cultural and financial 
cooperation”.
68 Although this might have been the EU’s plan at first, the stalemate in the final 
status negotiations between Israel and the PA – which were expected to reach a solution by 
1999 – led to the second intifada in 2000, followed by an increase in violence, consequently 
hampering progress and deadlocking the peace process. Therefore, the second intifada 
constitutes a critical juncture, where we witness a switch in the EU’s role and effectiveness 
concerning the PT. It is important to take this event into consideration when analysing the EU’s 
policies on the ground, by looking at the situation before and after the 2000 landmark (Box 1). 
Box 1. Overview of EU–PT relations under the EMP before the second intifada (1995-2000) 
* Four months after the Interim PA was established, Palestinians held their first general elections 
on 20 January 1996 (which the EU helped monitor) and elected Yasser Arafat as president.
69  
The post of special representative/envoy of the EU  to the Middle East was created in 
November 1996 to give presence, visibility and political impetus in the region to the EU’s efforts 
to help bring about a final settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; Miguel Ángel Moratinos 
from Spain was appointed the first EU special representative (1996-2003).
70  
* Concluding months of tense negotiations, the Hebron Protocol was signed on 17 January 
1997, detailing the Israeli redeployment from the city.  
This agreement was reinforced with two letters of assurances: one from the US, and the 
other from the EU, carefully negotiated by the EU special representative and signed by 
the EU Presidency. It was the first letter of its kind that the EU signed and marked a new 
quality of commitment by pledging to use all its political and moral weight to ensure that 
all the provisions in the agreement already reached will be fully implemented.
71 
* As negotiations on the interim issues (e.g. further withdrawals of Israeli forces, prisoner 
releases, settlement stop and economic issues) remained in stalemate, in April 1997 the EU 
special representative “proposed and negotiated with both parties a ‘Code of Conduct’ in order to 
introduce mutually acceptable guiding principles to resume and conduct the talks. This Code 
aimed at paving the way for an approach which combines both security concerns and political, 
economic and cultural policies based on the pursuit of mutual prosperity and welfare.” 
                                                      
66 Europa, “Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with the State of Israel” (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, 21 June 2000). Available from http://www.delisr.ec.europa.eu/english/content/ 
eu_and_country/asso_agree_en.pdf. 
67 European Commission External Relations, Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
68 Europedia, EU’s Relations with Mediterranean and Middle East’s Countries. 
69 Central Elections Commission – Palestine, The 1996 Presidential and Legislative Elections, 1996 [12 
Dec. 2009]. Available from http://www.elections.ps/admin/pdf/Results_election_1996.pdf. 
70 EurLex, “Joint Action of 25 November 1996 Adopted by the Council on the Basis of Article J.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union in Relation to the Nomination of an EU Special Envoy for the Middle East 
Peace Process” (25 November 1996). Available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc? 
smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31996E0676&model=guichett. 
71 Council of the European Union, Middle East Peace Process [cited 30 Nov. 2009]. Available from 
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Box 1. cont’d  
The adoption of the Code was supported by both the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers; yet, at the last minute, it was not signed because of disagreements between the parties 
concerned.
72 
* Shortly after the Code of Conduct negotiations failed, the Interim Association Agreement on 
Trade and Cooperation, between the European Community and the PLO, “for the benefit of the 
PA”, was signed on 24 February 1997 and entered into effect on 1 July 1997. This Agreement, 
still in effect today, has the primary objective “to establish the conditions for increased 
liberalisation of trade and to provide an appropriate framework for a comprehensive dialogue 
between the EU and the PA. These measures are aimed at integrating the Palestinians into the 
Euro-Mediterranean Process.”
73 
* The Wye River Memorandum was signed in October 1998. “This Memorandum brought an 
end to the nineteen-month impasse in the peace process since the Hebron Protocol was signed.” It 
was meant to implement the earlier negotiated Interim Agreement of 1995, and was brokered by 
the US at the Wye River Conference Center, in Maryland, where the EU special representative 
was present and “actively monitored the negotiations”.
74 
* Owing to the active diplomacy of the EU and the EU special representative, and following the 
Wye River Memorandum, the Gaza airport was finally opened on 24 November 1998 to flights 
that allowed Palestinians, for the first time, to establish a direct outlet to the rest of the world.
75 
The EU Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, entered into force on 1 May 1999 and amended 
the Treaty of the European Union. It was designed to change the EU’s decision-making process 
and to make the EU more democratic by giving additional power to the European Parliament.
76 It 
also marked the real beginning of the CFSP as it introduced a new instrument: the common 
strategy. “Common strategies are implemented by the Council, in particular by adopting joint 
actions and common positions, in fields where member states have important interests in 
common.”
77 
* By 4 May 1999, the Interim Agreement (Oslo II) between Israel and the PA was scheduled to 
end; with no other agreement in negotiation, the PA was losing legitimacy and credibility fast.
78 
“President Arafat, based on his right to self-determination, wanted to declare the independence of 
a Palestinian state. But mainly owing to the reassurances received by the EU through the Berlin 
Declaration of March 1999 he was persuaded to postpone this.” This Declaration, adopted by the 
EU heads of state, represents a landmark of EU diplomacy in the context of its CFSP.
79 In it the 
EU, for the first time, explicitly stated, 
                                                      
72 Ibid. 
73 European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy, Country Report – Palestinian Authority of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, SEC(2004) 565, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, 12 May 
2004: 3 Available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/pa_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf. 
74 Council of the European Union, Middle East Peace Process. 
75 Ibid. 
76 European Commission, “How the European Union Works: Your Guide to the EU Institutions”: 6. 
77 Europa, Glossary, Common Strategy (CFSP) [cited 30 Nov. 2009]. Available from 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/common_strategy_en.htm. 
78 Khalil Shikaki, “A Palestinian Perspective on the Failure of the Permanent Status Negotiations” 
(Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), January 2004): 15. Available from 
http://www.pcpsr.org/strategic/occasionalpapers/failurepsn.pdf. 
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Box 1. cont’d  
the reasoning behind the politics it had already been pursuing since the beginning of the 
Oslo process: the establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful, and sovereign 
Palestinian state next to Israel as the best guarantee for the security of Israel as well as 
for Israel’s recognition as a respected partner in the region. This would include a fair 
solution to the issue of Jerusalem and a just and agreed solution to the Palestinian 
refugee question. The position was complemented by the 2002 Seville Declaration, in 
which the EU stressed that the 1967 borders should be the basis for a final Israeli–
Palestinian settlement, if necessary with minor adjustment agreed to by the parties.
80 
* The Wye River Memorandum, signed a year earlier, was only reluctantly and partially 
implemented. This made a re-negotiation of the terms necessary, which was made possible by the 
election of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (Labour Party). The Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement 
No. I was to restore Palestinian self-rule over the Gaza Strip. Still, the Palestinian side was only 
willing to sign the renewed Agreement on 4 September 1999 upon receiving letters of 
reassurance from both the US and the EU.
81 
* In accepting the above EU proposal, in September 1999, the US collaborated with the EU 
presidency (of Finland) and the EU special representative in organising a Gathering of 
Peacemakers in New York, within the margins of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting. 
This was done with the participation of most Gulf, Middle Eastern and Maghreb foreign ministers 
to support the Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement.
82 
When the Amsterdam Treaty came into force, the post of high representative of CFSP was 
formally activated in October 1999. Javier Solana was appointed to this post (until November 
2009), replacing Jürgen Trumpf (of Germany), the first secretary-general of the Council of the 
European Union and CFSP since September 1994. Simultaneously, Solana was also appointed the 
secretary-general for the Council of the European Union. 
During the Helsinki European Council summit, on 10-11 December 1999, the European security 
and defence policy (ESDP) was adopted (the 2001 Nice Treaty, which came into force in 2003, 
made it permanent). The ESDP became one of the spearheads of the EU’s CFSP, covering 
defence and military aspects. Around the same period, the PSC/COPS was established. The latter 
is an advisory body to the Council of Ministers on issues concerning the ESDP. It prepares 
coherent EU responses to crises with the help of the European Union Military Committee (the 
highest military body set up within the Council) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (the body responsible for the civilian dimension of the ESDP).
83 
* The breakthrough of Sharm El-Sheikh I – which was made possible with the newly elected 
Israeli government, the secretary-general and the high representative of CFSP (Solana) and the 
EU special representative – encouraged Russia, co-sponsor of the Peace Process, to call for the 
Re-launch of the Multilateral Track in Moscow, which had remained in impasse since 1996. 
On 1 February 2000, the Ministerial Steering Group of the MEPP formally re-launched the track, 
and based on a proposal from the EU special representative, started a serious review of past 
performance with a view to improving structure and effectiveness.
84 
                                                      
80 Asseburg, “European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach”: 
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81 Council of the European Union, Middle East Peace Process. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Council of the European Union, ESDP Structures and Instruments [cited 30 Nov. 2009]. Available 
from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=EN. 
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Box 1. cont’d  
Impressed by the success of the Oslo secret negotiations, some Palestinian officials sought to 
repeat it with the permanent status negotiations. Starting in May 2000, Ahmed Qurei (or Abu 
Ala), the second-highest ranking person in the PA hierarchy (given his position at the time as the 
PLC speaker), began negotiations with Israeli counterparts through the Stockholm secret 
channel. Americans were not directly involved, but were briefed by the participants and senior 
American diplomats who attended. Mahmoud Abbas (the second-highest ranking person in the 
PLO hierarchy) and the official Palestinian negotiators were kept in the dark. But soon the press 
leaked the news, bringing this unofficial channel to a halt, although not before damaging relations 
between Arafat, Abbas and Qurei (senior advisers on the peace process).
1 
The EU decided to adopt a four-year Common Strategy for the Mediterranean in June 2000, 
under the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty. By doing so, it hoped to make the Barcelona 
process more coherent, “action-oriented and result driven”.
1 
In a desperate attempt by US President Clinton to broker a peace deal while still in office, under 
the insistence of Israeli Prime Minister Barak and against the reluctance of PA Chairman Arafat, 
the  Camp David summit was convened on 11 July 2000. “The summit ended on July 25, 
without an agreement being reached. At its conclusion, a Trilateral Statement was issued defining 
the agreed principles to guide future negotiations.”
1 
* An asterisk before a paragraph indicates meetings, elections and treaties in which the EU was involved. 
 
Both sides have accused the other for the failures of the Camp David talks, but it seems that the 
international diplomats and the academic community have levelled the blame at Arafat. The 
general consensus is that Ehud Barak has offered unprecedented compromises to the 
Palestinians on final status issues including the West Bank and Gaza Strip borders, East 
Jerusalem as the capital of the new Palestinian state with sovereignty over Muslim holy sites, 
and reconciliation between Palestinian demands and Israeli concerns over the refugees’ right of 
return in the form of compensation. This last aspect, however, is said to have been the breaking 
point of the negotiations. Several contradictory views still persist on this and other matters. 
Some authors, such as Noam Chomsky,
85 claim that Arafat refused the deal because of the 
border issues, which would have left the West Bank divided into cantons; others, for instance 
Alan Dershowitz,
86 say that the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees was the real breaker of 
the negotiations.
87 In the same vein, still other political scientists and politicians, such as 
Norman Finkelstein
88 and Shlomo Ben-Ami,
89 respectively argue that the Palestinian position 
was expected because the perspective of both sides on the international laws guiding the 
negotiations differed greatly.  
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Be that as it may, domestic challenges to Ehud Barak’s government were growing ever stronger. 
It was in this environment that the leader of the Israeli parliamentary opposition, Ariel Sharon, 
planned his controversial visit to the Al-Haram Al-Sharif compound (‘Temple Mount’ for the 
Jews). “His stated objective was to assert Israeli control over the holy place in response to 
Barak’s willingness to compromise that control.”
90 True enough, on 28 September 2000, 
Sharon’s strategically-timed stopover put the last nail in the coffin of the peace process,
91 
insofar as his provocative act constituted the catalyst that sparked the eruption of the second 
intifada on 29 September 2000.
92 It was exploited by both Arafat as well as frustrated young 
activists demanding a shift in Palestinian strategy to one resembling Hizbullah’s violent 
methods in southern Lebanon, which seemed effective in driving the Israeli Defence Forces 
(IDF) out of the country in June 2000.
93  
The political context and the Israeli–Palestinian–international community dynamics have 
changed dramatically since the outbreak of the second intifada. More than ever before, the EU–
Palestinian Interim Association Agreement has proven extremely difficult to implement, while 
the increasing violence at the local and global levels has been detrimental to any attempts at 
revitalising the agonising peace-process debate. Nonetheless, to better appreciate the switch in 
EU policies that followed the 2000 intifada, a chronology of events that occurred after the first 
critical juncture is presented in Box 2.  
In the subsections that follow, three of the parameters of the EMP’s political dimension (i.e. 
security and stability, democracy and good governance, and the rule of law and human rights) 
are examined. Examples for each parameter demonstrate the switch in EU policy that occurred 
around the first critical juncture during the EMP: the second intifada in 2000.  
Box 2. Overview of EU–PT relations under the EMP after the outbreak of the second intifada  
(2001-04) 
* At the Sharm El-Sheikh II meeting that took place on 17 October 2000, “the SG/HR and EU 
Special Representative, representing the EU, were present and contributed to the success of this 
gathering that tried to define ways to end the violence between Israel and the Palestinians. The EU 
maintains that the understandings reached there are still valid and provide a good base for 
disengagement and an end to incitement.”
94 
On  20 January 2001, George W. Bush was sworn in as the 43
rd president of the US, 
beginning the first of two consecutive terms (2001-09). Although no longer in the White House, 
former US President Clinton continued to work towards international peace, among other 
international issues, through the Clinton Global Initiative.
95 
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* Building upon the ‘Clinton parameters’ outlined at the end of 2000, the Taba talks that took 
place on 21-27 January 2001 were 
one of the most successful efforts of both parties [under leadership of Prime Minister 
Barak and Chairman Arafat] to close negotiations on the issues that were already 
addressed in Camp David in July 2000. Never before was so much agreement achieved 
on issues such as land, refugees, Jerusalem, settlements and security. On behalf of the 
EU, the EU Special Representative was asked by both parties to listen to the points of 
agreement and disagreement. In February the EU General Affairs and External Relations 
Council stated that renewed negotiations should start from this point.
96 
Yet, “the two sides were too weak to take bold steps” and “most Israelis, as the polls showed, 
viewed the talks with suspicion believing that it was not legitimate for Barak to engage in last 
minute diplomacy of this nature”.
97 
Ariel Sharon’s victory in the Israeli elections of 6 February 2001 brought an abrupt end to a 
process that had started nine months previously. Some say “it was this event that killed the ability 
of the two sides to capitalise on the achievements produced so far”.
98 Still, one could argue that no 
Israeli government could deliver on the Oslo promises (or Clinton’s parameters) without risking 
an Israeli division, or even worse, a civil war. In that sense, Sharon actually did what no other 
Israeli leader could: he unilaterally evacuated about 8,500 Israeli settlers and 5,500 Israeli soldiers 
from the Gaza Strip in August/September 2005. This move put an end to four decades of Israel’s 
‘permanent military presence’, although Israel retains control of the airspace, seafront, crossing 
points and all vehicle access – including deliveries of food and other goods.
99  
* With the assistance of the government of Greece, on 4 April 2001, the EU’s high representative 
for CFSP (Javier Solana) and the EU special representative managed to broker the first high-level 
meeting in Athens between Israelis and Palestinians, after Sharon became Israel’s prime minister. 
The aim of this event was to resume a dialogue on how to address the political, security and 
economic issues in order to end the vicious cycle of violence raging in the PT.
100 
Starting in 2001, there was a sharp increase in Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel, for which 
Hamas and its associates often claimed responsibility. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the US there was an escalation in the number of deadly suicide attacks in Israel, 
reaching a peak in 2002, and decreasing gradually until today. The total number of suicide bomb 
fatalities in this period varies, depending on the source, but ranges between 480 and 542 dead. It is 
not explicitly mentioned how many of those killed were suicide bombers and how many were 
victims (either civilians or Israeli security forces), or whether the perpetrators came from the West 
Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem or Israel. Also, the sources do not indicate exactly how many of 
those killed were Jews and how many were Israeli or Palestinian Arabs; however, it is clearly 
demonstrated that the majority of the victims of these attacks were Jewish civilians.
101 
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The euro entered circulation on 1 January 2002 replacing the former ecu – introduced in 1979 
as an internal accounting unit – at a ratio of 1:1. Since that change, all EU funding and aid to non-
EU countries, including the PT, has been made in euros.  
The then-acting Saudi regent, Crown Prince Abdullah, brokered the Arab Peace Initiative, which 
was endorsed by the Arab League during the 28 March 2002 Beirut summit (where only 10 out 
of 22 heads of the Arab League states where present, and President Arafat was discouraged by the 
Israeli government from attending). Arab leaders collectively offered Israel recognition of its right 
to exist and a normalisation of diplomatic ties in exchange for its complete withdrawal from Arab 
lands captured in and since 1967. The Arab Peace Initiative called for  the restoration of a 
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and a ‘fair solution’ for the Palestinian 
refugees. Although the plan was supported by US President George W. Bush and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, it was opposed by factions in both the Arab and Israeli camps. Syria opposed 
use of the term ‘normalisation’. Palestinian groups such as the armed wing of Hamas, Islamic 
Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade rejected the Saudi plan outright, while the Israeli 
government just ignored it and never formally accepted or rejected it.
102 
The Quartet on the Middle East was established in Madrid in June 2002 by the Spanish Prime 
Minister José María Aznar, as a result of the escalating conflict in the Middle East. In the same 
month, President George W. Bush floated the idea of a roadmap to peace in the Middle East 
under the supervision of the Quartet, with the UN expected to look into the security and financing 
of this mission.
103 Comprising the US assistant secretary of state, the Russian foreign minister’s 
special Middle East representative, the EU high representative for CFSP and the UN Middle East 
envoy, the Quartet is chaired by the Quartet’s special envoy (a post that was first set up in May 
2005).
104 
It has been argued that the Quartet “was formed by the Bush administration to provide European 
states with a formal peacemaking role in exchange for gaining their support for the Iraq war”.
105 
Following the violent outbreaks of 2001-02, the Israeli government started the construction of 
the Israel–West Bank separation wall/barrier in June 2002.
106 This physical barrier is being 
erected with the stated objective of separating Israel and the West Bank to prevent the 
uncontrolled entry of Palestinians into Israel. In most areas, the barrier entails an electronic fence 
with dirt paths, barbed-wire fences and trenches on both sides, at an average width of 60 metres. 
In others, a wall six to eight metres high has been erected. Some Israelis attribute the gradual 
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reduction in the number of suicide attacks to the barrier.
107 This claim is contested as there are 
many Palestinians living in East Jerusalem who have easy access to the rest of Israel to implement 
attacks if they so desired. Instead, it seems that Israeli intelligence has become better at preventing 
the attacks, while suicide bomb attacks have declined and been replaced by rockets launched 
directly from the Strip into Israel – a trend beginning with the Israeli military disengagement from 
Gaza (2005) and continuing with Hamas’s ascendance to power (2006) and their takeover of Gaza 
(2007).  
Arafat was under siege for the second time in the PA compound (Muqata’a) in Ramallah 
starting September 2002 (the first time being April-May of 2002).
108  
The Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, came into force on 1 February 2003 and helped put forward 
ways for the EU to work more effectively even after the new wave of member states joined in 
2004.
109 
The ENP was first outlined in a Commission Communication on Wider Europe on 11 March 
2003, followed by more developed strategy papers (including the EU–PA Interim Association 
Agreement and Action Plan shortly after the 2004 enlargement).
110 
On  19 March 2003, Abbas became  the first Palestinian prime minister;
111 the office was 
established by the PA under the amended Palestinian Basic Law, which was accepted by the PLC 
the same day.
112  
The second Iraq war started on 20 March 2003.
113 
* The official text of the latest version of the roadmap was published by the US government, 
under EU pressure, on 1 May 2003, ironically, this occurred on the same day that George W. 
Bush announced the “end of major combat operations” in Iraq. The roadmap was the result of 
a joint US–European initiative.
114 And it is “a ‘performance-based’ and ‘goal-driven’ plan, with 
clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps 
by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building 
fields, under the auspices of the Quartet”; in short, “a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict”.
115  
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On 4 May 2003, a final draft for a permanent Palestinian constitution was presented, but it has 
not yet been adopted. Instead, the Palestinian Basic Law functions as a temporary constitution for 
the PA until the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
116 
A Middle East Peace summit took place on 4 June 2003 at Aqaba, where both Prime Ministers 
Sharon and Abbas adopted the roadmap under the auspices of President Bush.
117 
A Joint Committee meeting of the Interim Association Agreement was held in Ramallah on 26 
June 2003. “This meeting was the second of its kind and the first in over three years. The meeting 
discussed ways in which to facilitate trade between the EU and the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
means to fully implement the Interim Association Agreement, including provisions related to the 
Palestinian reform programme.”
118  
On 14 July 2003, Marc Otte was appointed the new EU special representative for the MEPP. In 
his mission statement, he declared  
our objective for the Middle East is clear and well established: a two-state solution, with 
Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian state living side by 
side within secure and recognised borders, as well as a solution to the Israeli-Syrian and 
Israeli-Lebanese conflicts. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict lies at the heart of the 
problems in the region as a whole and must be resolved in order to bring about a 
comprehensive Middle East peace. This is vital not only for the region but also for us. 
We, in the European Union, are close neighbours, on the doorstep of the Middle East.
119 
Abbas resigned as prime minister on 6 September 2003. “During his six months in office, he 
has been in a power struggle with Arafat, particularly over control of Palestinian security 
forces.”
120 After his resignation, he led the Executive Committee of the PLO.
121 
The EU branded Hamas a terrorist organisation on 11 September 2003.
122 
Since  October 2003,  Iran plus the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) have engaged in 
negotiations to ensure that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons.
123 
The Geneva Initiative for peace should be pointed out, although it does not have the status of an 
accord. Initiated by Prof. Alexis Keller (at Geneva University in 2002), it was further developed 
by the former Israeli minister of justice, Yossi Beilin and the former Palestinian minister of 
information, Yasser Abed Rabbo. It was signed in Geneva on 1 December 2003. 
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More completely than the roadmap, it solves the thorny problems of Jerusalem, the settlements 
and refugees. The Geneva Initiative has received strong support from the Swiss government and 
many European powers. Even the US, which first perceived it as a competitor to the roadmap, 
eventually supported it. Yasser Arafat approved of it but stressed that it was not an official text. 
But the Geneva Initiative encountered fierce opposition from the government of Ariel Sharon and 
to date it remains without results. “The media stressed nevertheless at the time that future peace 
agreements would necessarily be similar to this one.”
124 
The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) was established in Naples on 3 
December 2003. It is the parliamentary expression of the EMP/UfM, which provides input and 
support for the development of the EMP and the implementation of the ENP. Although it adopts 
resolutions, addressed at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, they are not legally binding. The 
EMPA Bureau consists of four members, two of whom are appointed by the national parliaments 
of the Mediterranean countries, one by the European national parliaments and one by the 
European Parliament.
125 
The  European security strategy was published on 12 December 2003. Drafted under the 
guidance of Javier Solana, the high representative for the CFSP, “this document was meant to 
define the security challenges confronting the Union and to provide a common sense of purpose to 
the EU in shaping the international system. The rationale behind the Union’s strategy is to bring 
together its soft power and its emerging hard power to make multilateralism more effective.”
126 In 
this strategic doctrine, “the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict occupies a primordial 
place”.
127  
* An asterisk before a paragraph indicates meetings, elections and treaties in which the EU was involved. 
a. Security and stability 
The West Bank city of Hebron has been a place of violent clashes between Muslims and Jews 
since the time of the British Mandate. The city houses the Tomb of the Patriarchs (or in Arabic 
Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi) – a shrine where, tradition holds, the ancient Prophet Abraham is 
buried, making it sacred to both Muslims and Jews.
128 Owing to the “massacre in the Al-
Ibrahimi Mosque on 25 February 1994, when the Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein shot and 
killed 29 Palestinians, the UN Security Council called for an international presence in Hebron”. 
Since 1997, and based on the above-mentioned Hebron Protocol under the Oslo process, there 
has been a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). This is a civilian observer 
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mission, made up of six states, namely Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and 
Turkey. It has a mandate renewable every six months upon agreement from both Israel and the 
PA. Its reports are not public but rather conveyed to the Palestinian police forces and the IDF 
with questions requesting clarification.
129 
Since April 1998, the EU special representative, on behalf of the EU, has initiated and chaired 
the  Joint EU–Palestinian Security Committee. This initiative recognises that Palestinian 
security services require assistance on issues that would be devolved to them following 
negotiations at the political level. Since then, the EU has taken practical steps to help improve 
the security sector of the PA by providing expert training with the aim of upgrading Palestinian 
security forces.
130  
Accordingly, under the EMP “at least ten largely autonomous police and security forces” have 
operated in the PA, including civil police, criminal investigation, preventive security, general 
intelligence, and military intelligence. In addition, prisons, known as reform and rehabilitation 
centres, have come under the police directorate. “The various security forces operate their own 
detention and interrogation centres, access to which has often been denied to outside bodies or 
international human rights organisations.” Still, efforts to unify the various Palestinian national 
security services have been unsuccessful over the period because a central element of Arafat’s 
power structure was his direct control over the various PA security organisations.
131 Although 
he made some changes (due to mounting external pressure), such as unifying the “three internal 
security organisations – Civil Police, Preventative Security, and Civil Defence – under an 
empowered Ministry of the Interior” with a stronger prime minister’s office, Arafat never 
loosened his grip on the security sector. Indeed, the newly appointed minister of interior and 
prime minister did not “enjoy any authority in their respective positions”, while “all other 
security reforms remained cosmetic and were part of Arafat’s effort to deflect political pressure 
and secure his position”.
132  
Nevertheless, with the eruption of the second intifada, there was a substantial rise in the number 
of attacks carried out by Palestinians against Israelis; this persuaded Israel to take back control 
of security and weapons in the PT, fearing that the PA was turning a blind eye to these acts of 
aggression. Therefore, “[b]etween 2000 and 2002, Israel almost completely destroyed the 
security infrastructure of the PNA”.
133 Consequently,  
towards the end of 2003, there were increasing signs of a deterioration of law and order 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Central commands have been de-connected from 
local units, and forces are unable to move, due to closures. Police and Preventive 
Security commanders have often been unable or unwilling to carry out arrests of 
criminals and armed militants, since this often results in armed confrontations with 
radical groups or large family clans.
134  
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In its Presidency Conclusions in 2004, the European Council thus urged the PA to “take 
immediate, decisive steps to consolidate all Palestinian security services under the clear control 
of a duly empowered Prime Minister and Interior Minister”. The Council reaffirmed its 
readiness to support the PA in taking responsibility for law and order and especially in 
improving its counter-terrorism efforts.
135 
b. Democracy and good governance 
In this subsection we come to the crux of the controversy surrounding the EU’s foreign policy – 
more precisely, democracy promotion in the PT. Here is where we can clearly demonstrate what 
Michelle Pace refers to as the “paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the 
Mediterranean...and the limits of EU normative power”.
136  
Let us begin with some clarification of what good governance means, as the term could signify 
different things to different people. According to UN official sources, “governance means: the 
process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not 
implemented)”, be it at the international, national or local levels. Good governance, on the other 
hand, has eight major characteristics: it is participatory, consensus-oriented, representative and 
accountable, transparent, responsive to societal needs, effective and efficient, equitable and 
inclusive, and follows the rule of law. “It assures that corruption is minimised, the views of 
minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard 
in decision-making.”
137 To contextualise the different aspects of ‘good governance’ we need to 
deal with “people’s perception of and interaction with the state”.
138 For example, do they 
participate in elections or do they think their officials are legitimate?  
Depending on how modern democracy is defined, the link between the concepts of democracy 
and good governance can become weaker or grow stronger. In its most narrow sense, according 
to specialists in comparative politics, democracy is “electorally based with some allowance for 
freedoms of press and association”.
139 But in a broader sense, according to modernisation 
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theorists, a full democratic political system has the following characteristics: constitutionalism, 
decentralisation of power, fair and free competition over power positions, open political 
participation, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for minority rights, checks and balances, 
basic freedoms of press and association, a vibrant civil society and civil equality. (A few other 
elements that are generally present, but not as conditions, include respect for human rights, a 
free market economy, economic prosperity and secularism.)
140 So to ensure full democracy, we 
need good governance. Nonetheless, democracy is not a fixed concept that we can explain in 
few words; instead, it is a flexible set of social and political preferences and behaviours, with 
different arrangements depending on time and location, leading to “a matrix of potential 
combinations that are differently democratic” (e.g. facade or full democracies).
141 Hence, states 
are said to be more democratic than others depending on how many of the democratic elements 
they have internalised into their systems over the years.  
There are three major fallacies to watch out for, though. The first is what Adrian Little calls 
“democratic piety”, where the problematic, underpinning assumption is that democracy is a cure 
for violent conflicts.
142 This finds its root in the democratic peace theory, based on the 
reductionist observation that democracies have not engaged in full-fledged wars against each 
other for the past 60 years.
143 The second is what authors refer to as ‘electoralism’, where 
democracy is practiced in its most narrow sense – holding regular and fair elections, while 
neglecting other political realities and conditions for success – and is expected to prevent 
(internal and external) violent conflicts.
144 The third is what democratisation scholars denote as 
“democracy promotion without democracy consolidation”, where democracy is short-lived 
because of the lack of robust democratic political institutions and appropriate institutional 
designs.
145 
It becomes tricky when Europe tries to stretch its Western (liberal) concept of democracy to 
other places in the world, which have different tempos and interpretations of democracy that fit 
their own traditions and cultures. Some officials have refuted the claim that the EU is 
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‘imposing’ its form of democracy on others, including Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU’s 
external relations commissioner: 
The EU does not believe in imposing reform, but we do want to do all we can to 
support the region’s own reform quite simply because we believe that democracy, good 
governance, rule of law, and gender equality are essential for stability and prosperity. 
This has always been an objective of the Barcelona Process and it is the cornerstone of 
the Neighbourhood Policy.
146  
This statement nevertheless raises some concerns for a couple of reasons. First, it takes for 
granted ‘Western’ values (i.e. democracy and gender equality) as universally accepted public 
goods, which might not be true in places with different cultures and perspectives. Second, from 
this statement it seems obvious that democracy is not the end goal of EU foreign policy, but 
merely the means to further the EU’s own interests in stability and prosperity in the region 
(which are expected to boost the EU’s own objectives of security and reducing migration into 
Europe).
147 This telling quotation leaves us wondering about the EU’s normative position. Is the 
EU a true normative actor or just a realist one disguised in normative clothing
148 or both: 
normative as much as its own interests permit? It also demonstrates to us how some norms, such 
as democracy, have been instrumentalised and used by Western decision-makers to achieve 
their foreign policy objectives. This logic proves problematic, as it undermines not only 
democracy as a desired political system, but also the credibility of actors who try to promote it 
abroad. 
Even if European officials insist they are not trying to enforce their Western values in the 
MENA region, the EU’s own treaties tell a different story:  
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union reaffirms that the EU ‘is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’. Article 49 of 
the Treaty of the European Union stresses that respect for these principles is also 
required of those countries wishing to join the European Union. In addition, Article 7 
introduces a mechanism designed to punish serious and persistent violations of human 
rights by EU Member States. This mechanism was further strengthened by the Treaty 
of Nice, concluded in December 2000. It also extended the objective of promoting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms to development cooperation and to all other 
forms of cooperation with third countries in accordance with Articles 177 to 181 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Communities (EC Treaty).
149 
Without going into a deep philosophical debate, the assumption here is that the EU has tried (for 
its own perceived, collective interests) to export its own set of democratic values and rules to 
Palestinian society without paying sufficient attention to all the necessary conditions, resulting 
in a fragile democracy. Then, when it was not satisfied with the results of the elections, the EU 
has stopped short of consolidating democracy in the PT, thus leading to a democratic reversal 
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and the collapse of the newly established, democratic political institutions (e.g. the PLC). In 
turn, among Palestinians, there are some local actors who accept – or even admire – the 
occidental version of democracy and work (effectively or ineffectively) to implement it, while 
other actors challenge ‘Western democracy’ or at least its ‘social liberal’ notion (passively or 
aggressively) as they have their own set of priorities and vision of democracy. From here we go 
on to support these assertions. 
1995-2000 
The first attempts to democratise the Palestinian system, by establishing a separate ‘legislative’ 
branch held accountable by the people, go back to the Declaration of Principles in 1993. But the 
details of the PLC (or Palestinian Parliament) were ironed out in the PA Interim Agreement 
(Oslo II) in 1995. The PLC, which cannot dismiss the president, who is elected directly by the 
people in parallel elections, is set up as a unicameral body elected from 16 electoral districts – 
11 in the West Bank and 5 in the Gaza Strip. For the first legislative period 1996-2006, the 
parliament had 88 members elected by the electoral district system (with a quota from the outset 
in some districts for religious minorities, namely Christians and Samaritan Jews).
150 Two 
parliament buildings were set up: one in Ramallah and the other in Gaza (the latter was 
destroyed by the IDF during the first days of the air assault on Gaza in December 2008).
151 
During the PA’s early era under Arafat, the building in Gaza was considered the main 
headquarters; later, the PLC building in Ramallah became the headquarters.  
Four months after the Palestinian Elections Law was passed, with the help of a temporary 
Palestinian Central Election Commission (CEC), and pressure from Israel and the 
international community, the new PA held its first general elections (presidential and PLC) in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip on 20 January 1996.
152 Hamas boycotted both elections but did 
not try to cancel them, a decision, which it proclaims had little to do with accepting or rejecting 
democracy at the time and more to do with the fact that it had different political priorities from 
the PA and did not trust in Arafat’s good governance. This view is put by Mahmoud Zahar, a 
founding Hamas member: 
We have never been against elections as a principle. We boycotted the 1996 elections 
because they were held within the framework of the Oslo Agreement, which we were 
against because it proved nothing to us Palestinians, and because the administration of 
the PA apparatus was completely in the hands of Yasser Arafat. He cheated and 
fabricated in the 1996 elections.
153  
Registered voters totalled a million Palestinians. The elections were monitored by 519 
international observers (including from the EU) and more than 2,000 local observers.  
The Commission started providing financial support to the PA for the preparation of 
the elections as early as April 1994. This assistance amounts to a total of 7.5 [million 
ecus] (US$9 million), which have been used for preparing the electoral law, drawing 
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the electoral districts’ boundaries, setting up the election administrative machinery, 
training election officers, conducting a public civic education campaign, providing 
technical equipment, etc. Furthermore, the EU has committed 10 [million ecus] 
(US$12 million) out of the Community budget to cover the cost of the observation 
operation [which included approximately 300 observers].
154  
In their final mission report, election observers deemed the elections fair and democratic. With 
voter turnout of 71% and 97% of the votes cast being valid, Arafat was elected the first 
president of the PA and 88 PLC members were elected (both for a term of four years) – of 
whom 55 were Fatah members, 5 were women, 6 were Christians and 1 was a Samaritan Jew.
155 
There was no prime minister, only a speaker of the PLC.
156  
At the Palestinian municipal level, the last elections were held in 1976. It is notable that in this 
context Israel wanted to discredit the PLO representatives, so it allowed the municipal elections 
hoping that Palestinian personalities distant from the PLO would emerge. The results were quite 
the opposite, and the majority of those who won were very close to the PLO leadership. “At this 
point the Israeli authorities resorted to the exile or imprisonment of the elected mayors”, and 
since then no elections have taken place in the Palestinian localities other than those involving 
syndicate ones. The return of the PLO in 1994 developed a new dynamic, particularly with 
holding general elections for the first time in 1996. “But at municipal level, things were handled 
differently” as municipal councils in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were being nominated, 
“according to a system of regional and tribal balancing inserted in the Palestinian political 
system”. Still, the issue of municipal elections remained at the centre of Palestinian internal 
political and social struggles and demands. Thus, the first law passed by the newly elected PLC 
in December 1996 (slightly amended in 1997) was precisely on local communities and 
elections. Arafat, however, who feared Hamas taking over the leadership of municipal councils, 
“preferred to shelve this question for political reason[s]”. Hence, municipal nominations 
continued until Arafat’s death.
157 
2000-04 
In September 2000, as the Palestinians started to lose hope after five years of fruitless 
negotiations of achieving their dreams of an autonomous state, the second intifada erupted. As 
the office of the prime minister was not yet established (that came later in 2003), the lack of any 
real party opposition in the absence of Hamas from parliament and local councils, and the fact 
that the second Palestinian general elections (expected in January 2000) never took place 
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because of the second intifada, Arafat reigned almost until his death in 2004. He did so in a 
centralised manner with little accountability to the people, declining legitimacy and scarcely any 
checks and balances on his actions. The EU, which had invested hundreds of millions in 
establishing the legal framework, building democratic institutions and monitoring the 
Palestinian elections, was not pleased with these results. But instead of pushing for an end to the 
Israeli occupation, which was the basis for Arafat’s remaining legitimacy and the violent second 
intifada, and demanding more democratic reforms by using its economic leverage over the PA, 
the EU opted to focus most of its energy on democratic reforms while ignoring the ongoing 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Arafat tried to implement more reforms through the ‘100 Day Plan 
of the Palestinian Government’, but that proved too little too late. It is interesting to note that 
while Arafat’s reforms were seen by the international community as insufficient, Arafat was 
attacked domestically for yielding to the West’s demands without ending the occupation or 
assuring a Palestinian state.
158 
Once Brussels and Washington lost confidence in Arafat as a ‘peace partner’ they began to look 
for an alternative. From here the idea of establishing a strong prime minister’s post, which 
would curtail the powers of the president, became paramount – especially since they hoped 
Mahmoud Abbas as prime minister would be a better democratic force in the PT than Arafat. 
Following the Iraq war in the spring of 2003, pressure mounted on the US to release the final 
version of the roadmap for Palestinian–Israeli peace, as agreed upon by the Quartet. The 
Americans, on the other hand, insisted they would not release the document until the 
Palestinians had amended their Basic Law (or temporary constitution) in 2003, established a 
parliamentary democracy with a prime minister’s office and chosen a prime minister who would 
begin working on reforming Palestinian institutions as stipulated in the roadmap. Arafat was not 
happy with being marginalised but had little choice but to cede to these demands as he had been 
held under siege at the Muqata’a (or compound) in Ramallah since early 2002 by Israel.
159 
Accordingly, the office of the prime minister was established in March 2003, giving more 
power to Prime Minister Abbas. Other ministerial reforms followed suit; for example, in April 
2003, Nabil Shaath became the PA’s first foreign minister. In May 2003, a final draft for a 
Permanent Palestinian Constitution was presented, but it has not yet passed as it awaits the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Instead, the Palestinian Basic Law functions 
as a temporary constitution for the PA.
160 The Basic Law was passed by the PLC in 1997 and 
was ratified by Arafat only in 2002. It has subsequently been amended twice: the political 
system introduced a prime minister in 2003 and a new Elections Law in 2005. “The 2003 
reform was comprehensive and affected the whole nature of the Palestinian political system, 
whereas the 2005 amendment was only minor and affected only a few paragraphs.”
161 
Abbas vowed in June 2003 at the Aqaba summit to end terror and chaos, and to work for 
reforms and a negotiated peace with Israel (pledges he reiterated as president in 2005).
162 But as 
a result of a continual power struggle with Arafat, particularly over control of Palestinian 
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security forces, Abbas was so frustrated that he resigned from his post after six months, in 
September 2003.
163 Arafat was ruling again, and according to Israeli conventional wisdom, 
“never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity [to reform]”,
164 while Abbas led the PLO’s 
Executive Committee until Arafat’s death a year later; Abbas then succeeded Arafat as 
president.
165 
Compared with other Arab states in the Middle East, the Palestinian experience with functional 
democracy (through local unions, universities and syndicate elections) goes back to the mid-
1970s. Conversely, their experience with national-level democracy has not only been very 
recent and short-lived, but also a façade because it has been very centralised and lacking any 
real political opposition around which a consensus can be built. It has not held the leaders 
sufficiently accountable to the public and it has missed a vibrant civil society at a level deeper 
than the elite stratum, which was created in a top-down approach under the EU’s influence.  
c. Rule of law and human rights: The judiciary and fundamental freedoms  
Upon its establishment, the PA set about putting in place a new judicial system. Besides the new 
and unified PA laws, which apply to the entire Palestinian Territory (excluding East Jerusalem 
which is under Israeli law), the West Bank relies on civil (or French-influenced Jordanian) law, 
while the Gaza Strip relies on common (or British-influenced Egyptian) law. Some Ottoman and 
Israeli laws and decrees continue to be applied in both areas, as well as laws used by the PLO 
prior to the establishment of the PA. 
In an exceptional EU–US effort in the summer of 1999, with financing provided by the EU, the 
Council on Foreign Relations managed to complete an unprecedented, detailed and thorough 
evaluation of Palestinian public institutions – including the courts. Recommendations were 
outlined on how best to improve institutional performance, thereby enhancing respect for the 
rule of law and transparency. To that end the EU special representative, together with Henry 
Siegman from the Council on Foreign Relations, initiated the Independent Task Force on 
Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions. This project brings together high-level EU and 
US officials, who periodically review and oversee this institutional reform effort while regularly 
consulting with senior officials from the PA and international institutions.
166  
The key legal bases for the PA judicial system are the Basic Law and the Judicial Authority 
Law, which are supposed to provide for separation of powers (i.e. executive, legislative and 
judiciary) and regulate the formation of courts, the delineation of jurisdictions and enforcement 
of judicial rulings. Between 2001 and 2003, the PA embarked on several reform steps to 
improve the Palestinian justice system, which helped consolidate the legal status of the 
judiciary.
167  
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3.1.2  Economic dimension  
The economic and financial basket aimed at promoting shared economic opportunity through 
sustainable and balanced socio-economic development, including the gradual establishment of a 
free-trade area.
168 Under the EMP framework, the EU has allocated a budget envelope for the 13 
partners, including the PT. The Cannes European Council (26-27 June 1995) agreed to set aside 
€4.4 billion for the financial assistance of its partners in the form of Community budget funds 
for the period 1995-99, of which €3.4 billion was under the MEDA-I programme and €330.5 
million was actually distributed by 2000 (see Table 2). This was supplemented by €4.8 billion 
of EIB assistance in the form of loans of a similar amount and bilateral financial contributions 
from the member states. Starting in 2000, the amount of funds allocated by the EMP amounted 
to a budget envelope of €5.3 billion for the period 2000-06 (although the funds committed in 
2000 for the EMP’s activities reached €1 billion, the total payments did not exceed €472.2 
million). Most of these funds were committed within the framework of the MEDA-II 
programme and were again supplemented by EIB loans (the former with €5.3 billion mostly 
from the EC budget and the latter with a lending mandate of €7.4 billion from its own 
resources).
169 These funds were in addition to other budget lines, such as EIDHR-I for 
democracy and human rights issues (allocating €106 million per year for the period 2000-06).
170 
The MEDA programme is the principal financial instrument of the EU for the implementation 
of the EMP (1995-2007). The programme offers technical and financial support measures to 
accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the Mediterranean partner countries 
and is implemented by DG EuropeAid.
171 During the period 1995-99, some 86% of the 
resources allocated to MEDA-I were channelled bilaterally to the partners (including the PA) 
under the National Indicative Programmes. Around 12% of the resources were devoted to 
regional projects (e.g. the EuroMeSCo network of foreign policy institutes and the Short and 
Medium Action Plan for environmental priorities) under the Regional Indicative Programmes, 
while 2% was set aside for technical assistance offices.
172  
Table 2. EU funds for the Mediterranean partners of the Barcelona process 
EU-committed funds 
(before the second 
intifada) 
1995-99 
a) 
EU-committed funds 
(after the second intifada) 
2000-06 
b) 
EU-committed funds 
(after the 2006 PLC 
elections) 
2007-13 
c) 
MEDA-I 
€3.4 billion 
MEDA-II 
€5.35 billion 
+ 
€600.3 million in 2003 
for additional committed funds 
ENPI 
€12 billion 
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Table 2. cont’d 
EIB 
€4.8 billion 
EIB (FEMIP since 2002) 
€6.4 billion 
+ 
€1billion for transnational projects 
EIB (FEMIP) 
€8.7 billion 
d) 
 
EIDHR-I 
€106 million in 2005-06 
e) 
EIDHR–II 
€1.1 million 
  
Development Cooperation 
Instrument 
€16.9 billion 
a) European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Cooperation and 
Development: The MEDA Programme. 
b) Ibid. 
c) European Commission External Relations, European Neighbourhood Policy: Funding. 
d) European Investment Bank, 2007 FEMIP Conference: Financial Transfers from Migrants in the Euro-
Mediterranean Area – a Lever for Development. 
a) Europa, Summaries of EU Legislation, European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
(2000-2006). 
Notes: It has been extremely challenging to obtain reliable data since there is a high level of discrepancy 
between figures provided in different documents issued by the EC and available in the public domain. When 
confronted with that situation the document most recent in date prevailed over previous documents. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
In 2000, MEDA-I was upgraded to MEDA-II and the EIDHR-I was introduced; both operated 
during the period 2000-06. MEDA-II aimed at speeding up project implementation, which were 
accompanied by an increase in partners’ ownership and better follow-up mechanisms. Owing to 
devolution, decision-making was mainly in the hands of actors on the ground accompanied by 
EU monitoring missions.
173 On the other hand, EIDHR-I grouped together the budget headings 
for the promotion of human rights, democratisation and conflict prevention, which generally had 
to be implemented in partnership with NGOs, regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, OECD and the 
Council of Europe) and international organisations.
174 Similarly, the EIB launched a new 
initiative in October 2002: the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership 
(FEMIP), which brought together the full range of services provided by the EIB to assist in the 
economic development of the Mediterranean partner countries.
175 
The official website of the Commission states that the EU’s “financial assistance to the 
Palestinians dates back to 1971 when the EU made its first contribution to the budget of the 
UNRWA (mainly funds refugees’ health and education). Since then, the EU has become the 
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largest provider of development aid in the PT”,
176 and with its member states the biggest donor 
to the Palestinians.
177 The site also states that 
since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, the PA has been a full and 
equal partner in the EMP. In this framework, an Interim Association Agreement 
governing bilateral relations between the EU and the PA was signed in February 1997. 
The agreement provided for budgetary support, institution-building, technical 
assistance, humanitarian aid, and bilateral trade relations. Since the outbreak of the 
second intifada (September 2000), the implementation of the Interim Association 
Agreement has become more and more difficult.
178  
In addition, one of the declared and often-repeated commitments of the Barcelona process is 
“the establishment of a free-trade area by 2010 and increase in economic, financial and 
technical co-operation and other forms of support for economic development of the partners’ 
economies”.
179  
It is worth noting that the economic policy of the EU in the PT is not always appreciated by 
Israel. Although the EC provides Israel with ‘preferential’ treatment because it is more 
developed economically and technologically in comparison with other EMP partners, the EU 
still maintains some level of consistency between its foreign and economic policies. Thus, the 
Association Agreement with Israel only covers Israeli territories as per the pre-1967 borders and 
not the disputed territories, to which the separate Interim Association Agreement of 1997 with 
the PA applies.
180 That is not to say that the EU always sticks to this principle as it in fact 
imports, to a small but symbolic degree, some food and drink items produced in Israeli 
settlements in the PT. These products might even be falsely labelled as coming from Israel and 
hence are illegally exempted from tariffs imposed on settlements’ products, in violation of the 
Israeli–EU trade agreement.
181 In February 2010, however, “the European Court of Justice has 
ruled that Israeli goods made in Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank cannot be 
considered Israeli”. This means that goods made in the West Bank’s Jewish settlements cannot 
benefit from a trade deal giving Israel preferential access to EU markets, even if these 
companies are employing Palestinians who are not allowed to work in Israel.
182  
Development funds and assistance aid to the Palestinians have been provided through different 
financial instruments and institutions, along various thematic lines. Depending on the time and 
location, the EU has used, inter alia: MEDA, EIB loans, ENPI and the EIDHR, with the latter 
being a means to channel money for democracy and human rights projects in a way that did not 
require acquiescence from the PA. The EU has also used FEMIP, the South Regional 
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Programmes, the Neighbourhood investment facility, cross-border cooperation, the Temporary 
International Mechanism (TIM), the Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-
Economique (PEGASE), the Humanitarian Emergency Response Fund (HERF), NGOs, 
UNRWA, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and ECHO 
support human rights, elections, the peace process, food aid and security, humanitarian aid and 
other objectives.
183 (See Figure 3.) These instruments are further discussed as we make the 
distinction between before and after the two critical junctures: the second intifada in 2000 and 
the Hamas parliamentary victory in 2006. 
Figure 3. EU financial instruments to the PT from 1995 to 2010 
 
Note: This figure does not include other EU funds for PT/Palestinian targeted programmes: Development 
Cooperation Instrument, People-to-People (before 1998) and Partnership for Peace (since 1998), 
UNRWA (refugees, education, health, etc.), European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), and 
ESDP missions in the PT (EU Police Mission Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support 
(EUPOL COPPS) and EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah). 
 
At the beginning of 2001, Israel withheld its financial transfers to the PA in response to the 
second intifada – a sum estimated at between $650 and $750 million by September 2002, based 
on UN figures.
184 With the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, aid to Palestinians shifted 
from mainly serving peace and the state-building agenda to mitigating the immediate effects of 
Israel’s military response to the outbreak of the uprising. Thus, there was a precipitous shift 
from development aid to humanitarian aid. In realising that its focus on economic development 
and institution-building is not possible in the absence of a real peace process, the EU and its 
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member states shifted their focus to “alleviating the humanitarian situation, preventing the 
collapse of the PA, and reforming its institutions”.
185 (See Box 3.)  
 
Box 3. Overview of EU–PT economic aid relations 
From 1995 to the end of 2006, “the EU committed approximately €2.66 billion in assistance to the 
Palestinians”, in the form of MEDA-I & II and EIDHR-I grants and EIB loans.
186 From 1995 to 
1999, MEDA-I committed €3.4 billion.
187  
At the 1998 Washington ministerial donor conference  to support the MEPP and the PT’s 
development, the EU pledged a further €400 million for the period 1999 to 2003. But because of 
the intifada and rising emergency needs, this amount was exceeded. The “MEDA-II programme 
has allocated €5.350 million for the 2000-2006 period”.
188 
There was positive gross domestic product (GDP) growth per capita in the PT of about 6% a year 
during 2003-05, but real GDP per capita has never recovered the levels registered before the 
outbreak of the 2000 intifada.
189 (See Figure B3.1.)  
Figure B3.1 PT annual growth rate per capita (1995-2006) 
 
Source: UN Data, GDP Annual Rate of Growth (World Bank Estimates). 
From 1994 to the end of 2002, the EU had committed approximately €1 billion in grants and 
loans, and a further €500 million in contributions to UNRWA. On top of that, bilateral EU 
member-state assistance is estimated to amount to €2.5 billion during the same period.
190  
Based on Official Development Assistance figures, from 2000-07, the EC allocated €2.4 billion to 
the Palestinians. Indeed, in the period 2000-04, the average annual EC support amounted to €245 
million.
191 (See Table B3.1.) 
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Table B3.1 EU committed funds for the PT before & after the second intifada and after the PLC 
elections
 
EU-committed funds 
for PT 
(before the second 
intifada) 1995-99 
a) 
EU-committed funds for PT 
(after the second intifada & 
before the 2006 PLC elections)
2000-06 
EU-committed funds for PT 
(after the 2006 PLC elections) 
2007-13 
MEDA-I 
~ €111 million 
b) 
MEDA-II 
€522 million 
c) 
ENPI 
€654 million 
d) 
EIB 
~ €600 million 
EIB (through FEMIP) 
~ €240 million 
e) 
EIB (through FEMIP) 
€45 million 
f) 
 
EIDHR–I 
€2.5 million 
g) 
EIDHR–II 
€4.4 million 
h) 
   
TIM  
(Mid 2006 –2008) 
€373 million 
i) 
  
PEGASE  
(since 2008) 
€409.2 million 
j) 
a)  These figures are an approximation from the Palestinian National Authority: Ministry of Planning and 
Administrative Development, Directorate General of Aid Management and Coordination: EC Donor Profile 
[cited 1 Dec. 2009]. Available from http://db.mop.gov.ps/DonorSectorProfile.asp?donorid=4&datefrom=01/
01/1980&dateto=31/12/2009&dyear=1980&dyeart=2009&gl=0. 
b) UNISPAL (United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine), European Parliament Resolution 
on MEDA and Financial Support to Palestine – Evaluation, Implementation and Control. 21 June 2007 [cited 1 
Dec. 2009]. Available from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.nsf/2ee9468747556b2d85256cf60060d2a6/
7abdc950e26ea27c85257328005207b9?OpenDocument. 
c) Ibid. 
d) Europa, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI): Funding 2007-2013. 
e) UNISPAL (United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine), European Parliament Resolution 
on MEDA and Financial Support to Palestine – Evaluation, Implementation and Control. 
f) The currency conversion from US dollars to euros was done through the website www.xe.com, and the figures 
taken from a hard copy of the Palestinian National Authority, “Interim Briefing on International Assistance to the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory: Prepared for Meeting of the Local Development Forum in Ramallah”. 
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187 European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process [cited 30 Oct. 2009]. Available from 
http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/euromed/partnership.htm. 
188 Europa, Summaries of EU Legislation, MEDA Programme, 2007 [cited 11 Nov. 2009]. Available from 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_
partner_countries/r15006_en.htm. 
189 UN Data, GDP Annual Rate of Growth (World Bank Estimates) [cited 6 Dec. 2009]. Available from 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=CDB&f=srID%3A29921. 
190 Europa, External Relations, The EU’s Relations with West Bank and Gaza Strip: Political Background 
and Economic Development. 2006 [cited 27 Nov. 2009]. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dplc20041202_006/dplc20041202_00
6en.pdf. 
191 Asseburg, “European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach”: 
31. 38 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
Box 3. cont’d  
g) European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy, Country Report – Palestinian Authority of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, SEC(2004) 565. 
h) European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy – Reference Documents, “Progress Reports on 
Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Occupied Palestinian Territory” (23 April 2009). 
Available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_519_en.pdf. 
i) European Commission: External Cooperation Programmes, Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) [cited 1 
Dec. 2009]. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/
occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/index_en.htm. 
j) European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Overview of PEGASE: 
PEGASE and Donor Contributions [cited 1 Dec. 2009]. Available from http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/
en/funding/pegas_documents.htm. 
Notes: It has been extremely challenging to obtain reliable data since there is a high level of discrepancy among 
the figures provided in different documents issued by the EC and available in the public domain. When confronted 
with that situation, the most recently dated document has prevailed over previous one. 
This table does not include other EU funds for PT/Palestinian targeted programmes: the Development Cooperation 
Instrument, People-to-People (before 1998) and Partnership for Peace Programme (since 1998), UNRWA 
(refugees, education, health, etc.), humanitarian & food aid (ECHO), and ESDP missions in the PT (EUPOL 
COPPS and EUBAM Rafah). 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Next, three of the parameters of the EMP’s economic dimension (i.e. aid, development and 
infrastructures; fiscal policy reform; trade, taxation and investment management) are 
considered. Examples for each parameter show the shift in the EU’s economic policy towards 
the PT since the second intifada (2000).  
a. Economic aid, development and infrastructure 
The notions of development and democracy are not only intertwined, but also inherent to the 
Barcelona Declaration. To achieve peace, stability and prosperity, the Euro-Mediterranean 
partners agreed that their goal should be to strengthen democracy and respect for human rights; 
foster sustainable, balanced economic and social development as measures to combat poverty; 
and promote greater understanding among cultures.
192 
Since June 1997, under the auspices of the EU special representative, the EU and Israel have 
held a regular Dialogue on the Palestinian Economy. These exchanges are conducted in joint 
working groups on four topics: 1) the passage of goods and people; 2) the Gaza airport and port; 
3) fiscal and financial issues; 4) labour issues, and medium and longer-term economic 
possibilities. The working groups aim at assisting the implementation of the economic protocols 
between Israel and the Palestinians. This dialogue has at times contributed to easing restrictions 
on moving Palestinian goods and people, increasing the number of legal Palestinian labourers in 
Israel (until the second intifada), providing transparency on Israeli export and customs 
procedures, and assisting the opening of the Gaza airport.
193  
In addition, the European Commission also proposed 500 million ecus in financial aid to 
Palestinians from 1994 to 1998, which was divided mainly between development and 
humanitarian support (e.g. loans and grants that went inter alia to develop hospitals, schools, 
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roads, power plants, water supply and sewage treatment, telecommunications, and Technical 
Assistance Information Exchange – TAIEX).
194  
Indeed, both Israelis and Palestinians explicitly called for the EU to assist on two crucial, final-
status issues: water and refugees. Therefore, the EU special representative established two 
informal EU Task Forces on Water and Refugees (in July 1998), with the aim of first, 
starting to prepare internal options that could inform the EU position on these issues, and 
second, providing assistance to both parties when requested.
195 
Also thanks to the dialogue between the EU and Israel on the Palestinian economy in 1997, and 
the active diplomacy of the EU and its special representative after the Wye River Memorandum 
(23 October 1998), the Gaza International Airport was opened on 24 November 1998 (near 
Rafah on the Egyptian–Palestinian border). It allowed Palestinians to establish a direct outlet to 
the rest of the world for the first time. “The airport is mainly financed by the EU and considered 
a strategic project for economic recovery.”
196 
But since the outbreak of the intifada in 2000, some of the previously established infrastructure 
has been destroyed. For instance, claiming that the Gaza airport was possibly being used to 
smuggle weapons to Palestinians to carry out terrorist attacks on Israel, Israeli forces destroyed 
the airport and rendered it inoperable in December 2001 and January 2002 (and again in 2006 
after Hamas won the elections).
197  
b. Fiscal policy reforms: Conditionality, transparency and anti-corruption 
The European Commission’s financial aid to the Palestinians, proposed in September 1993, for 
the period 1994-98 “was never conditioned by the development of democratic institutions or 
financial transparency”. Yet, conditionality began to emerge through the financial instruments 
of the Barcelona process. “The MEDA programme managed to introduce the element of 
conditionality by arguing that any violation of human rights or of democratic principles would 
immediately entail a suspension of the aid.”
198 At the same time, the Commission pushed the PA 
for more fiscal transparency, “by streamlining all revenues to a single account overseen by the 
Ministry of Finance as well as the parliamentary oversight of the budget”,
199 with the objective 
of addressing the charges of corruption that have plagued the Palestinian party of Fatah.
200 
Although the EU’s conditionality helped increase transparency and reduce corruption, the 
second intifada and the direct, yet unchecked, subsequent EU budget support to the PA reversed 
some of these earlier improvements. Following its announcement of a comprehensive reform 
programme in June 2002, however, the PA has set about tackling shortcomings and improving 
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its overall system of public finances. Some progress has been achieved in the area of financial 
transparency and important achievements have been recognised by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).
201 Nevertheless, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
included the PA for the first time in 2003 with a ranking of 78 out of 133 (higher numbers 
equate to higher levels of corruption). The index polls continued for two more years only – 
ranking the PA at 108 out of 145 in 2004, and 107 out of 158 in 2005. The polls have indicated 
the general perception of a lack of public confidence in Palestinian public institutions.
202 
c. Trade and taxation  
Within the framework of the Oslo process, on 29 August 1994 the Israeli government, together 
with the PLO, signed an Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities. In Article XI on budgetary issues, Israel is expected to collect, on behalf of the 
PA, the customs duties and taxes until the PA establishes its own VAT collection system. These 
revenues amounted to around 60% of the PA budget.
203 
Similarly, the EU signed an Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation with 
the PA in February 1997, which is still in force.
204 But after the outbreak of the intifada in 2000 
and the imposition of closure and curfews within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, implementing 
various aspects of the Interim Association Agreement has been extremely difficult.
205 These 
restrictions would eventually lead to  
high levels of unemployment, a collapse in investment, a fall in exports, and a sharp 
decrease in labour income from Israel. Together with the destruction of infrastructure 
and the collapse in domestic revenue, the Palestinian economy has experienced an 
unprecedented decline since September 2000. GDP per capita fell by more than a 
quarter in 2002, and by the end of 2002, unemployment had reached a level of more 
than 40%, and over 60% of the population were below the poverty line of $2/day.
206  
In addition, in the wake of the second intifada, Israel refused to transfer the VAT money it had 
collected to the PA. Although this was a temporary measure by Israel to push the Palestinian 
government to act decisively to curb the rising numbers of suicide attacks, the EU had to step in 
to avert an economic collapse of the PT with direct budgetary support – which replaced the 
development assistance that had been provided prior to the intifada.
207 
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Yet, following the appointment of a new Palestinian government with a prime minister, and the 
publication of the roadmap, a Joint Committee meeting on the Interim Association 
Agreement was held in Ramallah on 26 June 2003.  
This meeting, which was the first in over three years, discussed ways in which to 
facilitate trade between the EU and the West Bank and Gaza Strip and means to fully 
implement the Interim Association Agreement. There was furthermore an exchange of 
views on PA efforts to strengthen the rule of law, to combat violence, to stabilise 
public finances and to prepare for elections.
208 
3.1.3 Cultural  dimension 
The cultural, societal and human basket has numerous aims. Among these are promoting mutual 
understanding and intercultural dialogue among cultures, religions and people. Here the EMP 
seeks to facilitate exchanges between civil society and ordinary citizens (particularly women 
and youth), and increase the level of reciprocal tolerance and respect for pluralism. It also has 
goals associated with establishing links and networks for the benefit of players in the political, 
socio-economic and cultural spheres, along with disseminating objective and multi-source 
information to the public through independent media outlets.
209 Generally, it is expected to 
address the psychological structure at the (intra-)societal, inter-societal and transnational levels. 
Since 1995, Europe has been progressively building cultural ties with the Mediterranean world – 
including the PT – through the Barcelona process. In the wake of the September 11 attacks 
(2001), the need for intercultural dialogue between the West and the Islamic world 
resurfaced.
210 This aspect has enjoyed increasing importance in the EuroMed partnership in 
recent years. Among the many EuroMed joint actions and cooperation programmes dealing with 
this dimension are the following:
211  
•  EuroMed Audiovisual, encouraging film and artistic talents; 
•  EuroMed Heritage, protecting and introducing cultural heritage;  
•  EuroMed Information and Communication programme, supporting media and journalists; 
•  EuroMed Youth programme, preparing and training young adults for the future; and  
•  EuroMed Gender programme for strengthening the role of women. 
There were repeated calls and ministerial declarations during the first 10 years of the Barcelona 
process – outlined in previous meetings of the EuroMed ministers of culture (Bologna 1996 and 
Rhodes 1998) and the meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean ministers of foreign affairs (Crete 
2003) – to reinforce the cultural dimension of the EMP and foster deeper dialogue among   
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civilisations. But it was not until the 2007 meeting of ministers of foreign affairs (Lisbon) that a 
tangible work plan with a follow-up mechanism was agreed upon, including places such as the 
PT.
212  
There are considerable differences in the intensity of the cultural cooperation between the EU 
and the various Mashreq and Maghreb partners. For instance, when it comes to the EU’s 
cultural and human support to the PT in the past 15 years, all the aforementioned elements 
(dialogue, civil society support, exchanges, etc.) have been tried in an effort to boost the peace 
process. It has been a sporadic effort, however, slow at first and in decline since the second 
intifada and the Hamas electoral victory in 2006. Thus, inconsistency in the implementation of 
programmes within the EuroMed cultural basket, coupled with the lack of effective monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms, has undermined this initiative and limited its outreach and overall 
impact even more than efforts on the other two baskets (political and socio-economic). 
In this section, three parameters of the EMP’s cultural dimension (i.e. supporting civil society 
and the media, empowering women and youth, and fostering peace education and cultural 
exchanges) are addressed. Examples for each parameter demonstrate not only the change in EU 
policy towards the PT since the second intifada (2000), but also the absence of a vision on how 
to involve and influence the societal level in the PT.  
a. Supporting civil society and the media  
The People-to-People programme launched in 1995 (and its successor, the Partnership for 
Peace programme, since 1998) is an EU instrument designed to work jointly with civil society 
organisations in partner countries – including the PT. The programme seeks to build confidence 
and “conflict transformation capacities” to help create the necessary atmosphere for the peace 
process and provide a solid foundation for democracy and good governance. The programme is 
grounded on the assumption that sustainable peace relies on strengthening, as well as increasing, 
direct civil society cooperation based on equality and reciprocity between Palestinian and Israeli 
societies.
 Moreover, People-to-People contacts are expected to make the European perspective 
tangible for both European citizens and the Palestinian population.
213 The programme has called 
for proposals “almost every year” since the start with an annual budget ranging from €5 to €10 
million (80% is the maximum EC contribution). The programme is jointly managed by the 
ECTAO to the West Bank and Gaza, and the European Commission Delegation in Israel and in 
Jordan.
214 In 15 years, around 140 projects have been funded through this initiative. The level of 
participation of civil society organisations in the reforms undertaken in the PT is a strong 
determinant of the attractiveness of the process, as well as the level of public support for these 
changes; nevertheless, engagement remains rather limited and concentrated at the elite stratum 
of society.
215  
Another indicator of a viable democratic community is the number of independent media 
available to the public. EU institutions have aimed at developing the media in the PT in order to 
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foster freedom of expression and democracy building, but these projects remain scarce and 
rather limited. For instance, the Birzeit University’s Media Development Center was founded 
in 1996 as a Radio Training Programme. The University station is unique in the region in so far 
as it broadcasts to the local community with the objective of serving both academics and 
professionals.
216 To further strengthen relations between the media and civic organisations, the 
Media Development Center established the Media Resource Unit in September 1998. This Unit 
became a gathering place for professional journalists, offering services for both Palestinian and 
international journalists working in the region.
217 But not until two years after the outbreak of 
the second intifada was another media-related project established, that being Ma’an Network 
(meaning ‘together’ in Arabic). This non-profit media organisation was founded in 2002 “to 
strengthen professional independent media in Palestine; build links between local, regional and 
international media; and consolidate freedom of expression and media pluralism as keys to 
promoting democracy and human rights”. The Network is a partnership among independent 
journalists throughout the PT, including nine local television stations and nine local radio 
stations. Various European countries, along with the European Commission, helped finance this 
initiative at its different stages of development and continue to do so.
218 Still, more of these 
projects are needed with different partners, to avoid having a restricted cluster of organisations 
monopolising the media.  
On a parallel track, to build trust and cooperation among cultures, the EU–Israel Forum was 
launched in April 2000. The EU political involvement in the MEPP has suffered from 
allegations of pro-Palestinian bias, but according to EU official sources, “[t]his perception 
contradicts reality, since Israel enjoys a privileged relationship with the EU in terms of trade, 
science and political relations”. Thus, to continue developing EU–Israeli relations, while 
showing that “the EU was only pro-peace”, the EU special representative proposed the 
establishment of this Forum for dialogue, which was approved by the Council of Ministers in 
December 1999. Through high-level dialogue, “the Forum aims to improve understanding of 
each other’s complexities through communication between civil societies, business and media 
people from both sides”.
219 
b. Empowering women and youth  
EU support for gender and youth programmes took more time to set up, as they were 
overshadowed by political and economic priorities, in addition to women’s and youth issues not 
being considered the main concern of these traditional societies. For the first 10 years of the 
Barcelona process the impact and scope of these initiatives remained constrained.  
When it comes to Palestinian women in particular there are many indicators to consider, such as 
education and training, health, poverty, economy and employment,
220 violence (domestic or in 
public, at the hands of Palestinian men or Israeli soldiers, be it sexual, psychological or 
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physical),
221 armed conflict, trafficking and prostitution,
222 politics and decision-making, human 
rights and basic freedoms. On almost all of these indicators Palestinian women continue to 
suffer. According to the European Commission’s country report, by 2004  
women accounted for only 13% of the formal labour force, mostly concentrated in the 
services sector such as health and education. Whilst equality of rights has not been 
given highest priority in the past, there has recently been some change in public 
attitudes. Discussions on issues such as violence against women, rape (including 
marital rape and so-called ‘honour crimes’) and women’s shelters have been held and, 
in November 2003, a Ministry for Women’s Affairs was established.
223 
If we focus on the political and decision-making indicator for women, we see that Palestinian 
women have been fighting from at least 2002 for a women’s quota system of 20% minimum of 
PLC seats, which was finally adopted by parliament in 2004. It is also evident that Palestinian 
women’s involvement in politics has definitely increased over the years. Since 1995 and the 
establishment of an Interim PA, women have gained rights to both vote and run for office. “But 
it is not about being in power per se, it is more about having women who can bring [a 
Palestinian] women’s agenda to the table.”
224 
As part of affirmative action towards religious minorities, the PA has set a quota for Christians 
in some districts and a minimum representation for women in the party lists. While the quota for 
Christians has been part of the Elections Law from the time it was originally drafted in 1995, the 
minimum representation for women is a recent development and appears in the newly decreed 
law.
225 Under a new quota system, the minimum number of women deputies will also increase. 
Because of the new quota system, the number of women deputies rose to 17 out of the 132 
parliamentary seats (about 13%), up from its previous total of 5 seats out of 88 (or 6%) since the 
last PLC elections in 1996.
226 
Various Palestinian women’s committees and organisations successfully lobbied governing 
bodies, especially the parliament, to ratify this quota system assuring a minimum representation 
for women in the local councils. But this was not a smooth ride. For example, the PLC ratified a 
quota of 20% minimum representation for women in its first reading, rejected it in its second 
reading, finally adopted it in the third in 2004, but later reduced it to 17%.
227 Still, the de facto 
percentage of women parliamentarians is only 13%. 
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As for youth, the EU set up the EuroMed Youth Programme as a regional initiative within the 
framework of the third chapter/basket of the Barcelona process dealing with social, cultural and 
human affairs. EuroMed Youth I (1999-2001) and EuroMed Youth II (2001-04) were primarily 
run by the European Commission from Brussels. Later they were sub-delegated by the DG of 
EuropeAid to the Youth Unit of the DG for Education and Culture.
228  
The problem with these programmes is that they were both restrictive and too centralised. The 
situation was further complicated for Palestinian youth by the second intifada and the rise of 
regional violence, which did not leave much room for the EU to support their movement in the 
way that had been envisaged earlier.
229 
c. Fostering peace education and cultural exchanges  
Part of the aforementioned Partnership for Peace project is to support local and international 
civil-society initiatives that promote peace, tolerance and non-violence education in the Middle 
East.
230 The programme has been underway since 1998 in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
seeking to contribute to the rebuilding of confidence within each society, between Palestinian 
and Israeli societies, and promoting communication and understanding.
231  
Indeed, it is considered one of the main instruments of the MEPP. “Projects include finding and 
implementing mechanisms for conflict management and educating communities about concepts 
and skills for dealing with disputes and for promoting peace.”
232 The programme also aims at 
strengthening and spreading direct bottom-up cooperation, based on reciprocity between Israelis 
and Palestinians. Generally, an average of “15 projects are selected each year, with a maximum 
duration of 36 months, and EC contributions ranging from €50,000-€500,000”.
233 But because 
of a slow start and the second intifada, the Partnership for Peace programme faced hurdles 
associated with low levels of appeal and logistics (e.g. restriction on movement and an 
asymmetry of actors).
234 
Concerning cultural exchanges, initiatives were also a little late to come about. The EU 
established the Anna Lindh Foundation (headquartered in Alexandria), which contributes to 
these efforts through networks that bring people and organisations from both sides of the 
Mediterranean closer together, with a special focus on youth and dialogue among cultures. 
Given that intercultural coexistence remains one of the major challenges of the 21
st century, the 
Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers’ meeting in Naples in December 2003 agreed on setting 
up this organisation to bring people together as equal partners.
235 
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The Foundation is shared by 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries, having established in its first 
phase of operation a region-wide network of over 2,000 civil society organisations (including 
some in the PT). To fulfil its goals, the Foundation leads regional initiatives in the EuroMed 
space and supports local activities carried out across civil societies that advocate a better 
understanding among people, religions and beliefs, and champion human rights and democracy. 
In doing so, it is a facilitator and an advocate of the participation of civil society in the 
Barcelona process, working to make peace and prosperity possible in the region.
236 
3.2  The European Neighbourhood Policy (2004 to mid-2008) 
The ENP puts this strong commitment to our neighbours into practice. It offers 
our neighbours substantial encouragement and support, if they want it. It is thus a 
partnership. 
Extract from a speech by Benita Ferrero-Waldner on 11 September 2007, Brussels.
237 
The European Commission’s website states that “[t]he European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
was developed in 2004, with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines 
between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability 
and security of all concerned. In this way, it also addresses the strategic objectives set out in the 
December 2003 European Security Strategy.”
238 Still, it is very important to keep in mind the 
failure of the Barcelona process mentioned above to really understand “the EU’s attempts to 
upgrade and ‘rescue’ the EMP through the ENP”, which was presented by the EU on 12 May 
2004.
239 The ENP does not replace the multilateral framework of the EMP, but instead it offers 
a second bilateral track and new financial instruments (ENPI, cross-border cooperation, south 
regional programmes, Neighbourhood investment facility, development cooperation instrument 
and TAIEX) that are expected to complement the Barcelona process. Moreover, “the ENP does 
not aim to open up the prospect of membership to the countries concerned”. As Commissioner 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner puts it, “the ENP is not an enlargement policy. It does not prejudge 
prospects for European countries that may at some future point wish to apply for membership, 
but it does not provide for a specific accession prospect either.”
240 Instead, the policy “seeks to 
provide a means for reinforcing bilateral relations” by strengthening security, stability, 
development and providing better access to the EU’s market.
241 Furthermore, “under the ENP, 
the EU would also seek to encourage human rights, the rule of law and good governance and 
would promote co-operation in fighting terrorism and cross-border crime such as trafficking in 
drugs and human beings”.
242 
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The ENP involves 16 neighbours, building closer ties with 6 new partners from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
243 “The countries involved in the first round are 
Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and the PA. The second ENP round was 
outlined in 2005, when the Commission issued country reports on Egypt and Lebanon as well as 
the Southern Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.” Although Russia is an 
EU neighbour it is not included in the ENP, as EU–Russian relations are covered through a 
separate partnership programme with Moscow (i.e. the Strategic Partnership, which covers four 
‘common spaces’).
244 The ENP does not encompass (potential) candidate countries for EU 
membership such as Turkey and the Western Balkan countries, which fall under the EU’s 
Stabilisation and Association Process.
245 
While multilateral relations between the EU and southern and eastern Mediterranean partner 
countries are conducted through the EMP, “there are considerable differences in the intensity of 
cooperation”.
246 The ENP builds upon existing agreements between the EU and each partner 
country in the framework of the EMP (such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with 
CIS countries or Association Agreements with most MENA countries), while it identifies means 
to materialise its strategies through Action Plans accompanied with conditions and benchmarks, 
and regularly monitors developments through annual progress reports. To date, Association 
Agreements have been negotiated, signed, ratified and enacted with all southern and eastern 
partner countries apart from Algeria (where the Association Agreement was suspended but 
might be activated in the future),
247 Libya (which has been an observer since 1999 but started 
negotiations only in 2008),
248 Syria (where the Association Agreement is not in force but 
negotiations were recently initiated) and Belarus.
249 (See also Table 1 above.) 
As far as the bilateral dimension of EU relations with the south and the east is concerned, the 
basic framework is similar for both groups of countries: Association or Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements, accompanied by national MEDA or TACIS instruments (later ENPI), 
respectively. It also includes political dialogue and negotiations on specific issues (e.g. 
fisheries). Yet, “the most important difference is that, in the Mediterranean, an explicit regional 
dimension encouraging the development of intra-regional initiatives and cooperation in a broad 
range of sectors is included”. A Five-Year Work Programme, adopted in 2005 on the occasion 
of the tenth anniversary of the EMP, identified a series of general and more specific objectives. 
The policy of promoting intra-regional cooperation supplements the ENP bilateral framework, 
while maintaining the three chapters previously defined in the Barcelona Declaration (1995): the 
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political and security chapter; the economic and financial chapter; the social, cultural and human 
chapter; and adding a fourth chapter (or basket) on migration, social integration and justice.
250  
3.2.1  Political dimension  
After the first critical juncture in EU–Palestinian relations, namely the intifada in 2000, 
Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections marked the second critical juncture. Thus, a 
chronological depiction (in Box 4) of the political climate that led to their victory sets the stage 
for the empirical evidence that follows. 
Box 4. Overview of EU–PT relations under the ENP before the Hamas electoral victory (2004-06) 
On 11 March 2004, almost a year after the invasion of Iraq, an al-Qaeda cell operating within 
Spain claimed responsibility for the Madrid train bombings.
251  
Not long after, on 1 May 2004 the EU enlarged for the fifth time, adding at first 10 new 
member states.
252 
The European Commission produced on 12 May 2004 a more developed Strategy Paper on the 
ENP, accompanied by an ENP country report on the PT.
253  
President Arafat became ill in October 2004 and was flown to Paris for medical care. At the time 
of his departure he had been under house arrest in the Muqata’a for over two years. Arafat died 
on 11 November 2004, and was buried in his compound in Ramallah the next day. Mahmoud 
Abbas has served as the PLO chairman ever since.
254 
On  9 December 2004, the European Commission outlined to the Council and the European 
Parliament a proposal on how the EU can work more closely with the PA through an Action 
Plan and new financial instruments (e.g. the ENPI).
255 
On 15 January 2005, Abbas won the Palestinian presidential elections for a four-year term in 
office. While Hamas boycotted these elections, some Hamas officials still congratulated Abbas 
on his win, saying, “we respect the Palestinian people’s choice”.
256 Hamas also started 
participating, and did relatively well, in the local/municipal elections that took place (for the first 
time in the PT) between January and May 2005.
257 
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Box 4. cont’d 
Five days after the victory of Abbas, US President George W. Bush started his second term in 
office on 20 January 2005.  
The Central Elections Commission was established by a presidential decree of the PA issued on 
1 April 2005.
258 
On 4 May 2005, the ENP Action Plan between the EU and the PA was adopted.
259 The Action 
Plan sets ambitious objectives based on commitments to shared values and effective 
implementation of political, economic, social and institutional reforms into two spheres: a) 
structural (constitutional, legislative, public administration, services, judicial and civil); and b) 
economic (budgetary and fiscal transparency).
260 
James Wolfensohn was appointed the first special envoy for the Quartet on the Middle East 
for the disengagement from the Gaza Strip on 31 May 2005.
261 Earlier that month, Alvaro de Soto 
was appointed the UN’s Middle East special coordinator/envoy.
262 
On 7 July 2005, an Islamist website claimed that al-Qaeda was responsible for the London bomb 
attacks that had taken place earlier that day.
263 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Sharon, the Israeli military disengaged unilaterally 
from the Gaza Strip during 16-30 August 2005. This move was endorsed by both President 
George W. Bush and Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative for CFSP, although it faced 
criticism from Israelis and Jewish settlers in the PT, and from the Palestinian and international 
side (because it was a unilateral decision not coordinated with the PA). “Israeli officials have 
agreed in principle to allow foreign inspectors to replace them at the Rafah crossing once 
improvements there are made, but said a final deal will depend on the Palestinians’ ability to stop 
attacks on Israel.”
264  
After succeeding in municipal elections and with Israel’s withdrawal, Hamas started showing 
interest in participating in the upcoming PLC January 2006 elections. In an address to the UNGA 
in New York on 15 September 2005, Sharon warned that “Hamas is a terrorist organisation and 
should not be allowed to participate, and Israel would not cooperate with it”. President George W. 
Bush was leaning towards Sharon’s views, but upon assurances from Abbas of Fatah’s victory, 
the Quartet issued a statement on 20 September 2005, leaving the question of participation to 
the Palestinians and calling on all to cooperate with what the Palestinians decide.
265  
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Box 4. cont’d 
In response to terrorist attacks a fourth chapter on migration was proposed by the European 
Commission on 12 October 2005, in time for discussion on the tenth anniversary of the EMP. 
This plan outlined a strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and 
justice.
266 The work programme set for the following five years envisaged progress towards 
creating an important basis for external cooperation to tackle the region’s challenges, with illegal 
migration, integration and terrorism being the central issues.
267 
On  15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on 
Movement and Access (AMA), including agreed principles for the Rafah crossing (Gaza).
268  
The Five-Year Work Programme of the EMP, marking the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona 
summit, was put forward on 28 November 2005. 
Five days later, the Council of the European Union welcomed the AMA and agreed that the EU 
should undertake the third-party role proposed in the Agreement. Hence it decided to launch the 
EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah crossing point (EUBAM Rafah) to monitor the 
operations of this border. The operational phase began on 30 November 2005. But the Rafah 
crossing point was last opened with the presence of EUBAM Rafah on 9 June 2007, as Hamas 
took control of the Gaza Strip. Since then, the mission has remained on standby (in Ashkelon, a 
nearby Israeli city bordering the Gaza Strip) ready to re-engage in 24 hours and awaiting a 
political solution.
269 The mission includes approximately 70 personnel, mainly seconded from EU 
member states, supported by an EC budget of about €10 million.
270 
The Council also established an EU Police Mission in the PT  (EUPOL COPPS) under the 
European security and defence policy on 14 November 2005. The operational phase began on 1 
January 2006.
271 The mission is based in Ramallah and includes around 70 experts (of which 15 
are local staff, about 20 are officers and the rest are civilians), with an EC budget of around €20 
million.
 The mission has been operating only in the West Bank since Hamas took over control of 
the Gaza Strip in June 2007.
272  
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Box 4. cont’d 
Disappointment overshadowed the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, which was 
held on 27-28 November 2005 in Barcelona.
273 It had become clear to all the partners involved 
that the Barcelona process had failed in accomplishing its goals, including putting an end to the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, creating a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade zone, opening up ‘fortress’ 
Europe to Mediterranean products, and achieving tangible progress in social as well as economic 
aspects of development in the region. 
A Jerusalem hospital announced on 4 January 2006 that Prime Minister Sharon had suffered 
a stroke. Ehud Olmert became acting prime minister of Israel – as the new leader of the Kadima 
party, which Sharon had founded on 21 November 2005 and led very shortly after leaving the 
Likud party. Sharon underwent several operations and has remained in a long-term care centre in 
a comatose state since 6 November 2006.
274  
On 25 January 2006, Hamas participated (as the ‘Change and Reform’ party) for the first time 
in Palestinian parliamentary elections and won a clear majority (74 seats to 45 of the ruling 
Fatah party), which stunned everyone, including the US, the EU, Fatah and Hamas themselves.
275 
 
Hamas’s electoral victory undoubtedly changed the landscape for all the actors involved. As the 
second critical juncture in the EU–PT relations it deserves a closer examination. Hence, an 
overview of the transformation of the political situation is given in Box 5, as the background to 
EU policies in the region from this time forward. 
 
Box 5. Overview of EU–PT relations under the ENP after the Hamas electoral victory 
(2006 mid-2008) 
On 26 January 2006, the day after the elections, the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) 
stressed that the elections were as democratic, free and fair as possible under occupation.
276 That 
same day a statement was issued, outlining for the first time the Quartet’s three conditions for 
engaging with Hamas: renounce violence and disarm, recognise Israel’s right to exist and respect 
previous agreements between Israel and the PA.
277 The Bush administration immediately declared 
that “there would be no recognition, no dialogue and no financial aid for a Hamas-led PA until 
Hamas complied” with those three conditions, while the EU followed suit, calling for total cut-off 
of foreign aid to Palestinian institutions.
278  
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Box 5. cont’d 
The US, the EU, Canada and other countries acted on their earlier threats after the Hamas victory 
and froze financial assistance to the PA once Hamas formed its government (without Fatah 
members) on 29 March 2006. Israel also suspended the transfer of $55 million in monthly VAT 
to the Hamas-led government – revenues that are collected on behalf of the PA, constituting a 
third of its economic income.
279  
Sharon’s illness and absence posed a serious challenge for his newly created party. But on 28 
March 2006, the Kadima party won a stunning majority in the Knesset elections and on 6 April 
2006, Ehud Olmert became the new prime minister of Israel.
280  
After a year of service, James Wolfensohn, the special envoy to the Quartet on the Middle East, 
resigned on 30 April 2006 over lack of progress (and probably over the Quartet’s boycott of the 
newly elected Hamas government).
281 
On 6-7 May 2006, hundreds of Palestinians demonstrated in Gaza and the West Bank, demanding 
payment of their wages. Tension between Hamas and Fatah increased with the “economic 
squeeze” on the PA.
282 
By early June of 2006, the 16-month truce between Hamas and Israel was over.
283 Soon after, 
on 25 June 2006, Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was kidnapped by Hamas forces and taken to Gaza 
where he remains, while negotiations on prisoner release and exchange continue with Israel.
284 
On 28 June 2006, the IDF carried out rescue operations to free Shalit, but did not succeed in its 
mission and instead destroyed Gaza’s power plant and major bridges.
285 
From 12 July to 14 August 2006, the Israel–Hizbullah war took place in Lebanon. Despite the 
massive destruction Lebanon endured during the battle, the results were seen widely “as 
disastrous for the Israeli army”.
286 The war, according to the Israeli government, was a response 
to a series of kidnappings and killings carried out by Hizbullah forces on Israeli soldiers at the 
borders. Whether that is true or other motives existed, such as flexing Israeli military muscle in 
front of Hamas and Hizbullah and their primary supporter, Iran, remain unproven speculations. 
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Box 5. cont’d 
What is certain is that at the start of the war, the EU’s high representative for CFSP called on 
Israel “not to enter into a logic of war, even as a response to actions that are provocations”.
287  
On 10 October 2006 a first Eurobarometer special report on the ENP showed that Europeans 
believe encouraging and supporting reforms in neighbouring countries will bring benefits for the 
EU’s neighbours in terms of economic and social development as well as good governance. EU 
citizens tend to have a positive perception of relations with neighbouring countries (68%) and to 
believe that cooperation with these countries will bring mutual benefits. The vast majority 
consider that EU assistance to neighbouring countries can help to extend peace (70%) and 
democracy (77%) beyond the borders of the Union. There are, however, some (45%) who have 
concerns that their own country’s peace and stability could be endangered by promoting reforms 
in neighbouring countries.
288 
On  4 December 2006, the European Commission proposed to strengthen the ENP. The 
document offered some examples of where the ENP already brings visible changes and 
improvements, taken from concrete actions and programmes conducted in a variety of areas.
289 
The EU went through the second phase of its fifth enlargement, adding two new members: 
Romania and Bulgaria on 1 January 2007, bringing the total number of EU member states to 
27.
290 
On 9 February 2007, an Agreement between Fatah and Hamas was brokered in Mecca, which 
was expected to end weeks of factional fighting in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 
Palestinians had hoped the Mecca understandings would bring a halt to a year-long international 
embargo against the Hamas government, by forming a national unity government with ministers 
from all parties represented in parliament. Israel and the US reacted with caution to this 
agreement, because of the rejection by Hamas of pressure from donor countries to recognise 
Israel, and “under this new deal that position has not been forced to change”.
291  
Ismail Haniyeh, the disputed Palestinian prime minister (from Hamas in Gaza), resigned on 15 
February 2007 as part of the process to allow for a national unity government between Hamas and 
Fatah. He was again sworn in on 18 March 2007, as head of the new cabinet, while Salam 
Fayyad was appointed the finance minister. The Quartet reiterated its three previous conditions 
for engagement with Hamas. Both the EU and the US refused to resume aid to the PA 
government, because Hamas did not declare its acceptance of these conditions.
292 
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Box 5. cont’d 
The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was not picked up for serious discussion as it was signed by only 
a handful of Arab countries. This led the secretary-general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, to 
declare in 2006 that “the peace process is dead”. Nevertheless, in an effort to revive it, on 28-29 
March 2007, a summit was held in Riyadh, where 21 Arab League states (excluding Libya, 
which boycotted the meeting) unanimously re-endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative. Its wide 
support this time makes it highly legitimate.
293 Among those who attended the summit were UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (incumbent since January 2007) and Javier Solana. PA President 
Abbas voted in favour of the initiative, even though Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh 
abstained in the vote.
294 The EU praised the Arab initiative.
295 US President Barack Obama said, 
in an interview to Al-Arabiya news station in 2009, that he appreciated the Saudi peace plan.
296 
The Israeli government has noted “positive aspects” in the plan but has not formally accepted 
it.
297 
The UN envoy to the Middle East, Alvaro de Soto, resigned from his position on 7 May 2007. 
Before walking out, he wrote a 53-page End of Mission Statement, dated 5 May, “meant only 
for senior UN officials”, with “wording far more critical than the public pronouncements of UN 
diplomats.” It was leaked to the Guardian and published on 13 June, and de Soto confirmed the 
authenticity of the text. In the report, he criticised both the Palestinian organisations (Hamas and 
Fatah) and the Israeli government for the ongoing conflict. He also condemned the US, the EU 
and Israel for the imposed sanctions on Hamas. Moreover, he charged that the UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon and his predecessor Kofi Annan provided political cover for US and 
European efforts to quarantine Hamas. Finally, he said that Ban Ki-Moon had undermined the 
UN’s “efforts to lead Hamas and the government toward a solution” by not visiting Gaza during 
his first visit to the region.
298  
The national unity government calmed the situation a bit, although clan feuds continued in Gaza 
where law and order were yet to be fully restored and the firing of rockets into Israel was yet to be 
halted. Separately, Hamas deployed a 3,000-strong shadow security force including its supporters 
to tackle lawlessness in Gaza. The move exacerbated tensions with pro-Fatah security agencies in 
Gaza, sparking a major spat, which resulted in Hamas expelling Fatah security forces from the 
Gaza Strip.
299 At the peak of inter-factional fighting, Hamas took control of Gaza on 15 June 
2007, ending the national unity government. President Abbas dismissed Prime Minister Haniyeh 
by a presidential decree (the legality of which Hamas disputes) and appointed a ‘caretaker’ 
government led by Salam Fayyad, which committed to the Quartet principles. Hamas now 
controls Gaza, while the Fatah-dominated PA has control of the West Bank. The PLC has not met 
since then. With the formation of the new government, the EU and the US announced their 
intention to renew direct assistance to the PA (in the West Bank).
300 
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Box 5. cont’d 
More than a year after the position was vacated, Tony Blair became the special envoy of the 
Quartet to the Middle East on 27 June 2007, following his resignation as the prime minister of 
the UK.
301  
On  30 August 2007,  a  second Eurobarometer report on the EU’s relations with its 
neighbours confirmed that a large majority of the European public approves of the efforts to 
intensify cooperation with countries bordering the EU. An overwhelming majority felt it is 
important to work with neighbours in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, as well as in 
the fields of environment and energy, economic development, immigration, democracy, and 
education and training. Most Europeans also believe that assistance from the EU to its neighbours 
can contribute to the spread of peace and democracy beyond the borders of the Union, while 
nearly half believe that neighbouring countries also want to cooperate with the EU to carry out 
domestic reforms.
302 
Under the Portuguese presidency, the first Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting on 
migration was held in Albufeira (Algarve) on 19 November 2007.
 During this meeting, political 
and operational conclusions of this fourth EMP dimension were approved.
303 
Senior officials from the US, the EU and other countries gathered on 27 November 2007 for the 
Annapolis Conference in a bid to revive peace negotiations as a means to establish “an 
independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security 
with Israel and its other neighbours”.
304 The Conference offered some promises to re-launch the 
process and for reconsideration of the Arab Peace Initiative. When negotiations began a month 
later, however, Hamas said it would reject the outcomes of negotiations, whatever they may be.
305 
Still, by the time Israeli elections took place, no agreement had been reached and election results 
brought in a right-wing coalition government. Immediately upon assuming his post, Avigdor 
Lieberman, Israel’s new ultra-nationalist foreign minister, said Israel was not bound by the 
agreement at Annapolis – in his view it had “no validity” as it had not been ratified by the Israeli 
government (which was the case with the predecessor roadmap that also calls for negotiations and 
a two-state solution). Since then, the process has been “at square one”.
306 
 
 
                                                      
301 BBC News, “Blair Appointed Middle East Envoy”. 
302 Europa, Communiqués de presse, Eurobaromètre: Les Européens Sont Favorables À Une Coopération 
Accrue Avec Les Pays Voisins, 30 August 2003 [cited 5 Dec. 2009]. Available from 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1264&format=HTML&aged=0&languag
e=FR&guiLanguage=en. 
303 Erwan Lannon and Iván Martín, “Euromed Survey – of Experts and Actors on the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership: Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (European 
Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), 2009). Available from http://www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey/. 
304 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State 
Solution to the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict” (30 April 2003). Available from http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 
MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/A+Performance-Based+Roadmap+to+a+Permanent 
+Two-Sta.htm. 
305 European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDA), Geneva 
Accord (10/2003) [cited 20 Nov. 2009]. Available from http://www.medeainstitute.org/ 
index.html?doc=1777. 
306 BBC News, “Israel FM Rejects Annapolis Deal”, 1 April 2009. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/7977002.stm. 56 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
Box 5. cont’d 
On 5 December 2007, the European Commission published a Communication highlighting the 
objectives of strengthening the ENP and identifying areas where additional efforts are required 
on the part of the EU to extend the ENP further in 2008 and beyond.
307The Lisbon Treaty was 
signed on 13 December 2007 but it still needed to be ratified by all 27 member states before 
coming to force, and Ireland (according to its laws) had to hold a referendum on amending the 
Treaty.
308 
On 19 June 2008, Israel and Hamas reached an unwritten, open-ended ceasefire agreement, 
brokered by Egypt, designed to halt Israeli incursions into the Gaza Strip and stop missiles being 
fired from the Strip into southern Israel.
309  
 
Next, three of the parameters of the ENP’s political dimension (i.e. security and stability, 
democracy and good governance, and rule of law and human rights) are examined. A few 
examples for each parameter are given to show the shift in EU policy that occurred around the 
second critical juncture during the ENP, namely Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006.  
a. Security and stability 
In the aftermath of the second intifada, Palestinian society witnessed a state of abominable 
insecurity demonstrated by increased homicide and abduction incidents along with a spread of 
arms and theft. So, in the period 2001-03 some small steps were introduced by the EU to help 
the Palestinian security forces reinstate security in the PT. But these measures were not enough, 
as the PT was in dire need of grand-scale security sector reforms to gain the public’s trust in the 
security system and apparatus.
310 Following Arafat’s death, the Palestinian leadership under 
Abbas was eager to break with the late president’s legacy of monopolising security. Working 
fast to reform and supported by the EU, the PA concentrated its efforts on four areas: structural 
reorganisation; establishing a legal framework for the security sector; civil police reform; and 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade operatives 
within the official PA security forces.
311  
Once the ENP and the Action Plans with the PT were in place, the EU set forth to undertake the 
‘third party’ security role proposed by the PA and Israel. It agreed to launch the EUBAM 
Rafah to monitor the operations of the border crossing point, which began working on 30 
November 2005. The mission includes approximately 70 personnel, mainly seconded from EU 
member states, supported by an EC budget of about €10 million.
312  
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Shortly after EUBAM Rafah was in place, the European Council established the EUPOL 
COPPS, which began operating on 1 January 2006.
313 The mission is based in Ramallah and 
currently includes approximately 70 experts (of which 15 are local staff, 20 are officers and the 
remainder are civilians), with an EC budget of approximately €20 million.
 It is important to note 
that this is a ‘civil police’ reform mission, so it supports efforts such as police training, 
equipping, institution building, establishing legal frameworks and developing security 
infrastructure. It also supports work on police-related criminal justice matters – prosecution and 
criminal investigation. Although EUPOL COPPS has relations with the Palestinian attorney-
general’s office and works with civil prison services and detention centres, it does not train 
judges or the Palestinian military, nor is it involved with military prisons.
314  
When Hamas won the PLC elections, Rafah’s crossing point remained open under EUBAM 
observation. Six months later, however, after Hamas militants infiltrated Israel from the Gaza 
Strip, killed two Israeli soldiers and kidnapped a third (Gilad Shalit), in June 2006 Israel 
responded by closing its borders with Gaza and the Rafah crossing was tightened by Abbas’s 
presidential guards on the Palestinian side and the Egyptian border guards on the Egyptian side. 
A year later, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing point was last opened with 
the presence of EUBAM Rafah on 9 June 2007.
315 From that time both Hamas and Egypt have 
remained in control of the crossing on their respective sides, while the EU mission has remained 
on standby (in Ashkelon, a nearby Israeli city bordering the Gaza Strip).
316 
Likewise, since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip EUPOL COPPS has reduced its 
engagement but continues to operate mainly in the West Bank. The problem this division 
creates is that while half of the Palestinian police force is being developed in the West Bank, the 
other half is not being developed in the same way in Gaza. So when, or if, there is reconciliation 
between the two competing factions, Hamas and Fatah, there will be two civil police groups that 
do not have the same ideas about or expertise in security. The longer the reconciliation takes, 
the more difficult it will be to merge these forces together.
317 
More problematic, and in an ironic twist, is that since Hamas won the PLC elections, “the 
Office of the President and Western Governments tried to restore the centralised structure of the 
security sector that had existed under Arafat”. For instance, “President Abbas separated the 
National Security Forces from the Ministry of the Interior and National Security and nominated 
a Chief of Staff who reported directly to him”. Furthermore, in April 2006, he expanded the 
presidential guards, provided them with “rapid-intervention capabilities” and put them under his 
direct control.
318  
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b. Democracy and good governance  
2004-06 
The last comprehensive local elections in the West Bank and Gaza were held in 1976 and 
organised by Israeli authorities. Afterwards, local posts were largely filled by appointment with 
little influence from residents on municipal government.
319 Although the PA created a new 
dynamic for democracy, it did not capitalise on local elections because the Palestinian 
leadership feared it would have to share power with Hamas in municipal councils. But in the 
wake of the second intifada, the international community pushed for substantial reforms, hoping 
that democracy would bring stability to the PT. The EU, US and Israel were expecting that by 
replacing President Arafat with a strengthened Abbas as prime minister, he would be able to 
implement these reforms. Yet, the resignation of Abbas in 2003 left Arafat again with exclusive 
powers. Still, with mounting external and internal pressures for reforms “he was obliged to give 
in to the demands of the political parties and associated movements”. That is why the PA 
decided, shortly after the PLC introduced some amendments to the local Election Law (of 1996) 
in 2004, to organise the first phase of municipal elections.
320 
The most important amendment established a minimum quota for the representation of 
women on municipal councils. “This stipulated the election of at least two women per council, 
whatever the size of the considered conscription.”
321 Notwithstanding these amendments and 
new election laws, some important issues were not addressed concerning local elections. For 
instance, not all of the registered voters were eligible to vote in local elections, including 1) 
those in Jerusalem, “as the Israeli authorities consider the territory of Jerusalem annexed rather 
than occupied” and, therefore, as falling under its jurisdictions; 2) refugee camps, even those in 
the PT, as they are administered by UNRWA, and have their own governing mechanisms, while 
awaiting final status negotiations; and 3) Palestinian prisoners detained in Israeli prisons “as the 
Palestinian electoral system does not include provisions for absentee voting at the moment”.
322  
Despite Arafat’s death in November 2004, a month before local elections were scheduled to 
take place, the plan was scrupulously adhered to. Major Palestinian cities, like Nablus, 
Ramallah, Hebron, Gaza, Jenin and Rafah were set to elect mayors and city councils over 
several election rounds starting in December 2004.
323 Having done well in Gaza as social 
activists and welfare providers to those neglected by the PA, Hamas had earned a reputation of 
honesty and efficiency that Fatah had lacked for some time, despite their resistance by any 
means possible and support for terror tactics.
324 Hamas officials were encouraged by their 
members to participate in the local elections and thus decided to run for municipal councils for 
the first time in the organisation’s history. 
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Contrary to the Local Councils Elections Law, elections were held over consecutive rounds on 
different days – with a turnout of approximately 80%.
325 “The first two rounds of local elections 
were held according to the cancelled Local Councils Elections Law No. 5 of 1996 and its 
amendments according to the majority (districts) system”. Subsequent rounds were to be held 
according to “the new Local Councils Elections Law No. 10 of 2005”, which adopted the (lists) 
system of proportional representation – respecting the amended gender quota of 2004.
326 The 
first round started on 23 December 2004 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas won (with 
31% to 30% for Fatah) and secured seats in both territories, marking “the first penetration of the 
Islamic movement” into the Palestinian political institutions. Despite low voter turnout (roughly 
50%), reflecting both Palestinian pessimism about the candidates and rushed elections to replace 
the late president, Abbas won the presidential elections held on 15 January 2005 (for a term of 
four years); Hamas decided to boycott the elections. One of the first decrees the new president 
issued in March 2005 established a denominational quota for some localities “which were 
historically, or in the majority, Christian. For the [elections] of May 2005, this involved 
Bethlehem (where 8 out of 15 councillors had to be Christian), Beit Jala and Beit Sahour (7 
councillors out of 13).”
327 Another presidential decree re-established a Palestinian CEC on 1 
April 2005 with missions supervising and monitoring each step of the electoral process.
328 On 5 
May,
 the second round of local elections began in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but this 
time Fatah won (with 39% vs. 32% for Hamas).
329  
Around that time Hamas announced its unprecedented decision to participate in the upcoming 
PLC elections of 2006. Fatah, which was plagued by internal disputes and division, and 
realising it would do better in election polls through the proportional representation (lists) 
system than a majority (districts) system, decided to introduce amendments to election laws to 
that effect. In June 2005, the PLC passed a new electoral law (amending the 1995 Election 
Law), increasing the number of members from 88 to 132, and stipulating a mixed electoral 
system in which half are elected by proportional representation (utilising the Sainte–Laguë 
method for seat allocation)
330 and half by traditional districts. The new Elections Law 
maintained the denominational and gender quotas. The PLC also amended the Basic Law on 27 
July 2005 to make it compatible with the new election law.
331 
The third round of local elections took place solely in the West Bank, on 29 September 2005, 
shortly after the new law went into effect. According a report by the National Democratic   
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Institute (NDI), this led to complications and some misconduct (which were not related to the 
occupation or restrictions); still, the results were in favour of Fatah (with 45% vs. 31% for 
Hamas).
332 The fourth and most important round was also held solely in the West Bank on 15 
December 2005, “just a month before the second legislative elections when Hamas officially 
announced its participation”. In this phase, which was held in four main towns in the West 
Bank, such as Ramallah (centre of the PA), Hamas won (with 44% vs. 35% for Fatah). “It could 
be said that this stage was in some way a first snapshot of the Palestinian political landscape, 
since a month later the Palestinian people elected a strong Hamas majority to the legislative 
council.”  
The local elections were not yet completed. The fifth round was expected to be held in major PT 
towns such as Hebron and Gaza in August 2006, but never took place because of the rising 
tensions between Hamas and Fatah after Hamas’s electoral victory, and the sense of futility in 
holding elections when all parties knew the results would not be honoured.
333 At that point, 
Abbas had been encouraging Hamas to participate in the legislative elections, and the 
international community did not object to their participation. On the contrary, a statement was 
issued by the Quartet in September 2005 saying that this was an internal issue for the 
Palestinians to sort out for themselves. No mention was made at that time of conditionality on 
engaging with Hamas, because they were not expected to win – as Abbas kept assuring the 
international community – despite Fatah’s slide in the local elections polls.
334 (See Table 3.) 
Both the municipal and presidential elections in 2004-05 were monitored by international and 
local election observers. Over 1,000 monitors participated in these missions to observe and 
report their findings without interfering in the procedures, while the Palestinian CEC supervised 
the logistics surrounding the elections. For the presidential elections the EU sent more than 180 
observers and managed a team of 16 short-term Canadian observers. In the report from its 
EOM, the EU found the elections to be as fair and democratic as possible under the political 
situation. Observers noted the difficulty facing the electorates, particularly in East Jerusalem, in 
view of the occupation and restrictions, but they also blamed some of the shortcomings on non-
compliance with the law on the Palestinian side.
335 As far as the municipal elections are 
concerned, there has been a lack of EU monitoring and reporting. Indeed, the “NDI was the only 
international organisation consistently monitoring and reporting on all of the stages of local 
elections”.
336  
                                                      
332 For details on the complications, see National Democratic Institute (NDI), Final Report: Palestinian 
Local Elections 2005, 2006 [30 Dec. 2009]. Available from http://www.accessdemocracy.org/ 
files/2069_ps_localelect_010106.pdf. 
333 Balawi, Palestinian Municipal Elections: A Gradual Change. 
334 de Soto, “End of Mission Report”. 
335 To read more about obstacles facing Palestinian elections check the elections observers’ reports at the 
Central Elections Commission – Palestine, Local and International Observation Organization: Election 
Observation [27 Dec. 2009]. Available from http://www.elections.ps/template.aspx?id=14&sndx=4. 
336 International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) – West Bank & Gaza Program, Q&A: 
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Table 3. Elections in the PT over the past 15 years 
Period  20 Jan. 
1996  2000  23 Dec. 
2004 
15/1, 5/5, 29/9, 
15/12 2005  26 Jan. 2006  2009  2010 
Presidential 
(% of votes) 
X* 
Hamas 
boycotted 
Voter 
turnout 
71.7% 
Arafat 
(Fatah) 
won 
(88.2%) 
Expected 
Second 
intifada 
Not 
Possible 
  X 
Hamas 
boycotted 
Voter turnout 
~50 % 
a) 
Abbas 
(Fatah) won 
(62.5%) 
 Expected 
Postponed 
for a year 
Expected 
Undecided 
PLC 
X 
Hamas 
boycotted 
District 
system 
Religious 
quota 
applied 
Fatah 
won 
(55 of 88 
seats) 
Expected 
Second 
intifada 
Not 
Possible 
   X 
Hamas joined 
Mixed 
system** 
Gender quota 
added 
Voter turnout 
77% 
Hamas won 
(Hamas: 
44.5%, Fatah: 
41.4%) 
proportional 
representation) 
(Hamas: 45 
Fatah: 17 
district seats) 
(Hamas: 74 
Fatah: 45 total 
seats) 
  Changed to 
proportional 
representation 
Expected 
Undecided 
Level 
Local 
(~80% voter 
turnout) 
b) 
  X 
Hamas 
joined 
District 
system 
Gender 
quota 
added 
1
st round 
in West 
Bank & 
Gaza Strip 
Hamas 
won 
(Hamas: 
31%, 
Fatah: 
30%) 
X 
Hamas joined 
District system 
2
nd round in 
West Bank & 
Gaza Strip 
Fatah won 
(Fatah: 39%, 
Hamas: 32%) 
Changed to 
proportional 
representation 
& gender 
quota applied 
3
rd round in 
West Bank 
Fatah won 
(Fatah: 45%, 
Hamas: 31%) 
4
th round in 
West Bank 
Hamas won 
(Hamas: 44%, 
Fatah: 35%) 
Expected 
5
th round in 
West Bank & 
Gaza Strip 
Cancelled 
Expected 
Undecided 
Undecided 
* The X stands for the times an election actually took place. 
** Mixed system: half of the seats determined by electoral district and half by the proportional representation system.  
a)  John Anderson and Molly Moore, “Palestinians Appear to Give Abbas a Clear Win”, Washington Post, 10 January 2006. 
Available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60583-2005Jan9.html. 
b) Ibid; also see Balawi, Palestinian Municipal Elections: A Gradual Change. 
Source: Shikaki, “The Palestinian Elections: Sweeping Victory Uncertain Mandate”, op. cit.  62 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
2006-08 
Without any preset restrictions on its participation, Hamas took part in the PLC elections on 26 
January 2006. Policy analysts predicted a “hung parliament with the two sides forced into a 
coalition”. But given the long dissatisfaction with Fatah’s “corruption and inefficiency”, and its 
“lack of progress in achieving the Palestinians’ national goals of independence and a just 
settlement with Israel”, Hamas surprised everyone by winning with a big majority.
337 With a 
voter turnout of 77% (out of 1.3 million registered voters) Hamas received 44.5% of the 66 seats 
distributed by proportional representation (Fatah: 41.4%) and 45 of the 66 district seats (Fatah: 
17 seats). In total, Hamas won 74 of the 132 PLC seats compared with 45 seats won by Fatah.
338 
The Palestinian CEC records show that more than 25 countries and over 1,000 observers 
monitored the elections. With a team of nearly 250 international monitors, the EU’s EOM was 
the largest in the field, costing approximately €3 million.
339 Elections took place in the entire PT 
(including East Jerusalem), and the reports by the EU and other international observers deemed 
them largely fair and free to the extent possible under conditions of continued occupation.
340  
Although the size of their win was shocking – even to Hamas – many Palestinians voted for 
Hamas “because of its perceived discipline and integrity, and its strong anti-Israeli ideology”, 
but at that early stage it was “still too early to say how these characteristics would have manifest 
themselves in a Hamas-led Palestinian government”.
341 Once Hamas was elected and the 
international observers concluded that the elections were fair and free, the international 
community wasted no time in presenting its reactive conditions and threats to boycott the new, 
democratically elected government. Hamas was only given two options: the Quartet way or the 
highway. It opted for the second choice and almost all funding taps were turned off. In doing so, 
the international community’s credibility as democracy promoters was at stake, and “the EU in 
particular has effectively out-manoeuvred itself from having effective influence” on the conflict. 
“This is because its influence principally derives from its disbursal of financial assistance 
contingent upon the recipient’s compliance with specified conditions and rules”, as Nathalie 
Tocci explains.
342 At a recent workshop, Véronique De Keyser, member of the European 
Parliament and chief observer of the EU’s EOM, stressed that the EU’s position on Hamas is 
unacceptable.
343 She argues that Europeans have paid the cost of the democratisation process in 
the PT and for monitoring the elections, yet in the end, the EU does not accept the results they 
produced. The EU owes it to its citizens and the Middle East to accept the results of elections 
                                                      
337 BBC News, “Q&A: Hamas Election Victory “. 
338 Shikaki, “The Palestinian Elections: Sweeping Victory Uncertain Mandate”. 
339 There are discrepancies in the numbers concerning observation missions among sources, but the 
consensus is that the EU EOMs in the PT have been, so far, the biggest and the most costly. See BBC 
News, “Hundreds to Watch Palestinian Vote”, 23 January 2006. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4638962.stm.  
340 Central Elections Commission – Palestine, Observation Reports [30 Nov. 2009]. Available from 
http://www.elections.ps/template.aspx?id=18. 
341 BBC News, “Q&A: Hamas Election Victory “. 
342 Michael Emerson and Richard Youngs (eds), Political Islam and European Foreign Policy: 
Perspective from Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean (Brussels: Centre For European Policy 
Studies, 2007): 157-58. 
343 Véronique De Keyser, “High Hopes and Law Expectations: Which Way Forward in the Middle East?” 
(Israel-Palestine-European Middle East Workshop, Brussels: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 19 
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they helped support, once they have been deemed democratic.
344 By rejecting the results of 
these elections, the EU has “sent a dubious signal, both to authoritarian Arab regimes and to the 
Arab street”,
345 and proved to be a “fair-weather friend to democracy in the region, unwilling to 
support democratic processes if elections resulted in victory for Islamic parties”.
346  
After the results were declared, Hamas tried to assure the international community of its good 
intentions and its aims of establishing a ‘moderate’ Islamic, democratic government. According 
to Ghazi Ahmad Hamad, Hamas spokesman for 2006-07, “Hamas never promoted revolutionary 
ideals, and it never advocated or endorsed the overthrow of national governments, either in the 
region or in the West”.
347 Likewise, Jamal Saleh, a Hamas legislator from Gaza, explained that 
“[w]e would have respected [the conditions] if the Quartet had asked us both [Hamas and Israel] 
to comply with these demands (renouncing violence and respecting previous agreements) – but 
they are demanding [the conditions] from us, the weaker party, only”.
348 When asked about his 
views on democracy during interviews conducted on 15 September 2009 with Hamas officials 
in the West Bank city of Ramallah, Aziz Dweik (speaker of the PLC and incumbent president of 
the PA for 2009),
349 gave this reply: 
I personally admire democracy and the efficiency of democracy, e.g. in the US. 
Democracy is a peaceful tool to change one corrupt government with another efficient 
one, in a way that pleases and satisfies people as they feel they have their own say in 
their political life. Democracy provides tools (the role of the majority and the minority) 
to deal with different ethnic groups, human rights and changes of politics. It gives a 
real impetus for transparency and management of public money. But what we will not 
accept is some type of democracy that is not accepted by democratic people, one that 
you can call ‘restricted or designed democracy’, with strategic goals set beforehand. 
Mahmoud Ramahi, secretary-general of the PLC (Change and Reform party), had this view: 
Without external interference the Palestinian people are democratic; since the 1980s we 
have been involved and respected the results of syndicates and university elections. But 
democracy is only a democracy if we accept the democratic game; we have to respect 
the right of all, so we have to give the minority their rights too. We said right from the 
start we will not impose Islam by force, and that the social shape of the cities will not 
change. We will not impose the veil or stop alcohol in a restaurant which still serves it 
in Gaza. But also the minority has to respect the options of the majority. We won this 
time the election agenda; if the minority of today wins it we will have to respect their 
preferences. The name of the game is ‘reciprocal respect’.
350 
                                                      
344 Europa, European Union Election Observation Mission, “West Bank and Gaza Strip: Palestinian 
Legislative Council Elections” (25 January 2006). Available from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
human_rights/election_observation/westbank/legislative/final_report_en.pdf. 
345 Asseburg, “European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach”: 
38. 
346 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: 276. 
347 Ghazi Ahmad Hamad, “The Challenge for Hamas: Establishing Transparency and Accountability”, in 
Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform, ed. Ronald Friedrich and Arnold Luethold (Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF), 2007): 130. 
348 Hovdenak, “Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions”: 71. 
349 This was his official title in 2009, as Abbas was not the de jure PA president after his four-year term 
had ended and the PLC did not renew it; if no other president is elected, the speaker of the PLC (in this 
case Dweik), by Palestinian law, should have been the PA incumbent president, but de facto this was only 
accepted in Gaza. Aziz Dweik agreed to be quoted as part of this research. 
350 Mahmoud Ramahi agreed to be quoted as part of this research.  64 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
Despite these efforts to gain the international community’s approval, the EU (among other 
actors) did not want to take a chance on Hamas, either because of lack of trust in its intentions 
or fears of a domino effect of other Islamist parties coming to power in the region right on 
Europe’s borders. 
As a consequence to the West’s rejection of Hamas and persistent occupation, Palestinian 
elections at all three levels (presidential, legislative and local) – which are expected to be held 
every four years – have been put off. The fifth round of local elections that were to take place in 
August 2006, in major cities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (e.g. Hebron and Gaza), were 
cancelled. The two factions had difficulty in establishing a unity government when Fatah was 
emulating the West’s position on Hamas. The Israeli occupation, intimidations, travel 
restrictions and imprisonment – of a third of Palestinian MPs (mostly from Hamas) – also posed 
logistical difficulties for the proper functioning of the PLC.
351 On the rare occasion when there 
was a majority of MPs available to meet, the PLC members in Ramallah and in Gaza City led 
joint sessions through video conferencing – provided the technicians showed up.
352 (See Table 3 
above.) 
As the EU’s embargo continued, the humanitarian situation in the PT worsened and the PA was 
on the brink of total collapse. The national unity government, which was established between 
Fatah and Hamas and other Palestinian factions in early 2007, could not survive under such 
conditions for more than six months. As the rifts deepened and violent clashes erupted between 
members of the two major factions, the unity government crumbled by mid-2007.
353 
Internationally isolated and bitter, Hamas fighters took control in the Gaza Strip, pushing Fatah 
loyalists out. Consequently, President Abbas dissolved the Hamas-led coalition and with a 
presidential decree appointed Salam Fayyad (Third-Way Party) the PA finance minister as well 
as prime minister of a PA emergency government functioning solely in the West Bank. In this 
move, Fayyad replaced Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas), who refuted the decree as 
illegal without the approval of two-third’s of the PLC; Haniyeh continues to exercise his prime 
ministerial authority in Gaza with a majority of the PLC confidence.
354 At this point, the EU and 
the international community resumed interactions with, and funding of, this ‘emergency’ PA. 
EU funds have since been channelled through the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) 
(2007-08) and the subsequent PEGASE (starting in 2008). The EIDHR-II (2007-13) is also a 
financial instrument that has been used to support various democratisation micro-projects in the 
West Bank. One example is a project called “Open and Accountable Government”, which funds 
the activities of the Palestinian CEC and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
355 
These are discussed further in the economic dimension section. 
                                                      
351 Marian Houk, “An Interview with Dr. Mustafa Barghouti: Getting the Palestinian Legislative Council 
out of the Freezer”, Al Mubadara, 10 June 2008. Available from http://www.almubadara.org/ 
new/edetails.php?id=4651. 
352  Asharq Al-Awsat, “Palestinian Parliament Shut Down”, 17 January 2007. Available from 
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=7683. 
353 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Middle East Report N°54: Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: 
Pulling Back from the Brink” (Jerusalem/Amman/Brussels: 13 June 2006). Available from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4171&l=1. 
354 BBC News, “Abbas Appoints New Palestinian PM”, 15 June 2007. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6756079.stm. 
355 Palestinian National Authority, “Interim Briefing on International Assistance to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory: Prepared for Meeting of the Local Development Forum in Ramallah” (18 December 
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Because of the boycott of Hamas by the Quartet (including the EU) and its backpedalling on 
accepting the election results, the Palestinians’ hopes for reconciliation and the salvaging of 
their fragile democratic process seem to be vanishing. 
Of course Israel carries a big share in that, by destroying the democratic system here. 
But we cannot say that it is Israel only – it’s also the Palestinian division, internally, 
especially the behaviour of Fatah and Hamas. The behaviour has violated the rule of 
law, democratic principles, and it is quite factional. That’s why what we see here is an 
effort from the Legislative Council, with the participation of members from all parties, 
to prevent a deterioration to the level that Palestine, again, becomes an autocracy, 
instead of sustaining or keeping what we have achieved of a democratic system, in 
anticipation that, hopefully, sometime soon we will be able to go to elections again. We 
don’t want the system to be destroyed in the process of division.
356 
So far, elections at all levels have either been cancelled or indefinitely postponed. In January 
2009, presidential elections were due but were put off for a year to be held at the same time as 
the legislative elections. Surprisingly, the Fatwa & Legislation Office
357 “issued a statement in 
which it declared that the presidential term shall be extended to co-occur with the end of the 
second legislative council term”.
358 This demonstrates a space for Islamists in democracy by 
shura (consultation among Muslims), for which Hamas often argues, but here it was used to 
serve Abbas (and his secular Fatah).
359 Similarly, municipal elections that were due to take 
place in 2006 were cancelled; re-elections of incumbent local officials have been due since 
2009, but have also been suspended or ignored. PLC elections were due in January 2010, but 
have been indefinitely postponed because Hamas refused to participate, and holding them in the 
West Bank alone in this context does not do much to bolster democracy. All the while the EU 
has been watching as its previous democratisation efforts have fallen to pieces, without any sign 
of an emerging strategy towards Islamist parties of the region, in general, and Hamas in 
particular.
360  
The EU justifies its schizophrenic attitude towards democracy promotion in the PT by 
reiterating that Hamas is on its terrorist organisation list and thus the EU cannot legally deal 
with Hamas unless the latter renounces violence. But that does not explain the EU’s double 
standards, manifested in supporting (emerging) authoritarian regimes in the region – such as 
Fatah – and in exempting Hizbullah (despite its similarity to Hamas) from being black-listed as 
well. This is not a matter of definitions or norms as much as it is a matter of strategic interests, 
for these decisions are highly politicised.
361 The EU lists al-Qaeda and Hamas as terrorist 
entities, but not Hizbullah because several EU governments with interests in Lebanon’s stability 
(including France, Spain and Britain) are concerned about upsetting delicate confessional
362 
                                                      
356 Ibid. 
357 A fatwa is an Islamic opinion issued by an Islamic scholar, but not always binding.  
358 International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), “Legal Opinion Regarding the Presidential 
Term of President Abbas (by Fatwa and Legislation Office)” (July 2008). Available from 
http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/downloads/legal_opinion_regarding_the_presidential_term_of_presid
ent_abbas_july_2007_by_flo_en.pdf. 
359 Hovdenak, “Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions”: 64-65. 
360 BBC News, “Q&A: Palestinian Political Turmoil”. 
361 Reuters, “EU Brands Hizbullah a Terror Group”, 3 October 2005. Available from 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3056692,00.html. 
362 Confessional democracy is a system used e.g. in Lebanon, where political seats and appointments are 
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negotiations by measures that would cripple finding a solution.
363 Conversely, the US includes 
al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hizbullah on its terrorist list,
 indicating a strong commitment to both 
Israel’s security and its own interests in the region.
364 So far, the EU’s policies and even rhetoric 
concerning the region reflect its predominantly realist approach as opposed to a normative 
one.
365 
One of the perpetual problems affecting the democratisation and peace processes in the PT 
remains the Israeli occupation, or put differently, the lack of autonomy from direct external 
influence to make decisions. This problem, however, cannot be solved by holding periodic 
elections alone. “This fallacy has been called ‘electoralism’ or the faith that merely holding 
elections will channel political actions into peaceful contests among elites and accord public 
legitimacy to the winners.” Even if the elections had resulted in a positive scenario, under 
occupation it would have been rendered superfluous because the rules of procedure entailed in 
making decisions binding are subject to change at the whim of the occupying power (or external 
actors). Indeed, the rules of the game (and laws governing elections) were suddenly altered – 
with the encouragement of self-interested actors – after Hamas won the elections, without any 
prior notice. This particular phenomenon is what leads many democratisation scholars to reach 
the conclusion that sustainable democracy is not possible under occupation, where the polity is 
not self-governing.
366 At the same time, the international community and the Palestinians should 
not be relieved of their responsibilities for the failure of democracy in the PT or blame it all on 
the occupation. By ending the occupation and providing political autonomy to a nation, one of 
the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for democratisation will be put in place.
367 (See 
Table 4.) That is not to say that the EU’s democracy promotion experience over the past 15 
years in the region in general and in the PT in particular has been completely negative.  
One area where debate has progressed since the creation of the EMP is over the issue 
of democratic change in the Arab world... The democratisation issue is more openly 
debated in the Middle East than before, but far-reaching political change has not 
occurred...rhetoric on the promotion of democracy has, for good or ill, been the main 
focal point of debate.
368  
Moreover, “EU funding and expertise allowed for the establishment of a Palestinian 
administration and of local authorities, for...the organization of the first democratic elections, 
[and] the creation and functioning of Palestinian police forces”, which ensures the smooth 
                                                      
363 Europa, “Council Common Position on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism 
(2001/931/CFSP)” (Official Journal of the European Communities, 27 December 2001). Available from 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:0093:0096:EN:PDF. 
364 United States Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, 7 July 2009). Available from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
365 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique”, Journal of European Public 
Policy 13 (2006). 
366 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is. . . And Is Not”. 
367 There is an inherit fear in Israel that if Palestinians get their own state, they will use it to attack Israel 
rather than build democratic institutions. The lack of trust between the parties and the uncertainty are 
paramount obstacles in the face of progress in the region. The EU must play a bigger role in confidence-
building between the parties and conflict resolution before peace and democratisation are possible in the 
PT. 
368 Richard Youngs, “How Europe’s Mediterranean Policy Went So Badly Wrong”, Europe’s World 4 
(Fall 2006). Available from http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ 
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operation of these elections.
369 The challenge now facing the EU is to identify a strategy to 
maintain these achievements and to revive Palestinian public trust in democracy and the EU’s 
commitment to support the Palestinian cause in establishing a stable, secure, democratic and 
independent state “living side by side with Israel in peace”, as pledged in the roadmap (2003) by 
the Quartet.
370  
Table 4. Factors affecting the democratisation process in the PT 
Period  1995-2000 2000-03  2003-06 2006-10 
EU 
Focus on political & 
economic structures 
Slow start on cultural & 
legal structures  
Focus on state/national 
level 
Neglected societal and 
local actors (including 
religious leaders) 
Not enough money 
disbursed 
Halted economic 
development 
Ignored the cultural 
structure and local 
actors 
Increased socio-
economic 
development 
Work on the cultural 
structure 
Continued neglect of 
religious leaders 
Involved local actors 
Pushed for political 
reforms 
Supported PA (Fatah) only 
Halted development in PT 
Deepened rift between 
factions 
Reversed democratic 
processes 
Neglected Gazans and 
Islamists 
Worked selectively on the 
cultural structure 
(neglecting religious 
leaders) 
Lost credibility 
External 
Factors 
a)  
Israel 
Lack of trust in the 
Palestinians 
Occupation 
Started the peace process 
Increased violence 
Palestinian movement 
restrictions 
Occupation  
Halted the peace 
process 
Separation wall 
Movement restrictions 
persist 
Occupation 
Restarted the peace 
process 
Increased movement 
restrictions 
Increased violence and 
violations  
Occupation 
Froze the peace process 
Internal 
Factors  PT 
Lack of fiscal transparency 
Corruption 
Selective reforms 
(managed democracy) 
Nepotism and partisanship 
Lack of trust in Israelis 
Terrorism and violence 
General elections were 
held but no local elections 
Started the peace process 
Second intifada 
No security 
No elections 
No reforms 
Continued corruption  
Increased 
unemployment 
Nepotism and 
partisanship 
Increased violence 
and terrorism 
All elections were 
postponed 
Halted the peace 
process 
Less corruption 
Increased 
transparency 
Increased reforms 
Enhanced democracy  
Enhanced rule of law 
Better governance 
Violence and 
terrorism reduced 
presidential and local 
elections were held 
Restarted the peace 
process 
Hamas win 
Increased corruption  
Lack of good governance 
Improved fiscal 
transparency in the West 
Bank only  
Lack of leadership (no 
strategy or vision) 
No government 
accountability 
Reversed previous reforms 
Authoritarian governance 
without public mandate 
Increased violence 
(Hamas-Israel & Fatah-
Hamas) 
No national unity 
government 
All foreseen elections 
were postponed  
Froze the peace process 
a) There are other external factors besides the EU and Israel (e.g. the US, American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee, Arab countries, Turkey, Scandinavian countries, etc.) but they are not the focus of this paper. 
b) Pace, “Paradox and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: The Limits of EU 
Normative Power”: 43. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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c. Rule of law and human rights: The judiciary and fundamental freedoms  
The rule of law is linked to security and stability as it includes fighting crime, enforcing order in 
the streets and providing life and property security for Palestinian citizens. Following the 
establishment of the PA, the EU has supported judicial reforms with an aim of fostering the rule 
of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms (of peaceful expression, association, assembly, 
belief, press, speech and movement, as well as freedom from want and fear).
371 This task started 
in 1995, was slowed down by the second intifada (when violence and disorder spread 
throughout Palestinian society), and resumed between 2001 and 2003. 
By 2004, most of the legislation that applied to the functioning of courts in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip had been unified. Even so, many issues have continued to hamper the Palestinian 
judicial system, which the European Commission’s country report on the PT summarises as 
follows: 
Much of the legislation has not been implemented and the judicial system is far from 
being fully operational. The division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Justice, 
[the Ministry of Interior] and the Higher Judicial Council remains unclear. There are 
also major challenges in implementing the newly unified legal framework under 
current Israeli movement restrictions and closures. The court infrastructure is 
extremely poor. Courts are unable to hold sessions most days of the year, resulting in 
an increased backlog of court cases. There are insufficient resources for proper training 
within the judiciary. Judges and court personnel also suffer from lack of 
communication between courts, ineffective procedures and poor management of 
records. This is once again compounded by movement restrictions between the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The independence of the judiciary has, according to human rights 
organisations, been undermined by interference from the executive. Whilst in principle 
the State Security Courts were formally abolished in 2003, the military courts, 
established in 1995, remain active, including some competence in civilian cases. 
Military Courts’ jurisdiction applies to police and security force personnel as well as 
[alleged] crimes by civilians against security forces.
372 
Therefore, in its Presidency Conclusions in July 2004, the European Council reaffirmed its 
commitment and “readiness to support the PA in taking responsibility for law and order and, in 
particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity”.
373 Owing to these 
efforts, in 2005 Palestinian society witnessed an increase in judicial staff. In that same year, the 
Basic Law was amended so that the attorney-general, who earlier had only been appointed by 
the president on the basis of political loyalty, was also to be approved by the PLC. This step was 
to encourage the post-holder to take further measures to enhance the rule of law (while 
previously appointed attorney-generals did not want to challenge a legal system that assured 
their survival).
374 Moreover, by 2006 there was a clear increase in the share of women who 
worked as judges (reaching 11.2%), and who occupied the position of general prosecutor 
(reaching 12.1%).
375 
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This progress was curbed, however, by the increasing political and institutional split between 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the subsequent tightening of the Palestinian president’s grip 
over the justice system. The PLC stopped its legislative activity after the detention of more than 
half of its parliamentarians (mostly Hamas) in Israeli jails. Instances of unlawful detentions, 
torture and death under the PA’s custody have increased without judicial investigation. To add 
to this, there is insufficient protection of judicial personnel and non-implementation of the 
courts’ decisions – even in areas where the PA has explicit jurisdiction over security and the 
judiciary (e.g. Area A in the West Bank). Maen Id’ais, the coordinator of the Public Policy and 
Research Unit at the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights since 2001, 
emphasises that  
[t]he responsibility of the current lawlessness in the PNA-controlled areas lies 
primarily with the [Palestinian] Authority itself. It is true that Israeli occupation has 
had a negative impact on the PNA’s capacity to enforce law and order. However, it is 
not true that the increasing number of violations committed by security personnel is an 
outcome of the occupation and that the Authority is unable to put an end to this... In 
other words, the PNA can take effective steps to improve the rule of law and the 
security of the citizens, if only the political will is there to do so.
376  
Consequently, “the first ENP Joint Committee session in three years took place in May 2008 
and decided [on] the formation of four Sub-Committees. The first Sub-Committee on human 
rights, good governance and rule of law convened in December 2008.”
377 This group focused on 
ways for the EU to support Palestinian judicial reform through a number of major programmes, 
which include  
establishing the Palestinian Judicial Training Institute, a permanent professional 
training system; providing legal training for judges and prosecutors and IT training for 
all legal staff; setting up an inspection department and legal library that supports the 
High Judicial Council; and the provision of IT equipment for the judiciary. The EU has 
funded the compilation of a database of all Palestinian court judgements, which is an 
integral part of the Legal and Judicial Databank, Al-Muqtafi.
378  
According to EU official sources, “the conditions for training of judges and prosecutors were 
improved by the establishment of the EC-funded Judicial Training Institutes”. Yet, this is not 
the only problem impeding the Palestinian justice system and much remains to be done to solve 
the aforementioned lingering ones that hinge more on the PA’s political will to change than on 
EU funding.
379 
3.2.2  Economic dimension  
As mentioned earlier, the ENP did not replace the EMP, it merely provided a more focused 
bilateral track with new financial tools (e.g. ENPI) and legal instruments (e.g. Action Plans) to 
better implement the objectives of the Barcelona process.  
                                                      
376 Friedrich and Luethold, Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform: 96-98. 
377 Europa, Press Releases, European Neighbourhood Policy – Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 April 
2009 [23 Dec. 2009]. Available from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
MEMO/09/181&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
378 European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, PEGASE: 
Helping to Build a Palestinian State: Promoting Good Governance and the Rule of Law, 2009 [12 Dec. 
2009]. Available from http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/cooperatio_development/pdf_sec/ 
governance.pdf. 
379 Europa, Press Releases, European Neighbourhood Policy – Occupied Palestinian Territory. 70 | ROUBA AL-FATTAL 
Building upon the earlier Interim Association Agreement (1997), and taking into consideration 
the PT country report prepared by the Commission’s working group in May 2004, the 
Commission proposed an Action Plan for the PA in December 2004, which was adopted in May 
2005. With this Plan, the ENP aimed at opening new partnership prospects for the PT by
 380 
•  moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration, through giving a stake in 
the EU’s Internal Market and the possibility for the PA to participate progressively in key 
aspects of EU policies and programmes; 
•  upgrading the scope and intensity of political cooperation; 
•  providing the opportunity for convergence of economic legislation, the opening of 
economies to each other, and the continued reduction of trade barriers to stimulate 
investment and growth; 
•  increasing targeted financial support for the actions identified in the Association Agreement 
and Action Plan, through the ENPI, which will also cover the very important aspect of 
transnational cooperation. There may also be infrastructure investment support through the 
EIB; 
•  opening or reinforcing gradual participation in relevant Community programmes, 
promoting, inter alia, cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links; 
•  including technical assistance and twinning to meet EU norms and standards, and targeted 
advice and support for legislative approximation through a mechanism such as TAIEX; and 
•  deepening trade and economic relations, extending them progressively to cover agriculture 
and the service sector, and to provide the conditions for increasing investment and exports. 
To monitor the implementation of the ENP in neighbouring countries, the EU decided to draft 
annual progress reports, starting two years after the launch of the ENP in 2004. To date there 
have been three progress reports concerning the PT (in 2006, 2008 and 2009).
381  
In the early years of the ENP (2004-07), both MEDA-II and EIDHR-I (which started in 2000) 
continued to be used as the main financial instruments, along with EIB loans for development 
projects. From 2007, MEDA-II was replaced with the ENPI. EIDHR-I was upgraded to EIDHR-
II and EIB loans continued for all neighbouring partners – except for the PT. For the 
aforementioned political reasons, the EU (along with the US, Canada and other international 
donors) stopped funds or loans to the PA in the PT completely in the first half of 2006. From 
mid-2006 until the end of 2007, direct financial assistance to Palestinians in need was 
transferred through the TIM as discussed in detail below. But starting in 2008 the TIM was 
replaced by PEGASE, which was designed solely for the PA, while the ENPI, the development 
cooperation instrument and EIB loans complemented this instrument (as shown in Figure 3 
above).  
After five months of freezing aid funds to the Hamas-led PA, the Quartet, in May 2006, 
addressed the financial difficulty of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the international 
community decided in June 2006 to establish the TIM. This EU-designed tool has provided 
funding for emergency health, social and fuel costs. Despite the embargo against the new PA, 
“it is regularly pointed out that in overall terms European aid had paradoxically increased since 
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the boycott was imposed”.
382 Hence, the TIM has often been compared to “covering problems 
with a sticking plaster”.
383 More problematic, it actually bypasses many of the good governance 
mechanisms that had been implemented earlier by the PA under pressure from the EU to 
undertake reforms. In an effort to increase fiscal transparency, the PA had all the money 
transferred into a single account, which is closely monitored by the IMF. “Under the TIM it is 
not clear who decides who gets what, and diplomats complain of money draining into a black 
hole.”
384  
In June 2007, the PA split de facto into a Fatah-led branch in control of the West Bank and a 
Hamas-led one in control of the Gaza Strip. Given that split, during the donor conference held 
on 17 December 2007 in Paris, the EU introduced PEGASE to support the Fatah-led PA. 
PEGASE has been operating since February 2008 and is used to channel support for the three-
year Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), which was presented by Salam Fayyad 
in his joint capacity of prime minister/finance minister. “PEGASE, which covers EU assistance 
to [the] West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, will be coordinated locally with EU member 
states and other international partners.”
385 In a video press release at the donor conference, 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European commissioner for external affairs, praised the instrument 
for being fast, transparent and effective, and urged other international donors to make use of it 
to channel their funds to the PA.
386  
From 1 January 2007 onwards, as part of the reform of EC assistance instruments, MEDA, 
TACIS and various other programmes were replaced by a single instrument – the ENPI. “This is 
a much more flexible, policy-driven instrument. It is designed to target sustainable development 
in approximation to EU policies and standards – supporting the agreed priorities in the ENP 
Action Plans (as well as the Strategic Partnership with Russia, which was previously also 
covered by the TACIS).”
387 Other sub-instruments were developed under the ENPI to target the 
Mediterranean partners, such as that for cross-border cooperation.
388 The ENPI funds allocated 
to Mediterranean and Central and Eastern European countries will continue to depend on their 
needs as well as their implementation of agreed reforms. For that purpose, the Commission has 
prepared for each of its neighbours (except for Palestine and Libya) both country and regional 
strategy papers. Each of these papers includes an analysis of the situation by sector and the 
Commission’s response strategy over a seven-year period (2007-13).
389 In the PT, the ENPI has 
been in use along with PEGASE since the beginning of 2008, focusing mainly on UNRWA and 
the Partnership for Peace programme.  
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It was further decided to upgrade the EIDHR-I (2000-06) instrument to one for the promotion of 
democracy and human rights in the world (EIDHR-II, 2007-13). While keeping it separate, it is 
complementary to the ENPI for providing assistance to civil society as well as private and 
public sectors that are contributing to the development and enhancement of democracy, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in neighbouring partners – 
including the PT.
390  
For the period 2007-13, about €12 billion was allocated for the ENPI and approximately €17 
billion for the development cooperation instrument.
391 Under this latter instrument, the EC 
finances measures aimed at supporting geographical cooperation with the developing countries 
and territories included in the list of aid recipients of the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee, such as the Palestinian-administrated areas.
392 The development cooperation 
instrument for the period 2007-13 encompasses developing areas not covered under the previous 
instruments. It supports development cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, and has 
poverty reduction and the fight against poverty-related diseases as objectives.  
International aid to the Palestinians is classified into the following three categories:
393  
1)  budget support, which includes all contributions to TIM/PEGASE and any aid going 
directly to the ministry of finance to cover government costs and salaries; 
2)  emergency aid, which includes all funding to UNRWA or other humanitarian organisations 
for rebuilding destroyed infrastructures, providing food aid and other humanitarian 
objectives; and 
3)  development aid, which includes other projects not included under items 1 and 2 above, 
such as peace-building and cultural projects, or support for specific programmes run by PA 
ministries.  
It is worth noting the sharp increases in EC funding especially after the outbreak of the second 
intifada and again after the electoral victory of Hamas (see Figure 4). Still, this increase was 
mainly attributable to emergency aid and PA budget support while there was a noticeable 
decrease, particularly after 2006, in development assistance and bank loans to the PA (Box 6).
394  
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Figure 4. Evolution of EC budget commitments to the PT 
 
Source: European Commission External Relations: Occupied Palestinian Territory, EC Support to the 
Palestinians in 2008 [cited 1 Dec. 2009]. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
occupied_palestinian_territory/ec_assistance/ec_aid_to_pa_2008_en.pdf. 
 
Box 6. Overview of EU–PT economic aid relations 
The European Commission’s economic instruments are incorporated into the various EC support 
programmes and funds. Within the 2007-13 financial framework, 5.7% (or €53.3 billion) of the 
total EU budget for that period (about €862 billion) has been devoted to the ‘EU as a Global 
Partner’. The most important instruments are the ENPI and the development cooperation 
instrument, which receive in total nearly €29 billion (or 54%).
395 The EC also supports the MEPP 
and allocated for the period 2005-10 an ENP budget of €20 million to help that objective.
396 
Despite positive growth rates during 2003-05, real GDP per capita declined after the 2006 
elections. Under current conditions of suspension of revenue transfers by the government of Israel 
and increasing trade and labour restrictions, macroeconomic projections for 2006 pointed to a real 
GDP contraction of around 18%, and a GDP per capita and personal income per capita 
contraction of around 21%. The UN Economic and Social Council underlined that for 2006, 
unemployment (estimated at 23% in 2005) was expected to climb as high as 35%, with poverty 
levels (estimated at 44% in 2005) at close to 65% of the population.
397  
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Box 6. cont’d 
Economic distress in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank has been aggravated by the compounded 
action of several factors: continued restrictions on movement and access between Gaza and the 
West Bank as well as to and from Gaza, suspension of the transfer of clearance revenues by the 
government of Israel and reductions in the number of Palestinian workers permitted to work 
inside Israel.
398 (See also Figure B3.1 in Box 3 above.) According to Official Development 
Assistance figures,  
[o]ver the last few years, a sharp increase in aid was registered: while in the period 2000-
04 the average annual EC support amounted to €245 million, it was increased to €280 
million in 2005, to €340 million in 2006, and to €550 million in 2007. On top of that, 
bilateral contributions of EU member states have also increased considerably (totalling 
€315 million in 2005, €385 million in 2006, and €405 million in 2007).
399  
For 2008, the EC committed €486 million in assistance to the Palestinians mainly to cover the 
running costs of the PA and to support the PRDP. “In addition, as the PA found itself in extreme 
financial difficulties, the EU repeatedly provided extra funds to help the PA meet its recurrent 
expenditures and ensure the continued delivery of public services as well as emergency aid.”
400 
At the December 2007 donor conference in Paris, representatives of states and organisations 
pledged a reported $7.7 billion of assistance to support the implementation of the PRDP. “While 
these pledges signalled collective international support for the peace process and the West Bank 
government of Salam Fayyad, the actual transfer of funds has been delayed in many cases, 
causing cash flow problems for the PA.”
401 EIDHR-II was granted a budget of €1.1 billion for the 
budgetary period 2007-13, of which the PT has received €2.7 million so far.
402 
The EU and its member states are the major multilateral donors to the Palestinians. “In 2003, the 
EC ranked first in disbursements in Palestine (about 25% of total disbursements).”
403 The total EC 
funds distributed reached $3.5 billion by 2009. On top of that, EU member state assistance is 
estimated to amount to $3 billion over the same period. Next in line is the US, which has 
distributed $1.3 billion so far, followed by Saudi Arabia with $1 billion and other Arab nations 
totalling $1 billion.
404 Indeed, in comparison with all of the EU neighbouring partners (eastern and 
southern), the PT and Morocco seem to have received the lion’s share of the ENPI assistance.
405 
(Figure B6.1) 
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Box 6. cont’d 
Figure B6.1. ENPI funding distribution for the budgetary period 2007-13 
 
Note: The PT percentage is calculated from instruments other than the ENPI (i.e. TIM and PEGASE) for the 
same period. These are planning figures only and the percentages calculated are based on data provided by 
Europa, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI): Funding 2007-2013. 
In 2005, EU disbursements for emergency, budget and development aid were relatively evenly 
split. After 2006, development assistance dropped from a third of all disbursements in 2005 to 
under 10% in 2007, while budget support rose from a third in 2005 to nearly 70% in 2007.
406 (See 
Figure B6.2.) 
Figure B6.2. EU assistance to the Palestinians 2005-07 
 
Source: Palestinian National Authority: Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, 
“International Assistance to the Palestinian People (2005-2007)”. 
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The following subsections examine three parameters of the ENP’s economic dimension: aid, 
development and infrastructures; fiscal policy reform; and trade, taxation and investments 
management. Examples for each parameter are given to highlight the change in the EU’s 
economic policies in the PT since Hamas won the elections in 2006. 
a. Economic aid, development and infrastructure 
From 2004 to 2006, the international community continued its support of the PA, but mainly 
through direct budget support and humanitarian assistance; the EU resumed its development aid 
as the second intifada calmed down. But once Hamas won the PLC elections and formed a 
government in early 2006, all financial assistance was frozen. This did not last long, though, as 
the humanitarian situation deteriorated – causing unrest in the PT – and the rift grew between 
Hamas and Fatah. The EU resumed its financial assistance solely to the Fatah-led PA and to the 
suffering civilians in the Gaza Strip, while excluding the Hamas government.
407 To keep the PA 
alive, the EU transferred contributions in the form of direct support to the salaries and pensions 
of PA employees (Fatah faction) in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, even when they did not 
work. The EU also gave social allowances in the form of direct cheques,  
to vulnerable families and payments for the fuel bill of the Gaza power plant. PEGASE 
transferred funds from the EU Budget as well as bilateral funds of 14 Member States. 
Humanitarian aid in the areas of food aid, emergency job creation, health, psycho-
social support, water and sanitation and protection has continued through ECHO in 
parallel. The EC has also maintained its support to UNRWA through a contribution to 
the General Fund of €66 million and several other projects exceeding an overall 
contribution of €113 million in 2008. [An] additional €4.4 million [was] programmed 
in 2007-08 for the PT under the thematic programme: Non-State Actors and Local 
Authorities in Development.
408 
In the words of UN envoy de Soto, between 2006 and 2007, “Europeans have spent more 
money in boycotting the PA than what they previously spent in supporting it”.
409 Taking all 
contributions together (ENPI, humanitarian assistance and the instrument for stability), total 
funding for the Palestinian people in 2008 amounted to €486 million.
410 Meanwhile, overall 
economic growth in the PT in 2008 “remained below 2% GDP, well below the population 
growth of 3.8%, leading to a continued decrease of per-capita income”.
411 
The PT therefore did not see much development for two years after Hamas won the elections. 
By the end of 2007, the EU pledged its assistance to the West Bank government of Salam 
Fayyad, to support the implementation of his PRDP.
412 Before long, the issue of energy was 
taking centre stage. The European Commission launched a pilot project on wind energy and the 
PA (in the West Bank) developed plans for a solar power plant in Jericho. In mid-2008, the PA, 
Israel and the European Commission re-launched trilateral energy cooperation with the aim of 
facilitating the joint Palestinian–Israeli “Solar for Peace” initiative and the establishment of a  
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joint energy office. A study financed by the European Commission was undertaken to support 
this project, but progress was stalled as Israel launched its offensive in Gaza by the end of the 
year.
413 
b. Fiscal policy reforms: Conditionality, transparency and anti-corruption 
After the second intifada, particularly in 2003-05, the EU focused its efforts on the Palestinian 
fiscal reform process, through strengthening the financial control mechanisms and enhancing 
the PA’s reporting on budget execution and public debts. Efforts were also directed at 
developing a unified pension system covering all public employees, integrating the PA’s donor-
funded investment budget into the overall budget and bringing the investment budget under the 
direct control of the minister of finance.
414 
Notwithstanding the crisis in Gaza and the deep rift between Hamas and Fatah, the fiscal reform 
process in the West Bank seems to have been successful in reinforcing transparency in the PA’s 
public finances. Indeed, it has helped to consolidate all sources of PA revenues into a single 
treasury account, which is closely monitored by the IMF. Moreover, the EU has ensured that the 
finance ministry is fully responsible for managing the PA’s payroll, and has maintained a freeze 
on public sector hiring along with a strict ceiling for expenditures under an austerity budget. A 
recent IMF report states that the Palestinian Monitory Authority “has made considerable 
progress during 2008 in internal reform and capacity-building, including in strengthening the 
supervisory framework and governance”.
415  Nevertheless, “safeguards against corruption 
continue to be weak due to the lack both of an adequate legal framework and of enforcement 
measures. Bodies established to monitor corruption remain weak without adequate resources to 
fulfil their mandates.”
416  
c. Trade and taxation  
Thanks to the increased facilitation of trade between the EU and the PT, and the EU’s intentions 
to better implement the Interim Association Agreement, EU–PT trade improved during the 
2004-06 period, but remained limited because of Israel’s restrictions and low cash flow.
417 
In the period 2006-08, the PT faced political as well as financial crises. These crises stemmed 
from international sanctions imposed as a reaction to Hamas’s victory, followed by Israel’s 
suspension of $55 million in monthly VAT for a year and a half to the Hamas-led 
government.
418 This in turn led to an exasperated humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, coupled 
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with an economic slowdown in the PT. In 2008, “Palestinian exports to the EU decreased 
dramatically by 49.1%, while imports from the EU increased by 37.1%”.
419 
3.2.3  Cultural dimension  
EC funds targeting Palestinian civil society improved slightly between 2003 and 2005; 
nevertheless, as a percentage of total aid disbursements it steadily declined between 2005 and 
2007 (e.g. 7% in 2005, 5% in 2006 and 2% in 2007). After the electoral victory of Hamas, the 
EU completely halted its financial support and half a year later switched its focus to support for 
the Fatah-led PA government budget and emergency assistance, neglecting the development aid 
that covers civil society and cultural projects. A shrinking budget, in conjunction with the 
logistical difficulties associated with Israel’s imposed restrictions on movement, led to the 
failure in reaching tangible and sustainable results in this domain.
420 
Notwithstanding the EU’s neglect of the cultural basket in the PT, there is a rising awareness 
among European politicians of the need to nurture a healthy Palestinian civil society, among 
other partners, for the sake of sustainable peace-building. Thus, culture and dialogue among 
cultures have enjoyed increasing importance in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in recent 
years – an observation underscored by the many joint actions and cooperation programmes that 
have been implemented: the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation, EuroMed Audiovisual, 
EuroMed Heritage, the Regional Information and Communication programmes and the 
EuroMed Youth Programme. But still more needs to be done and the EU knows it. Hence, the 
meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs in Lisbon (November 2007) agreed on a Euro-
Mediterranean partnership work plan, including the organisation of the third EuroMed 
conference of ministers of culture in Athens, which was held on 29-30 May 2008.
421 
The Conference in Athens took place during the ‘2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’ 
and in the specific context of the ‘2008 Euro-Mediterranean Year of Dialogue between 
Cultures’. Building on previous meetings (Bologna 1996 and Rhodes 1998), and the meeting of 
the Euro-Mediterranean ministers of foreign affairs (Crete 2003) devoted to the dialogue among 
cultures, the conference offered a good opportunity to exchange views on the cultural dimension 
of the partnership. “The Ministers agreed on a set of conclusions, from which the main objective 
is to mark the starting point of a fully-fledged Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Strategy, 
encompassing cooperation in both dialogue between cultures and cultural policy.” An ad hoc 
working group at the expert level was created to draw up this Euro-Mediterranean cultural 
strategy as well as tangible proposals to be endorsed by the next meeting of the ministers of 
culture in 2010.
422 It is hoped that this cultural strategy will bring some concrete projects to 
invigorate the Palestinian civil society and reach some critical mass – a factor that has been 
missing.
423 
The next subsections look at three parameters of the ENP’s cultural dimension (i.e. supporting 
civil society and the media, empowering women and youth, and fostering peace education and 
cultural exchanges). Examples for each parameter are provided to demonstrate not only the 
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change in EU policy towards the PT since Hamas won the 2006 elections, but also the 
continuous lack of EU effectiveness in how to involve and transform the societal level and the 
psychological structure of the PT.  
a. Supporting civil society and the media  
The period 2004-05 saw an increase in the EU’s awareness of the need for intercultural 
programmes to foster dialogue and understanding among Palestinians, Israelis and Europeans. 
Different activities involving Palestinian civil society and media were introduced.  
Although the events at the beginning of 2006 put a strain on the actors’ movement and 
communication, most programmes have continued (facing logistical restrictions), while others 
were created. The Partnership for Peace programme has expanded its activities and broadened 
its scope,
424 and media competitions have been organised in which Palestinian journalists could 
participate for the first time. For example, since 2006 the competition for the Samir Kassir 
Awards for Freedom of the Press has been organised by the Delegation of the European 
Commission in Lebanon in collaboration with the Samir Kassir Foundation. These awards are 
dedicated to the assassinated journalist and writer Samir Kassir (of a Palestinian father and a 
Syrian mother) with the objective of perpetuating his commitment to the rule of law. They are 
open to journalists from all MEDA countries and include prize monies between €10,000-
15,000.
425 Another media award was established in 2007 to be utilised on reporting for 
promoting and spreading children’s rights. The EC covers 80% of its financing, which could 
amount to €187,000.
426 
b. Empowering women and youth  
Dr Zahira Kamal, the director of the Palestinian Women’s Research and Documentation Centre 
at UNESCO, recently presented an overview of the current numbers of women in decision-
making positions globally, but with a specific focus on the EuroMed region – including 
Palestinian society.  
Women currently account for 17.7% of members of national parliaments globally. 
According to data from 2007, the Arab region has the lowest average representation of 
women in both the upper and the lower houses at under 10%. The percentage of 
women parliamentarians is highest in Tunis and Iraq with figures of 20% and 25% 
respectively. The lowest numbers are in Lebanon, where only 4.7% of parliamentarians 
are female.
427 
The social situation for Palestinian women remains difficult, more so than the situation for 
Palestinian men. For the same period and age group, women have a higher illiteracy rate than 
men (9.6% versus 2.7%),
428 higher unemployment rates compared with men with the same 
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credentials (only 14.7% of women were in employment, compared with 52% of men).
429 
Women are also more exposed to domestic violence than men (almost a quarter of married 
women in the PT have been exposed to at least one episode of physical violence at the hands of 
their husbands, compared with 4.2% of Palestinian men being physically assaulted by their 
wives in that same period).
430  
Nonetheless, in 2005, “an unprecedented number of women have stepped forward onto the 
political scene following the [Palestinian] parliament’s introduction in 2004 of a long-awaited 
quota system”, which guaranteed them a greater level of participation in political life at both 
local and parliamentary levels.
431 That same year, two female Palestinian ambassadors were 
appointed to serve in France and at the European Commission.
432 Moreover, the 2005 PA 
Action Plan addressed women’s rights and promoted equal treatment and opportunities for 
Palestinian women.
433  
Many women ran in municipal elections during 2004-05, the first municipal elections held in 28 
years. In the first round, which took place in the West Bank, a record 139 women took part in 
the ballot and won an impressive 50 of the 306 seats competed for in local councils – nearly 
17% of the total. Similar results have been recorded in subsequent rounds.
434 
By the end of 2005, “women represent[ed] just over 47% of the 1.34 million registered voters” 
in the PLC elections in the PT. Hence, their votes and entry into politics will definitely have an 
impact on the broader political picture. As the parliamentary elections of 2006 approached, a 
higher number of women, many of them Islamists, were expected to compete.
435 
Thanks to the quota system in the 2006 PLC elections, numerous women – including the wives 
and widows of notable political figures – took up seats in the Palestinian parliament: the number 
of female deputies rose from 5 (1996 elections) to 17 out of the 132 parliamentary seats.
436 Yet, 
after the detention of more than half of the parliamentarians (mostly Hamas members) in Israeli 
jails, the PLC stopped its legislative activity, so it remains unclear what legislative role women 
(could) have actually played, if any, in their short-lived term in power. 
At the first ministerial conference on “Strengthening the Role of Women in Society”, held in 
Istanbul on 14 November 2006 under the Finnish EU presidency, ministers adopted a five-year 
framework for action “to strengthen women’s role in political, civil, social, economic and 
cultural spheres”, as well as to fight against discrimination and violence. The second ministerial 
conference was held three years later in Marrakesh in November 2009 under the Swedish EU 
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presidency, which reiterated the previous commitment to strengthening the role of women in 
society, and it was decided to hold a third conference in 2012.
437  
For the first time in PLO history, the Palestinian National Council elected a woman, Hanan 
Ashrawi, to the Executive Committee on 27 August 2009. Ashrawi, a Christian PLC member 
from the Third-Way party and a former PA minister of higher education, was elected to the 
PLO’s highest decision-making body shortly after Fatah’s long-awaited (20 years) sixth 
convention and party elections took place in Bethlehem in August 2009. “The era of done deals 
that exclude women is over”, said Ashrawi, who won 182 votes.
438  
Between 2004 and 2006, the European Commission was involved with Palestinian youth 
through the EuroMed Youth II programme. The upgraded EuroMed III Programme was 
launched in 2006 with a focus on “mobility, non-formal education and intercultural learning”. It 
covers some new criteria, including “Euro-Med Youth Exchanges; Euro-Med Youth Voluntary 
Service; [and] Euro-Med Youth Support Measures (Job-shadowing, Contact Making Seminars, 
Study Visits, Training Courses and Workshops)”.
439 Its geographical scope comprises 37 
countries: 27 EU member states and 10 of the Mediterranean signatories of the Barcelona 
Declaration (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey). The “novelty of this phase is the decentralised implementation of the 
programme”, seeking to bring the action “as close as possible to the beneficiaries and to adapt it 
to the diversity of national systems and situations in the field of youth... Applicants (project 
leaders) from the Mediterranean partners apply directly for grants to their own national youth 
authorities, now responsible through the Euro-Med Youth Unit for grant awarding and the 
overall management of the programme.”
440 
c. Fostering peace education and cultural exchanges  
Peace education and cultural exchanges, particularly between Palestinians and Israelis, have 
been hampered by the events following the PLC 2006 elections, the deepening rift between 
Hamas and Fatah and the Israeli-imposed restrictions on movement since the second intifada. 
Nevertheless, the first Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) was established in Piran 
(Slovenia) during the Slovenian EU presidency – representing one of the six priority projects of 
the UfM, which were confirmed within the Common Declaration adopted in Paris on 13 July 
2008.
441 The General Assembly of EMUNI includes members from Palestinian universities in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The year “2008 also saw the first meeting of the expert’s level 
Ad Hoc Working Group, which was created to guide the implementation of the conclusions of 
the First Education Ministerial Conference held in Cairo in 2007”.
442 
3.2.4  Migration dimension  
This is the newest chapter (or basket) added to Euro-Mediterranean relations, which was 
announced during the tenth anniversary ceremony of the Barcelona process on 28 November 
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2005. It came in response to the escalation in terrorist attacks within Europe, particularly in 
Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005).
443 
The Five-Year Work Programme of the Barcelona summit (2005-10) called for enhanced 
cooperation in the fields of migration, social integration, justice and security through a 
comprehensive and integrated approach with the following six stated objectives:
444 
a)  promoting legal migration opportunities, 
b)  reducing significantly the level of illegal migration, 
c)  pursuing the modernisation and efficiency of the administration of justice, 
d)  reinforcing judicial cooperation (including cross-border issues), 
e)  facilitating solutions to mixed marriage disputes and the trafficking of women and children, 
and 
f)  implementing the relevant UN conventions on combating organised crime and drugs. 
To contribute to these objectives, it was decided to
445 
a)  hold ministerial meetings to discuss all issues pertinent to migration, 
b)  develop mechanisms for practical cooperation and sharing experiences,  
c)  promote schemes for safer and easier channels for the efficient transfer of migrants, and 
d)  enhance cooperation to fight illegal migration, organised crime and arms smuggling. 
The European Council agreed in December 2005 on a new global approach to migration
 
and that 
priority actions should focus on Africa and the Mediterranean for 2006. Cooperation in the field 
of justice, security and migration was at the top of the agenda of the ENP. For instance, the 
European Commission’s Communication on strengthening the ENP in December 2006
 
identified the following “action points” concerning mobility and migration:  
a)  facilitating visas, removing obstacles to legitimate travel (e.g. for business, education, 
tourism and official purposes); and  
b)  ensuring well-managed mobility and migration, and cooperating in fighting illegal 
immigration.
446  
Indeed, concerning immigration the EU has a “broad range of instruments at its disposal for 
tailoring its external cooperation to the situation of each country”. In the case of the 
Mediterranean countries in general, and the PT in particular, these include Action Plans.
447  
Under the Portuguese EU presidency, the first Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting on 
migration was held in Albufeira (Algarve) on 19 November 2007.
 
During this meeting, where 
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facilitating legal movement was considered one of the key elements of the cooperation, political 
and operational conclusions were approved.
448 In its December 2007 Communication on a 
stronger ENP,
 
the European Commission noted that “the promotion of mobility will go hand in 
hand with the commitment of our partners to increase security and justice and fight illegal 
migration, with efforts to strengthen our neighbours’ capacity to deal with migratory flows to 
their countries, and with the security of documents”.
449 It must be stressed that this issue is also 
one of the priority areas of the ENP Regional Indicative Programme for 2007-13, which 
identifies a number of concrete projects.
450 (See also Box 7 on the EuroMed migration policy 
budget.) 
Box 7. Overview of the EuroMed migration policy budget 
The EuroMed Migration-I (2004-07), with a €2 million budget,  
aimed to promote analysis and cooperation on questions linked to migration, and the 
social integration of immigrants. The project developed four research programmes: 
migration, transfers and development; transit migration; border management; and 
Diaspora and countries of origin. A database with information on migratory flows in the 
Mediterranean region has been created and studies were conducted on different areas, 
such as the Annual Report on Mediterranean Migration.
451  
The new EuroMed Migration-II (2008-11), with €5 million, “aims to strengthen the EuroMed 
cooperation in the management of migration, so as to build up the Mediterranean Partners’ 
capacity to provide an effective, targeted and comprehensive solution for the various forms of 
migration”. Four working groups involved in the management of migration were set up on 
legislative convergence and institutional reform, labour migration, institutional response and 
national strategies to combat illegal immigration, and migration and remittances by migrants to 
their countries of origin.
452 
 
According to Eurostat statistics of 2008, it seems that the level of Palestinian migration to the 
EU is among the smallest of the Mediterranean partners, reaching a low total of 1,477 
(compared with Turkish 2,395,265 and Moroccan 1,718,738), next only to Jordanian migration 
(17,217). Among EU member states, the most common migration destination of Palestinians is 
France (595), followed by Italy (316), then Belgium (267) and the Czech Republic (104).
453 
There was a recorded increase in migration from the southern Mediterranean partners to the EU 
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after 2000. In 1999, the total share of migration to the EU from the southern Mediterranean 
partners was 1.9%, which increased to 8.4% in 2000 and further to 17% in 2001. It is not clear, 
however, whether this was related to the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 or whether 
these immigrants were from the PT or other partner countries.
454 (See Figure 5.) 
Figure 5. Immigration of southern Mediterranean countries to the EU-15 (2000) 
 
* Derived from Eurostat. The ‘P’ in the figure stands for PT, but there are no data available specifically 
for the PT. 
** According to the source, nationality-specific details for eastern and southern countries are not 
available.  
Source: European Commission, Communication on Wider Europe–Neighbourhood: A New Framework 
for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 
2003. 
 
The ENP has stressed the following three goals in relation to immigration from Mediterranean 
partners (including the PT): 
a)  combating terrorism, the anti-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms 
control;  
b)  fighting organised crime, i.e. human and drug trafficking as well as illegal migration; and 
c)  providing social justice and integration measures for immigrants. 
Still, it remains unclear how the EU implements its migration policies in the PT with the help of 
the PA, given that the PT is under occupation and lacking control of its own borders. 
Nevertheless, the EU police and rule of law missions in the West Bank might help implement 
some aspects of the EU’s migration goals – especially those involving anti-terrorism measures, 
criminal justice apparatus and the judiciary.  
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3.3  Union for the Mediterranean (mid-2008 to 2010) 
If we are all gathered here, it is because we all believe that the European dream and 
the Mediterranean dream are inextricably linked, that they will come true together or 
they will be broken together.  
Extract from President Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech at the Union for the Mediterranean summit.
455 
In an attempt to avoid the deadlock and inflexibility imposed by the conditionality associated 
with the ENP and to revive the MEPP through a European initiative, the second half of 2008 
marked the beginning of a new phase for the multilateral EMP track. More specifically, it 
entailed not replacing the EMP but building upon it, while keeping the bilateral ENP framework 
in place for those interested in joining it. Under the auspices of the six-month French presidency 
of the EU, President Nicolas Sarkozy initiated the Barcelona process: Union for the 
Mediterranean (BP: UfM) on 13 July 2008 – previously known as the Mediterranean Union – in 
an effort to revive the Barcelona process. This new community has its joint secretariat 
headquarters in Barcelona and includes 43 members: all 27 EU countries and 16 Mediterranean 
partners plus an observer. These include Arab League members Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the PT, Mauritania (not Mediterranean but a member of the Arab 
Maghreb Union), Jordan (not Mediterranean) and Libya (only an observer). They are joined by 
EU (potential) candidate countries Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and 
Turkey, along with others (Israel and Monaco) (see also Table 1 above). 
The concept was originally presented during Sarkozy’s election campaign, which he started 
implementing once he assumed office on 16 May 2007 – hoping it would be enforced during 
France’s EU presidency a year later. Sarkozy first sent an invitation to all Mediterranean 
leaders, calling them for a summit to take place in June 2008 where they would lay the 
foundations of a Mediterranean Union. The idea of a Mediterranean Union was proposed at the 
time as an alternative to Turkey’s EU membership, whereby Turkey would be the backbone of 
the newly created Mediterranean Union. This Union would include the EU member states 
bordering the Mediterranean Sea
456 and the Mediterranean partners, while non-Mediterranean 
EU member states would be granted observer status. Yet, this plan was fiercely rejected by both 
Germany and Turkey. The former felt it would be excluded (as a non-Mediterranean country) 
and refused to finance Mediterranean Union projects on which it had no influence, while the 
latter rejected the idea of being part of any group that would undermine its EU membership 
aspirations. Other EU states also rejected Sarkozy’s proposal, seeing it either as a means to push 
France’s interests in the region, worrying that it might create a division among existing EU 
member states, or duplicate efforts that would be detrimental to the existing EMP policies in the 
area.
457  
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Left with no choice and dreading to lose completely his ‘Mediterranean dream’ – a vision of a 
‘Club Med’ that would project his legacy – at the start of 2008 Sarkozy decided to respond to 
the criticism. He modified his original plan by including all EU states and giving Turkey 
guarantees that its involvement would not affect its EU accession negotiations (which had 
begun in 2005). Once German Chancellor Angela Merkel was promised a seat at the table and 
Ankara received its assurances of EU membership prospects, they declared that they were ready 
to take part in the planned Mediterranean Union. But by February 2008, the Mediterranean 
Union was renamed the BP: UfM, reflecting the Barcelona process and clearly indicating the 
continuity between the old and the new initiatives.
458  
The EMP was formally re-launched as the UfM on 13 July 2008 in Paris. The summit was co-
chaired by France and Egypt. Among those present were all EU and Mediterranean members as 
well as the president of the European Commission (José Manuel Barroso), high representative 
for the CFSP (Javier Solana), the UN secretary-general (Ban Ki-moon) and the secretary-
general of the League of Arab States (Amr Moussa).
459 The meeting was a diplomatic success 
for France and “more than anything, a victory for Sarkozy… [Moreover,] even if the result is 
quite a bit different [from] the Mediterranean Union the French president had envisioned”, he 
still succeeded in gathering Ehud Olmert, Mahmoud Abbas and Bashar Al-Assad (Israeli, 
Palestinian and Syrian leaders respectively) at the same table on a rare occasion of unity.
460  
This relative success of France does not mean the summit went smoothly or without any last-
minute hurdles. On the contrary, at first Israel strongly objected to the Arab League receiving an 
observer status at UfM meetings, but later accepted this in exchange for holding the three-year 
rotating post of deputy secretary-general.
461 Furthermore, on the eve of the summit establishing 
the UfM, the Arab League held a meeting in Paris to establish a common position, the result of 
which led to a half-hour deadlock over a Palestinian–Israeli disagreement on the wording of the 
summit declaration.
462 The Palestinians rejected the Israeli insistence on use of the phrase “state 
for the Jewish people”, saying this infringes the rights of the non-Jewish Israelis within Israel, 
and hinders the right of return for Arab refugees to the “Jewish” state. At the end, Palestinian 
demands were granted and “the final text had to undergo some little changes” before it was 
unanimously adopted.
463 
Four months later, the UfM was at an impasse again, but this time it was over “where to base its 
headquarters, who should attend meetings and who should get the top jobs”. On 3 November 
2008, foreign ministers from the EU and their Mediterranean partners met in Marseilles and 
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engaged in “a round of horse-trading” designed to iron out differences and find a way out of the 
deadlock.
464 After a lengthy debate, Barcelona was chosen as the secretariat’s base, to be led by 
a secretary-general
465 and five deputy secretary-generals,
466 from both the EU and the southern 
Mediterranean region – yet to be determined. “Representatives from Israel and Palestine need to 
be included as joint secretary-generals. But any attempt to bring the two camps closer through 
the Union seems to stop there.”
467 A co-presidency system for a non-renewable period of two 
years was also established, to be presided over by one Mediterranean state and shared between 
an EU state followed by the rotating presidency of the EU. (For instance, 2008-09 saw 
France/Czech Republic on the EU side and France/Sweden in 2009-10, while from the south 
Egypt served as co-president for the 2008-10 period.)
468  
At the outset of the project, two camps emerged from the south: the sceptics and the optimists. 
From the first camp, voices were heard expressing doubts about the initiative, which included 
the PA, the Arab League and Libya. Leila Shahid, the general delegate of the PLO to the EU, 
warned against the risk of launching the UfM “in spite of the inexistence of a Palestinian 
state”.
469 Amr Moussa, secretary-general of the Arab League, suggested that regional problems 
in the Middle East must be sincerely addressed before any form of Mediterranean Union could 
succeed.
470 Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi feared the Mediterranean Union would replace the 
African Union and divide the African countries, while being nothing but another imperialist 
Roman Empire in European clothes.
471 Other critics of the Mediterranean Union have claimed 
that controversial issues such as migration and terrorism have been left out of the scope of the 
new set-up. A second look, however, reveals that these are addressed in the main official UfM 
documents (i.e. the Joint Declaration of the Paris summit for the Mediterranean in July 2008, 
and the final statement of the ministerial conference in Marseille in November 2008).
472  
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Despite these doubts, cautioned optimism was also heard from Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak and Israeli President Shimon Peres.
473  
But how does the UfM differ from its predecessor, the EMP/Barcelona process (launched in 
1995)? What else does it offer its members? The UfM, like the EMP, is “the framework of 
multilateral relations” between EU countries and the Mediterranean non-EU countries. It 
“complements bilateral relations, which will continue to develop under the ENP and the pre-
accession framework. It also builds upon the acquis and reinforces the achievements of the 
Barcelona Process.”
474 While the goals and cooperation areas of the Barcelona Declaration (i.e. 
political and security dialogue; economic and free trade support; human, social and cultural 
empowerment) remain valid, the UfM breathes life into the process in three ways, by
475 
•  upgrading the political level of the relationship between the EU and its Mediterranean 
partners (e.g. inviting heads of states to the negotiation table); 
•  reinforcing co-ownership of multilateral relations through a system of co-presidencies (one 
from the EU and one from the Mediterranean side), by setting up a shared secretariat in 
Barcelona responsible for identifying and promoting projects across different sectors, and 
using a joint permanent committee to ensure north–south parity; and 
•  making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional, trans-regional 
and sub-regional tangible projects, relevant for the citizens of the region. 
In addition, at the 2008 Paris summit, the six priority projects were identified for the UfM
476 
(see Boxes 8 and 9).  
Box 8. Euro-Mediterranean relations over 15 years 
I.  EMP 1995–2008 (multilateral) 
1) Political  dimension 
a. Security and stability 
b. Democracy and good governance 
c. Rule of law and human rights, the judiciary and fundamental freedoms 
2)  Economic dimension 
a. Economic aid, development and infrastructures 
b. Fiscal policy reforms, conditionality, transparency and anti-corruption 
c. Trade and taxation 
3)  Cultural dimension 
a. Supporting civil society and the media 
b. Empowering women and youth 
c. Fostering peace education and cultural exchanges 
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Box 8. cont’d 
II.  ENP 2004–present (bilateral) 
1)  Political dimension 
a. Security and stability 
b. Democracy and good governance 
c. Rule of law and human rights, the judiciary and fundamental freedoms 
2)  Economic dimension 
a. Economic aid, development and infrastructures 
b. Fiscal policy reforms, conditionality, transparency and anti-corruption 
c. Trade and taxation 
3)  Cultural dimension 
a. Supporting civil society and the media 
b. Empowering women and youth 
c. Fostering peace education and cultural exchanges 
4)  Migration dimension 
a. Combating terrorism, anti-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and arms control 
b. Fighting organised crime, human and drug trafficking, and illegal migration 
c. Providing social justice and integration measures for immigrants 
 
III.  UfM 2008-present (multilateral) 
1)  Initiatives 
a. Upgrading the political level of the relationship between the EU and Mediterranean partners 
b. Reinforcing co-ownership of multilateral relations 
c. Making these relations more visible through additional tangible projects 
2)  Projects 
a. De-pollution of the Mediterranean 
b. Construction of maritime and land highways 
c. Civil protection from the effects of climate change and man-made or natural disasters 
d. Identifying alternative energies & the Mediterranean Solar Plan  
e. Encouraging higher education and research through the EMUNI in Slovenia 
f. Supporting business initiatives focusing on small & medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
 
Box 9. Overview of the UfM budget and EU–PT economic aid 
Funding and implementation of UfM projects will be pursued on a case-by-case basis and will 
require a high degree of donor coordination. The Commission envisages mobilising financial 
resources through various sources:
477 
•  the private sector; 
•  bilateral cooperation from EU member states; 
•  contributions from Mediterranean partners; 
•  the FEMIP provided by the EIB; 
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Box 9. cont’d 
•  Community budget for the Mediterranean, such as the ENP South Regional Programmes, 
ENPI EuroMed Envelop, the Neighbourhood investment facility and the cross-border 
cooperation instrument, all of them within the ENPI; 
•  other instruments applicable to the countries covered by the initiative, for which the usual 
selection and procedural rules will continue to apply; and 
•  other countries, international financial institutions or regional banks. 
Additional financial provisions include the following ones:
478 
•  The cost of the secretariat (staff, equipment, etc.) will be funded from an operating grant on a 
shared-balanced basis by Euro-Mediterranean partners (voluntarily), and by the EC budget 
(from existing resources within the ENPI). 
•  The host country will provide the premises of the secretariat free of charge. 
•  Seconded officials will be financed by their respective administrations (possibly through a 
trust fund). 
•  Initial financial contributions shall be made available as soon as the statutes are adopted, so as 
to allow the secretariat to start functioning by May 2009. 
•  Funding provisions should reflect the EU and Mediterranean partners’ co-responsibility of the 
UfM.  
On the eve of the first anniversary of launching the UfM, the European Commission announced a 
further contribution of €72 million for 2009-10, in addition to the original amount of €18 million 
dedicated since July 2008. Irrespective of the political blockage (discussed below), the 
Commission has kept busy implementing the activities regarded as priorities in Paris and has 
since provided or earmarked €90 million to achieve its goals. To this amount, contributions of 
more than €50 million from the EIB and from the European Neighbourhood investment facility 
need to be added, bringing the total budget to about €150 million.
479 
On 2 March 2009, world leaders met in Sharm El-Sheikh for another Palestinian donors’ 
conference, which was co-sponsored by the European Commission. At the meeting, Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner, European commissioner for external relations, pledged €436 million for 2009 in 
support of the Palestinian economy for the reconstruction of Gaza. This offer is comparable with 
the €440 million that was made available in 2008 following the December 2007 Paris donors’ 
conference. The Commissioner also reiterated her offer “to all donors to use PEGASE to channel 
their assistance to the people in Gaza”, which she considered a “quick, effective, efficient [tool] 
and in compliance with the highest international standards of monitoring and control”.
480 
 
The partnership is expected to provide “new impetus to regional cooperation by agreeing on a 
set of priority development projects that [would] create de facto solidarity between participating 
nations” while addressing institutional imbalance and weak visibility – issues that have imbued 
the EMP. Hopes are also high that the structure of the UfM, based on a shared presidency 
between north and south, will “increase co-ownership in the process and give it more political 
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authority via regular [highest-level] summits, to be held every two years”.
481 Robert del Picchia, 
a French senator and member of the EMPA, recently authored a report about the UfM for the 
French Senate,
482 wherein he pointed out that 
[t]he purpose of the project is to strengthen bilateral relations between the southern and 
northern states on each side of the Mediterranean... The UfM objective is to say that if 
we cannot agree politically, we must at least try to implement the projects. One or two 
countries from the north can agree with some southern countries to implement 
projects... If this works, other countries will join such initiatives. If north and south are 
able to achieve concrete projects, we will be able to think about a political solution.
483 
Notwithstanding these benefits, critics of the initiative remain concerned about the overlap and 
duplication of the UfM with the existing ENP policies, which might reduce the effectiveness of 
the EU’s activities in the region. The loss of the civil society dimension is a further worry. This 
initiative also allows more room for the southern countries to escape unpopular EU policies 
based on human rights and democratisation as it is project-oriented without clearly set 
benchmarks – depriving the EU of its limited leverage on southern countries.
484 
The short success story of the UfM has been hampered by two consecutive hurdles. The first has 
been the international financial/economic crisis, hitting its peak in September 2008 and 
affecting all partners to some extent or another. Nevertheless, when asked about the effects of 
the financial crisis on the project, del Picchia said “it could be either positive or negative”. He 
elaborated further that “some countries may choose to fund projects which create jobs. 
Moreover, some markets may experience strong growth in the south of the Mediterranean and 
thus assist countries in the north [that] now [experience] financial or industrial problems.”
485  
The second and worse problem relates to Israel’s devastating bombing campaign in Gaza from 
27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009 (code-named ‘Operation Cast Lead’), which took place 
under the command of acting Prime Minister Tzipi Livni (who had replaced Ehud Olmert on 21 
September 2008 as Kadima party leader). The operation – unprecedented in its magnitude of 
harm to the population – came as Israel’s response to Hamas formally announcing the end of its 
unwritten six-month truce with Israel and resuming violence by firing four rockets into southern 
Israel on 19 November 2009. Hamas in turn blamed Israel for ending the ceasefire, charging it 
with “imposing a painful economic blockade on Gaza”.
486 The Israeli military incursion into 
Gaza not only worsened the socio-economic situation for Gazans but also blocked Euro-
Mediterranean progress in the entire region. Arab countries in particular were reluctant to 
continue to participate in UfM meetings after the Gaza war. Israel, for its part, “did not want the 
Arab League to attend meetings”. Thus, “as things stand now, there are no more meetings on the  
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agenda. The process is half-frozen”, del Picchia admitted, before insisting that “the project 
remains. Experts and diplomats are working ahead without the official endorsement of the 
institutions.”
487 
Some analysts say the Gaza war was a way for the Israeli government, particularly the Kadima 
party, to redeem itself before the upcoming elections after its non-victory in the Lebanese war 
earlier in 2006.
488 Nonetheless, with its 22-day war against Gaza, Israel has been losing the 
European public-opinion battle, especially with a death toll of over 1,300 on the Palestinian side 
(100 times more than on the Israeli side), at least half of them civilians. Although Europeans 
seem to blame both sides (Israel and Hamas) for the violent confrontation, the majority still 
believes that Israel’s offenses in Gaza “went too far” and its intensity was “unjustified”.
489 At 
the official level, the EU remains divided along European Parliament party and national lines on 
the question of sanctioning Israel (i.e. suspending the EU–Israel Association Agreement signed 
in 2004) or upgrading relations with it.
490 Despite the damage-control efforts of Israel before, 
during and after the Gaza conundrum, the EU remains reluctant to further advance diplomatic 
dialogue and economic ties with the country owing to Israel’s settlement policy in the PT.
491 
This issue has been mulled over by the EU (particularly in the European Parliament) since the 
last unanimous agreement by European foreign ministers to gradually upgrade bilateral relations 
with Israel in June of 2008 – regardless of numerous PA objections.
492 The current ENP Action 
Plan with Israel was due to expire and be replaced in April 2009 but has been extended until 
negotiations on its new form are reached.
493 The upgrade of relations would include 
“strengthening structures for political dialogue with Israel, for example, by intensifying high-
level meetings as well as informal consolidations, by encouraging Israel to align itself with 
positions adopted in the frame of the EU’s CFSP, and by promoting cooperation on the ground 
and inviting Israel to take part in civilian missions pursued under the ESDP”.
494 
In the midst of these economic and political challenges, US President Barack Obama assumed 
office on 20 January 2009, bringing an end to eight years of the controversial Bush 
administration. Obama’s victory and his first formal interview six days after taking office with 
the Arab satellite station Al-Arabiya, bolstered later by his June 2009 speech in Cairo in which 
he promised a new chapter  in US–Muslim relations, brought about a spirit of change and 
dynamism to the Middle East. The mottos of ‘choose hope over fear’ and ‘yes we can’ at first 
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loomed large in Middle Eastern–US relations.
495 But with the challenges facing the region and 
an Israeli coalition government, dominated by right-wing and ultra-Orthodox parties (led since 
31 March 2009 by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) and the polarising foreign 
affairs minister Avigdor Lieberman, chair of the far-right Yisrael Beitenu party), which is not 
succumbing to international pressure to change its hard-line policies towards the Palestinians, 
hope seems to have run out.
496 Months of shuttle diplomacy by George Mitchell, the American 
special envoy to the Middle East for the Obama administration, have proved fruitless in 
persuading the Israeli government to change its position on a negotiation-breaker issue, i.e. 
‘settlement freeze’. In parallel, time and patience are running out on the Palestinian side, where 
Abbas is losing his legitimacy as the PA president since his four-year elected term in office de 
jure expired in January 2009
497 and Hamas keeps refusing to hold new elections in the Gaza 
Strip, where its own four-year mandate also came to an end in January 2010.
498 
Middle East–EU relations are further suffering from the refusal of the Arab members of the 
UfM to hold meetings with Lieberman, who would represent Israel as its foreign minister. 
Neither his hard-line positions concerning the Palestinians, nor his comments regarding 
President Mubarak sat well with the Palestinians and Egyptian leaders. Egypt even boycotted a 
joint UfM summit – scheduled to take place in Istanbul in November 2009 – postponing the 
EuroMed summit indefinitely and bringing the process to the brink of a stalemate. The decision, 
some say, was a protest to Lieberman’s expected presence; however, an Israeli official, who 
preferred to remain anonymous, claims otherwise: “Lieberman was not the problem. The issue 
from the beginning has been the refusal by Egypt and Arab countries to discuss joint 
cooperation projects with Israel.”
499 Thus, like its regional predecessor – the Barcelona process 
– the UfM is being stalled in large part over the Arab–Israeli spat. 
These gloomy developments come in sharp contrast to the positive picture drawn by French 
President Sarkozy during the 2008 Paris summit, when both he and President Mubarak praised 
the Arab nations for attending the summit, saying they had made a “gesture of peace”.
500 More 
recently, voices like that of former external affairs commissioner Ferrero-Waldner are more 
often heard, still calling desperately for an emphasis on the concrete projects outlined in the  
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proposal, while acknowledging the obstacles that beset the process, particularly the Israeli–
Palestinian dispute.
501 In the same vein, Leila Shahid, PLO representative to the EU, wistfully 
wonders: 
[H]ow do you expect us, who have been under occupation for 41 years, aspiring for an 
independent state for 60 years, to go ahead and ‘put the cart before the horse’, have 
motorways over the sea, work towards a pollution-free Mediterranean, build 
environmental projects even when we cannot leave the perimeters that we are forced to 
live in? I find it hard to believe that we could succeed today where the Barcelona 
Process failed [in the creation of a Palestinian state] as long as the essential element of 
stability, peace, coexistence, and economic integration are not there.
502 
Meanwhile, after a lengthy process, and with the clearing of the Czech Republic’s last hurdle of 
having the court’s approval of the government’s opt-out clause to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the Lisbon Treaty was finally ratified by all EU member states in 
November 2009. The Treaty aims at streamlining decision-making and bolstering the bloc’s role 
on the world stage. It introduces some important innovative ideas and modifications to solve 
problems of organisation and consistency in EU foreign policy. Yet, an aspect that has been 
overlooked is how EU actors would coordinate their efforts with international organisations that 
are relevant to the MEPP (e.g. the UN, the World Bank and the IMF) in order to increase their 
efficiency. In light of the importance of these international organisations in supporting the EU’s 
efforts and projects in the PT, this oversight in the Treaty can be considered one of its main 
shortcomings concerning its external outreach. Still, it remains to be seen whether the new 
Treaty will help bolster the EU’s role and coherence on the world stage in general and in the 
Middle East in particular. 
The questions that remain are whether the UfM has been nothing more than just a photo-op and 
whether the EU–Mediterranean relations can overcome the current impasse? In a bid to 
revitalise the process, during recent months there have been mediation attempts by France to 
bridge the differences between the two sides, but nothing has come to fruition yet. The new 
UfM has completely stalled with no signs of resuming its activities following the row between 
its Arab and Israeli members. “This is very serious”, an EU diplomat told the Sunday Times. 
“We are risking the death of the Mediterranean Union just after being born. The Union is in 
complete shambles and no progress has been made since its launch, both on the structure of the 
organisation and its seat.”
503  
It is also imperative to recall the European Council’s mid-June 2009 statement on the MEPP 
after it met in Luxembourg. “The EU’s leaders adopted Barack Obama’s line on both the two 
states solution and on the freezing of Israeli settlements, but it is also clear that the EU must also 
be ready to use its diplomatic, economic and technological leverage to influence Israel. Without 
this, Israel will continue to regard the EU as a lightweight and disregard its demands.”
504 
In spite of these concerns, it seems too soon to pass a verdict of success or failure on the UfM 
only a year after its launch. Some analysts suggest two years as the minimum before assessing 
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the initiative, giving the projects some time to materialise. But at times such as these, when 
foreign ministers of Arab Mediterranean states refuse even to attend UfM summits when their 
Israeli counterpart is present, one wonders if there is a point in restarting the process.
505 It is still 
worth remembering how, within a span of 10 years, the UfM’s predecessor (EMP) helped 
transform two Mediterranean members (Cyprus and Malta) into EU member states and prepare 
Turkey for accession negotiations. These positive achievements might have more to do with the 
EU playing its ‘trump card’ with these countries, the accession prospect, which is leverage that 
it cannot afford to use with all its Mediterranean partners at the moment. Thus, only time will 
tell if this new initiative can bring more progress to the fragile region, especially to the Arab 
partners, without having the EU membership carrot to offer. 
4.  Reflections, Proposals and Conclusions 
Reflections 
The history of EU–Palestinian relations since Oslo has been one of an unending series of 
setbacks and reactive policies aimed at addressing the stumbling blocks as they arise. Every 
initiative from the EMP to the ENP, and recently the UfM, has been developed with the 
expectation (or hope at least) of kick-starting a stagnating peace process and an idle internal 
development process. Unfortunately, none of these frameworks has proven effective for the 
simple reason that they have lacked the holistic approach needed to address the root cause of the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict in order to achieve the desired “just, comprehensive and lasting 
peace in the Middle East”.
506 Therefore, salvaging the PT will require action on all EU 
principles (i.e. human security, good governance, political institutions, economic development, 
cultural openness and societal building) internally, while working on the external factors (i.e. 
the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and regional cooperation) at the same time.
507 This is 
important, because it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Arab–Israeli conflict has 
proven to be one of the main impediments hampering Euro-Mediterranean progress. The 
conflict, in this sense, is “part of a wider regional problem that extends from the neighbouring 
countries to Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and, indeed, throughout the entire Muslim world 
and beyond”, resulting in a destabilising global impact.
508 
Time and again we hear from Palestinians at all levels that building political institutions, 
developing the economy, empowering civil society and importing Western-style democracy and 
human rights in the PT are not sufficient conditions to build a genuine and sustainable peace.
509  
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According to many Palestinians, this is half the equation, one that will not be complete unless 
the US and the EU put pressure on Israel to end its occupation of the PT and help them establish 
a sovereign and viable Palestinian state. Although these demands might sound simple and 
straightforward, in international relations identifying the cure does not necessarily translate into 
starting the treatment.  
Both the US and the EU have geostrategic, economic and cultural ties with Israel. For instance, 
“the EU is Israel’s largest trading partner; [while] Israel is one of the EU’s biggest trading 
partners in the EuroMed area, with total trade amounting to almost €23 billion in 2005”.
510 
Simultaneously, the EU also has a vested interest in maintaining good relations with the 
Palestinians in view of its large Arab and Muslim immigrant communities, its geographical 
proximity to the conflict zone and the far-reaching ramifications of the conflict across EU–
Mediterranean relations. Nonetheless, although often considered an “economic giant”, the EU 
remains to some a “political dwarf” in comparison with the US.
511 It also goes without saying 
that the biggest Israeli lobby in the US (i.e. the American Israel Public Affairs Committee – 
AIPAC) has a lot of influence on US party politics, the Congress and American foreign policy 
towards Israel and the entire Middle East.
512 So, while the EU cannot exert the needed pressure 
on Israel to change its policies towards the Palestinians, the US does not even try. In the absence 
of clear actions by the EU, one is forced to agree with Natalie Tocci’s observation that, “beyond 
words and surreal negotiations with Israel over what constitutes a humanitarian good, it remains 
unclear what the EU will do to alter Israel’s policy”.
513 
Europe nevertheless has shown “greater willingness in recent months to play a larger part in the 
Middle East’s most protracted conflict, that of Israel and Palestine. But willingness doesn’t 
necessarily indicate readiness.”
514 Thus, the combination of a lack of leverage over Israel’s 
actions or a lack of the actors’ political will to either give more incentives and security 
assurances to Israel or to resort to “hard politics”,
 such as enforcing economic sanctions or 
downgrading commercial relations with it,
515 contributes to Israel’s apathy towards the demands 
of the Palestinians and the international community alike.  
Certainly, for an accurate assessment of EU politics in the PT, one must avoid the all-too-often 
recited generalisations made about the ‘complete failure’ of EU engagement with the 
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Palestinians. Rather, Muriel Asseburg’s scheme should be taken into consideration, which 
breaks down EU policies in the PT into the following three (overlapping) components and then 
measures the effectiveness of each aspect independently over time:  
1)  regional security and stability,  
2)  state and institution building, and  
3)  financial aid and economic development.
516  
In this manner, the EU’s success or failure on the ground can be better evaluated, while at the 
same time comparing the EU’s actions with its declaratory positions broadcasted in Brussels.  
1. What has the EU done? 
Europe “is already deeply involved in the MEPP, through its large financial assistance to the 
Palestinians, its membership of the Quartet, and its various missions on the ground”.
517 In Denis 
Bauchard’s words, “from 1980 to 2001, Europe played a leading role in the Middle East, 
particularly in asserting the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and by convincing the PLO 
to abandon violence and so become a viable party to negotiations”.
518 Likewise, Asseburg points 
out that since Oslo, the EU has tried to lay the foundation for socio-economic development and 
good governance, supported comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours through 
multilateral and bilateral frameworks, sought to create an environment conducive to peace in the 
region, and supported regional cooperation and integration through the EMP, ENP and UfM. In 
the process of achieving these ends, the EU has exercised some  
1)  conflict management, by introducing security-sector reform and the ESDP police and border 
missions;  
2)  crisis mediation, by playing the mediator role in facilitating dialogue among Israelis and 
Palestinians during the second intifada; and  
3)  conflict resolution, by pushing the Bush administration to adopt the roadmap and to re-
engage in Middle East conflict-settlement through the Middle East Quartet.
519  
2. Has the EU succeeded? 
According to Maria Gianniou, the success of the EU in the PT can be measured by asking 
whether the actions of the EU in this matter have been effective in contributing positively to the 
efforts for resolving the conflict. In answering this, Gianniou claims that  
the institutional evolution of the diplomatic system of Europe suffers from one 
primordial flaw, [which is a] constant and unchangeable critique of all the analysts 
focusing on the European integration process: the lack of an external and coherent 
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action, primarily due to the absence of a foreign policy system pooling both the 
common and the intergovernmental elements of the external activity of Europe.
520  
Nonetheless, she stresses that it would be wrong to argue that Europe has limited itself through 
its incoherence, in view of two pertinent observations:  
1)  Over the past 30 years, “Europe has managed to successfully develop a European policy 
vis-à-vis the conflict, notably via the progressive elaboration of a set of basic principles, 
expressed within the framework of European Political Cooperation/CFSP, and later as 
applied on the ground through concrete and tangible actions”.  
2)  “[T]he institutionalisation of CFSP granted to Europe a more solid and well-defined 
international image...[that] offered to European officials a series of instruments, the 
application of which contributed to better interpret[ing] Europe’s engagement on the 
ground.”
521  
In Gianniou’s opinion, Europe’s objective today is clearer and more focused on “the resolution 
of the conflict by peaceful means and negotiation which should inevitably lead to a two-state 
solution”. She also adds that “by its declarations and actions [the EU] obtained some concrete 
results: it contributed to the legitimisation process of the Palestinian people and the PLO; it 
supported Israel’s normalisation and integration in the Middle Eastern region; [and] it offered an 
alternative yet complementary diplomatic track to that of the US”.
522 
3. Where has the EU gone wrong? 
Where the Europeans have gone wrong is that “while their support had political objectives – to 
form the nucleus of a Palestinian state and to provide the environment for a comprehensive 
settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict – Europeans [have] remained reluctant to get directly 
involved on the political level. Rather they [have seen] their role as complementary to the 
political negotiations facilitated by the US”, Asseburg holds. Also, for years the EU focused its 
attention exclusively on the Palestinian–Israeli track instead of using the multilateral track first 
envisaged to solve the regional conflict as a whole.
523 Moreover, the EU did not use its leverage 
on Israel or Hamas by yielding to the former and disengaging from the latter. By setting 
preconditions for negotiations with Hamas and refusing to engage with them, “the EU in 
particular has effectively out-manoeuvred itself from having effective influence on the conflict. 
This is because its influence principally derives from its disbursal of financial assistance 
contingent upon the recipient’s compliance with specified conditions and rules.”
524 
Furthermore, the EU trapped itself in a position from which it found difficult to get out. On the 
one hand, it adopted the Quartet’s three aforementioned conditions prior to negotiations with 
Hamas, but at the same time it added Hamas to its list of terrorist organisations in 2003,
525 
making it legally arduous to break this deadlock. Veronique de Keyser, member of the European 
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Parliament of the Socialists & Democrats group, stressed that this list is actually “political and 
not democratic” because the EU has not been transparent in its categories for making or getting 
off that list. She claims that shortly after Hamas won the PLC elections in 2006, they contacted 
the European Parliament to see what process they could follow to be removed from that list; 
however, she laments that there was no such process written down to consult. Voices from the 
EU have been calling for engaging in a dialogue with Hamas, but no one seems willing to take 
the first step.  
More fundamental is that the EU has often applied post-conflict resolution mechanisms to the 
PT, while at the same time (deliberately or unintentionally) postponing or neglecting to deal 
with the core issue: the occupation. The EU erred when it focused primarily on the ‘structural’ 
aspect of foreign policy in the PT, influencing to a limited degree some structures (i.e. political, 
legal, socio-economic and security) on a few levels (i.e. state, societal and individual), while 
overlooking other important elements (e.g. human security, psychological and cultural matters) 
and levels (e.g. inter-state/societal and regional ones). In addition, the EU disregarded or 
procrastinated over the ‘traditional/conventional’ dimension of foreign policy, which influences 
national security and stability through the crisis-management and conflict-resolution 
mechanisms needed before post-conflict resolution instruments can be fruitful. The occupation, 
in this sense, is the antithesis of structural foreign policy, which revolves around human 
security, development and freedoms of movement, association and speech. In essence, “both 
conceptualizations of foreign policies are relevant” in today’s complex and global world for 
conflict resolution to succeed.
526  
Richard Youngs adds to this analysis that the EU’s support for Palestinian institutional reforms 
had begun to make headway in the mid-1990s, when it was “using a skilful mix of funding, 
incentives and political conditionality”, but in doing so Europe was “walking a very thin line. 
On the one hand, it sought to nudge along Palestinian reform without detracting from the fact 
that a fully functioning democracy depended most essentially on the end of occupation. On the 
other hand, by the late 1990s it had become clear that unduly neglecting underlying reform was 
militating against the prospects for peace.”
527 While rolling back previous reforms enhanced 
Palestinian presidential powers and reversed earlier democratic achievements in the PT, the EU, 
by continuing to give aid money to the PA, helped keep a moderate interlocutor of the peace 
process (President Abbas) alive.
528 Hence, the EU was criticised from all sides, but depending 
on who is asked, for different reasons: for being “too critical towards or too indulgent of the 
Palestinian Authority political elite”;
529 for being too hard or too soft on Israel; for giving a lot 
of money to the PA without ending the occupation; or for not giving enough money to induce 
reforms. 
But academics are not alone in criticising the EU. In a policy paper analysing the conclusions of 
the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council on the MEPP – prepared by a group of 
15 European/international humanitarian and peace organisations with operations or partners in 
Israel and the PT – nine key inconsistencies in the European Council’s position on the MEPP 
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were outlined with recommendations to rectify them. The main points of critique are that the 
Council has
530 
 
1)  failed to support an independent inquiry into the Gaza war;  
2)  failed to stress the illegality of the blockade of Gaza;  
3)  ceased criticising Israel’s construction of the wall in the PT since 2007;  
4)  dropped its earlier calls to reverse the settlements policy of Israel; 
5)  not called on Israel to enforce law upon settlers perpetrating violence; 
6)  been silent about intra-Palestinian human rights violations; 
7)  been silent about thousands of Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons; 
8)  conditioned engagement with the Palestinians but not with the Israelis; and 
9)  not called for any restrictions on arms transfers to Israel. 
4. Why has the EU chosen ineffective policies? 
The main reasons behind choosing such an ineffective approach, in Asaf Siniver’s opinion, are 
largely rooted in “the EU’s (and particularly Germany’s) yielding to Israel’s pressure to separate 
the political from the economic spheres of interaction, and to obvious post-war historical and 
political sensitivities to Israel’s accusations of anti-Israel policies”.
531 Note, for instance, that no 
European government has outright condemned the “excessive” 2009 Israeli offenses in Gaza 
without justifying the actions first and foremost as a “legitimate act of self-defence” instigated 
by the Hamas attacks on Israel, demonstrating a special sympathy towards Israel.
532 In addition, 
the EU was “initially reluctant to become actively involved in direct political negotiations 
between the parties to the Middle East conflict and in hard security issues, leaving the field[s] of 
conflict management and conflict resolution largely to the United States”.
533  
Gianniou, however, believes that despite the common declarations published at times, “from the 
outset an atypical division emerged between the member states according to their position vis-à-
vis the conflict: consequently, France, Ireland, Italy or Greece were more willing to concede to 
Palestinian demands (such as the association of the PLO or the creation of a homeland, and later 
on a state) than were Holland, Denmark or Germany”. She even goes as far as saying that “some 
states clearly distinguished themselves from their partners in many occasions: the Greek 
insistence to recognise the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people in the beginning 
of the eighties (whereas Europe only called for its association with the negotiations); and the 
proposal of Jacques Chirac in October 1996 to co-sponsor – with the US – the peace process” 
are such examples. Gianniou claims that undoubtedly, these actions “contribute to rais[ing] 
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tension between partners and harm the European efforts to promote a single image…as a 
coherent international actor in the peace process”.
534 
Be that as it may, to Denis Bauchard it seems like the Bush administration coupled with 
successive Israeli governments “have constantly sought to distance Europe from any political 
negotiations in the region. Europe has instead had to play the passive part of ‘banker’, financing 
equipment and infrastructure.”
535 Still, Asseburg argues that the EU later had a change of heart – 
when it increased its activities in the PT – in light of the EU’s ambitions to become a global 
player and the urgency imposed by the deteriorating situation, coupled with the US 
administration’s neglect of the peace process during President Bush’s first term in office.
536 Yet 
other considerations might have also contributed to the EU’s deeper involvement, such as the 
strengthening of the CFSP and the creation of ESDP (new EU foreign policy instruments) and 
finally getting rid of the war on its outskirts in the Balkans.  
5. What are the ramifications of the EU’s failure?  
Consequently, what “over the last 15 years has proven to be the main stumbling block to 
improve EuroMed relations and confidence-building and regional integration – the Arab–Israeli 
conflict – is bound to remain a major impediment to closer cooperation, particularly in the 
Mashreq”.
537 Adding to that, the EU’s reactive policy in 2006-09 with regard to Hamas has led 
it to lose its credibility. Its support for democracy was discredited in the eyes of the local 
Palestinian population and the wider Islamic world after the dubious signal, to both Arab 
authoritarian regimes and Arabs in the streets, of its stance when Hamas’s electoral victory in 
2006 was given merely pro forma recognition, while de facto legitimacy was denied to the 
majority faction in parliament.
538 Moreover, the reversal of the EU’s earlier reform policies in 
the PT since Hamas’s electoral victory to the advantage of the West Bank Abbas-led 
government has undeniably helped deform more than reform the fragile Palestinian institutions 
and put a question mark over the EU’s honesty as a democracy and reform promoter in the 
Middle East. 
Within the context of a volatile Oslo peace process and the intifada, EU aid to the Palestinians 
has mainly been used “as a substitute for international political will and to compensate for the 
lack of genuine bilateral negotiations between the parties”. Aid alone, however, cannot buy 
peace. “Not only has the international community’s ‘aid for peace’ strategy failed to attain its 
stated political and socio-economic objectives…[but also] such international intervention has 
actually been harmful.”
539 Donors have ended up financing Israel’s continued occupation of the 
PT and its expansionist agenda at the expense of international law, the well-being of the 
Palestinian population, their right to self-determination and the international community’s own 
developmental and political goals. Indeed, Le More’s predictions in 2005 came true. Despite the 
optimism surrounding Israeli disengagement from Gaza, she rightly speculated that it would not 
work unless there is a genuine effort to build a Palestinian state and collective Israeli and 
Palestinian security. She posited that “not only did aid relieve Israel of its responsibilities under 
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international law, but it also clearly helped sustain its occupation and expansionist policy, which 
would have been much more onerous to maintain had the international community not paid the 
bill”.
 But the international donors continue their aid because they know it is naive to expect 
Israel to step up to the plate just because their assistance is discontinued, and they fear a 
humanitarian catastrophe in the area if they stop.
540 
More alarming, the international community “[has] not achieved their intended results of 
weakening or ‘moderating’ Hamas”; on the contrary, they have contributed to “the lawlessness 
and lack of governance in Palestine”. EU policies against Hamas have also “fuelled polarisation 
and confrontation” within Palestine, “leading most dramatically to a civil war in Gaza, the 
ensuing political split between the West Bank and Gaza, and with it the disappearance of any 
realistic prospect for a two-state solution”.
541  
Proposals for the way ahead 
According to Richard Youngs,  
recommendations for reforming Europe’s Mediterranean policy commonly propose 
incremental increases to the EMP acquis. But the primary need is not for more activity, 
or for a broader range of policy initiatives. A vast array of ‘EuroMed’ branded dialogue 
and cooperation now takes place across the Mediterranean, but it is doubtful that much 
more impact could be gained through more summits, a ‘Mr Med’ special EU 
representative, a common definition of this, or a new charter on that, or through more 
institutional structures like the often proposed EuroMed Development Bank. It is 
unlikely even that throwing more money at the EU’s Mediterranean strategy would be 
effective when the large amounts of resources already provided are not working as 
intended.
542 
Still, in spite of pessimism and based on various assessments of EU involvement in the 
Mediterranean and the MEPP, some recommendations have been outlined by various experts on 
the subject. In Asseburg’s view, for instance, the EU should  
1)  encourage intra-Palestinian reconciliation;  
2)  open the Rafah border crossing and reconstruct the Gaza Strip;  
3)  return to building good governance and reforming Palestinian institutions;  
4)  restart the Palestinian–Israeli peace process; and  
5)  if it is to regain some credibility in the Arab world, take some drastic measures and exert 
real pressure on Israel to re-engage in negotiations, and accept the indigenous forces of the 
Territory by supporting without imposing democratic changes.
543  
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In a nutshell, “the Europeans have to make peace in the Middle East a priority”.
544 Asseburg 
further states that the EU’s approach should not just be about “claiming a role” but  “assuming 
that role” and engaging in the politics of the region.
545 The EU’s “efforts should be 
complemented by support for state- and nation-building processes in the Palestinian territories, 
rather than simply cooperation with those local forces whose agendas we share most. This is 
more urgent in the face of the persisting stark societal and political polarisation in the 
Palestinian territories.”
546  
Asseburg is not alone in trying to define solutions to revive the EU’s peace and development 
process in the Middle East. From various debates during conferences and workshops on the 
subject, many suggestions to boost the EU’s role in managing the conflict have been put 
forward: 
•  Increase the number of effective and democratic players involved in solving the conflict; for 
example, use (un)diplomatic channels, (in)formal networks and big or small private 
business partners.  
•  Engage new people, like women and youth, in local development programmes, but keep the 
Palestinian priorities (and not just the EU’s own agenda) in mind.  
•  Resolve the problem of actors’ movement by creating special EuroMed visas to enable them 
to participate in debates to find answers together. 
•  Invest in a new generation of Palestinian leaders through programmes resembling the ones 
within Europe. These young leaders will be part of the solution and not the problem. 
•  Shed light on abuses in the Middle East and the PT and stop protecting perpetrators by 
publicising flagrant issues (also in order to regain the EU’s credibility in the Arab street).  
•  Challenge the notion that democracy can be exported by the West and imported by the PT. 
That does not mean it cannot and need not be supported, however, because indeed it should. 
•  Stop the slippery slope of the PA transforming into another Arab authoritarian regime by 
restoring conditionality and attaching benchmarks to the EU’s aid (for instance, demanding 
political, legal, institutional and socio-economic reforms, and increasing transparency).  
•  Avoid having an EU donor- and relief-driven agenda by continuing development projects. 
The challenges to state building, however, include Israel’s restrictions on access and 
movement, and the division between the West Bank and Gaza – the practical implications of 
which make it very hard for the EU and the PA to deliver key services.
547  
•  Combine Palestinian state building with finding lasting solutions to the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict; otherwise, EU aid is “merely money supporting the objectives of the Israeli 
occupation”, which is not constructive for peace. Long-term objectives take time, so 
patience is needed. 
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•  Engage with Hamas, because a two-state solution or further democratic elections are not 
possible without a Palestinian unity government, including Fatah and Hamas, working 
together. The EU must help the two factions reach reconciliation, as the peace process is 
only viable if Hamas gives its consent to it, and democratic elections cannot take place 
without Hamas. Sanctions did not succeed in changing Hamas, but only further radicalised 
other factions in the Gaza Strip (e.g. the Jundallah Gaza attacks in the summer of 2009).
548 
This last point seems very important, as it is the recurring theme in most recommendations and 
highlighted by most experts on the subject. Analysts often agree that “serious peace talks are 
impossible while Palestinians remain divided. The EU must actively support Palestinian 
reconciliation and consider suspending its assistance to Palestinian police forces until a unity 
government is formed to avoid deepening divisions between Hamas and Fatah.”
549 This is 
particularly significant given that Hamas, despite its isolation by the international community, is 
“still strong and in control of the Gaza Strip”, while “disorder and radicalisation are spreading 
across the Strip, where the social fabric has been severely weakened by the humanitarian crisis 
caused by Israel’s border closures and military conflict between Hamas and the Israeli army”.
550 
Likewise, the International Security Information Service (ISIS) in Europe prepared a brief 
summary of the European Security Contact Group meeting on 23 July 2009. The meeting 
included experts on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and coincided with the Brussels launch of 
the 2009 annual peace report issued by five leading German peace and conflict research 
institutes. The summary, drawn from the commentaries of two of the report’s authors, Margret 
Johannsen and Jochen Hippler, had the following conclusions:
551 
1)  New wars (with non-state actors) are different from old wars (between states) and are on the 
rise, which is why different conflict-resolution mechanisms that are not based merely on 
military power but on “winning the hearts and minds of the population” are needed.  
2)  In most cases, dependable governance structures are the key to terminating instability. 
Instruments of military security and sustainable development policy can only contribute to 
building peace if combined with these structures and supported by the indigenous 
population.  
3)  The EU and its member states seem to at least “rhetorically accept the need for a re-
conceptualisation of the way to end [the] conflict”, which is a first step in the right 
direction, but concrete actions must follow. 
4)  Two approaches are present among policy experts within governments:  
a)  one that favours civilian elements to solve war and only includes the military to provide 
support and security; and 
b)  one in which the primacy of the military remains but where civilian tools are added to 
the strategy (an option that is supported in this publication as well). 
While commenting on Denis Bauchard’s recent article in Europe’s World,
552 El Sayed A. 
Shalaby concurs with the notion that the region’s future will depend on the outcome of two 
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basic issues: a just settlement for the Palestinians, and “progress towards a plural and 
democratic system of government in the Arab World that can make poverty, unemployment and 
corruption things of the past”. But Shalaby makes it clear that the EU cannot do it alone and that 
there is an important role for the Arab governments to play, too. These governments, in his 
view, will need to find a feasible way to assimilate the Islamic movements, especially the more 
moderate ones, “into the political fabric of their societies”.
553 This opinion is shared by other 
analysts who believe that “decisions on the PA must also be viewed in the larger regional 
perspective, which includes issues concerning Iran, the cartoon controversy, and 
democratization”.
554 The US and the EU should engage Arab nations, especially in the Gulf 
region, in a more constructive dialogue and refocus their attention on the Palestinian question 
along with the Iranian issue. Elizabeth Young summarised the argument by the EU’s Middle 
East envoy, Marc Otte, as follows: “[i]n particular, the West must face the accusation that it has 
a double standard for democracy. As witnessed in the Palestinian elections, there is no real 
alternative secular third party in the Middle East to contest the Islamists.”
555 Nevertheless,  
the return to a Pax Americana as outlined by President Bush in his January 2004 State 
of the Union address is clearly not an option. The Greater Middle East project, which 
was meant to ‘eradicate tyranny’, promote democracy and make the region prosperous 
through free trade is no longer viable. But the US [and the EU] can regain credibility 
and influence if [they engage] in crisis resolution. President Obama’s approach, 
therefore, marks a very real turning point. He recognises that all the region’s problems 
are connected and that there can be no stability in the Middle East without a solution to 
the Palestinian question.
556  
Obama and the EU are conscious of the need to confront hostility from opponents like Iran but 
also from friendly states such as the current Israeli government. Even so, the risk of outright 
chaos is real enough, with all that implies for the region as a whole as well as for its immediate 
neighbours and global security.
557 So, the question to be posed is this: Are the EU and the US 
looking for short-term or long-term stability in the Middle East, while being aware that a period 
of unrest may precede long-term stability? 
It is doubtful whether the new US administration would or could exercise pressure in the face of 
domestic considerations. For a US president who has to deal with the worst economic crisis 
since 1929, the political costs would probably be too high. Yet, this leaves some room for the 
EU to manoeuvre and assume that role. A Palestinian state would need to hold legitimacy in the 
eyes of the Palestinians, but as long as the PA is not delivering on the two-state solution it will 
be unable to assert its legitimacy, a situation that could be improved under the right pressure and 
incentives from the EU to Israel. Also, the EU can continue to help in state building in areas 
such as justice, the rule of law, health and governance, where it has led the way. But it should 
also couple such help with the human security dimension by encouraging civil society 
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involvement and engaging with Hamas to be part of the solution. The EU must push for the 
creation of a Palestinian state while taking into consideration the changes in regional dynamics. 
The EU needs to work effectively with the US to revive the dialogue between parties and 
unblock the status quo. Israel’s current insistence on negotiating borders first with discussions 
on settlements to follow could actually facilitate a solution, but only if the negotiations are 
conducted in good faith and able to reach an agreement fast. If, however, it is a delay tactic, the 
end result will be a prolongation of insecurities on both sides and exacerbated frustration on the 
Palestinian side. Recently, a Palestinian official, Sabri Saidam, astutely reminded his US 
counterpart of this point at a conference: “How do you want me to keep negotiating with you on 
a [p]izza while it is being eaten?”
558 Both parties have agreed to land swaps in principle but 
questions remain about how much and where? If an agreement is not reached soon, at the pace 
settlements are going, there will be not much land left about which to negotiate. 
For Europe to gain influence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, it is “essential that its diplomatic 
puissance is recognised by all interested parties, that is, the Israelis and the Palestinians but also 
the Americans”.
559 Even though Europe is keen on “being perceived as a potential mediator to 
the conflict, this aspiration had never constituted an easy task”,
560 for two main reasons. These 
are “the inability of Europe to always present a coherent image and to speak with one voice; and 
the level of acceptance of the interested parties to attribute to Europe a stronger diplomatic role 
in the efforts towards the resolution on the conflict”.
561 As Sinivir puts it, a mediator in 
international conflict needs to demonstrate three aspects in order to be accepted in such a role: 
power, impartiality (even-handedness) and good timing. The EU – especially from an Israeli 
perspective – is behind on all fronts.
562 
Thus, if the EU “wants to maximise the value of its generous assistance, it should try to increase 
its diplomatic influence. It should also move away from the narrow role of benevolent financial 
provider it has all too often assumed”, and has to “embrace Israel with ‘tough love’ [but also 
build confidence with it based on mutual interests]. Presenting itself as a true friend, it should 
make clear that it is keen to deepen bilateral relations and provide full assistance for peace talks, 
but insist on the need for Israel to fully recommit to the peace process.”
 563 This is more 
important now as “the new Israeli government is only reluctantly endorsing a two-state solution; 
in a speech on June 14th, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a significant concession 
(yet declaratory in nature and [still] lacking substance)”.
564 
One must keep in mind that on a political level the EU is an expression of the discussions 
among its member states, which makes the EU appear divided and paralysed at times. At 
present, the member states often disagree about the conflict in the Middle East – some put more 
emphasis on Israel’s security, while others put it on the human security perspective. “The EU 
needs to adopt the concept of human security as a new narrative underpinning its foreign policy, 
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as well as an organising framework guiding its security capabilities and the tools and 
instruments of foreign policy.”
565 To that end, the EU has to use the array of tools available to it 
to support human security, but that of course needs the political will of all its member states to 
capitalise on those instruments that would make it a force for peace in the PT. One such 
measure is emphasis on the construction of a legitimate political authority, which could best be 
achieved through a “bottom-up approach [and] would mean mobilising civil society in Israel 
and Palestine as well as in Europe to push for a new political solution”.
566 The polls demonstrate 
that both Palestinians and Israelis long for peace and security. “The principle of legitimate 
political authority depends on those who have the power to grant legitimacy – civil society. So, 
ordinary people need to be involved in the search for a political solution.”
567 
Conclusions 
After five years (1995-2000) of the EU focusing merely on economic development and state-
building projects in the PT, its approach failed in the end because it did not take into 
consideration the realities of the occupation, which remained a background issue. Although 
there was a short moment of success at first, the EU eventually fell short of achieving its goals 
because it applied, right at the start, a “post-conflict peace-building [approach] – as if there were 
no continuing conflict, occupation or mobility restrictions hampering economic development, 
reconciliation and institution-building”.
568 Still, this approach did not last long. Facing the 
pressing realities of the second intifada and Hamas’s electoral victory, the EU switched from 
support for economic and institutional development to humanitarian aid and emergency relief in 
order to alleviate the rapid deterioration of the Fatah-led PA and the worsened the suffering of 
the Palestinians under occupation.  
Stephan Keukeleire argues that  
the EU wanted to apply to its relations with the Mediterranean the objective and 
methodology that had proved so successful with its Eastern neighbours. The EU 
envisaged fundamental changes in the political, legal, economic and societal structures 
within the individual Mediterranean countries [including the PT], in their mutual 
relations and in their relations with the EU. However, in this case the EU could not 
play its trump card – the prospect of accession.
569  
The drawback is that the EU played a limited political role from the start and was absent from 
the negotiations leading to Madrid and Oslo in 1991 and 1993 respectively, brokered by the US, 
which in a sense hijacked it in the process. The EU eventually assumed a pivotal role in the 
peace process by shaping the terms of the debate (implicitly prior to Oslo) and by then explicitly 
developing a long-term, complex, comprehensive and ambitious structural foreign policy (i.e. 
the EMP) to translate the agreement into practice. Yet it failed in achieving its goals, because it 
did not simultaneously take into account traditional foreign policy measures and conflict-
resolution means for enhancing peace and security in the PT. Hence, it was left to pay the bill 
for a deal that it did not broker or succeed in materialising. 
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That notwithstanding, there is no denying that Europe has been much more sensible in its 
treatment of the area and its inhabitants than the US, not just because of its many vital 
development projects in the PT, but because  
Europe, unlike the US, doesn’t always view its relationship to Palestine as an arrogant 
power with a list of uncompromising demands which have to be fulfilled or else. The 
US’s fundamentally erroneous approach to the Middle East in general, and Palestine in 
particular, has created untold animosity towards Washington, and generated a lack of 
trust that will eventually undermine its position in the entire region – a process 
currently underway.
570  
This special relationship between the EU and the Palestinians is usually attributed to historical 
links (e.g. Europe’s recent colonial past in the Middle East), geographical proximity or 
sympathy with the devastation of war (experienced in Europe not so long ago). Hence, 
European policies in the PT are embedded in a broader European approach of support for the 
MEPP and the EMP/ENP/UfM, and not merely imposing by force ‘Western values’ onto the 
Territory – which tended to be the Bush administration’s approach towards the region.
571  
Thus, if the US holds the key to peace in the Middle East, the EU has a unique position and an 
opportunity to play an influential role as well. Although it is not powerful enough to force the 
Israeli government to do something it does not want, the EU could put enough international 
pressure on Israel while providing ‘carrots’ for both Israelis and Palestinians to cooperate. As 
Arab–Israeli relations have soured so badly, they are now only candidates for improvement. The 
EU should help put an end to settlement expansions and formally supervise the implementation 
of international agreements according to pre-determined UN resolutions. All parties must seize 
this historic moment and remember that today’s opportunities might not be available tomorrow. 
A major challenge for this scenario is that not long ago the EU was a colonial power in the 
Middle East, and although it likes to project itself now as a “normative power”,
572 Peter Seeberg 
depicts it as “a realist actor in normative clothes”
573 – a notion that is detrimental to Arab trust 
in Europe’s intentions and to the EU’s credibility. 
But with a situation going from bad to worse on a daily basis, and with the dream of something 
remotely close to Palestinian democratic elections being shattered without a unity government 
in place, it was not surprising that the Palestinian CEC had to declare that the expected January 
2010 presidential and parliamentary elections would have to be postponed indefinitely, because 
“Hamas has banned elections in Gaza and Israel’s cooperation was not confirmed”. Amid this 
deadlock, whether the elections will take place in 2010 or whether Abbas will run for 
president
574 are up in the air.
575 Lately, there also seems to be a Palestinian move to gain 
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international recognition for an independent state without Israel’s approval; yet, Israeli Prime 
Minister Netanyahu has warned against such a move, insisting on negotiations as the only 
solution. Still, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said he would ask the EU and the UN  
 
Security Council to recognise an independent Palestinian state despite Israel’s objections given 
a failure to restart talks against the background of Israel’s continued settlement expansion, 
which is leaving the actors with fewer options.
576 Whether the EU will support such a move is 
unclear. What is clear is that unless the EU can bridge the gap between its rhetoric and political 
will and can back its ‘declaratory’ policies with concrete and effective actions, EU–PT relations 
will increasingly be challenged by the growing radical forces on the ground and continue to 
suffer unfulfilled commitments that will render progress, trust and peace beyond the roundtables 
unattainable.  
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
AHLC  Ad Hoc Liaison Committee 
AIPAC  American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
AMA  Agreement on Movement and Access 
BP: UfM  Barcelona process: Union for the Mediterranean  
CEC  (Palestinian) Central Elections Commission 
CFSP  Common foreign and security policy 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States  
COPPS  Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support 
DG Directorate-General   
DG-RELEX  Directorate-General for External Relations  
DOP  Declaration of Principles  
EC European  Community 
ECHO  European Commission Humanitarian Aid  
ECTAO  Commission Technical Assistance Office 
ECU(s)  European Currency Unit(s) 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
EIDHR  European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights  
EMP  Euro-Mediterranean Partnership  
EMPA  Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly  
EMUNI Euro-Mediterranean  University 
ENP European  Neighbourhood  Policy 
ENPI  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument  
EOM  Election(s) observation mission 
ESDP  European security and defence policy  
ESSP  Emergency Services Support Programme 
EUBAM  EU Border Assistance Mission 
EUPOL  EU Police Mission 
EuroMed Euro-Mediterranean 
FEMIP   Facility for the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership 
GDP  Gross domestic product 
HERF  Humanitarian Emergency Response Fund  
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
IDF  Israeli Defence Forces 
IMF International  Monetary  Fund 
MEDA Mediterranean  Assistance THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORY | 111 
MENA  Middle East and North Africa 
MEPP  Middle East Peace Process  
MP(s)  Member(s) of Parliament 
NDI  National Democratic Institute   
NGO Non-governmental  organisation 
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OPEC  Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries  
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PA Palestinian  Authority 
PASSIA  Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
PCBS  Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
PEGASE  Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-Economique 
PLC  Palestinian Legislative Council 
PLO  Palestinian Liberation Organisation  
P(N)A  Palestinian (National) Authority 
PRDP Palestinian  Reform and Development Plan 
PSC/COPS  Political and Security Committee/Comité Politique et de Sécurité  
PT/OPT Palestinian  Territory/Occupied Palestinian Territory 
REDWG   Regional Economic Development Working Group  
SG/HR  Secretary-general of the Council of the European Union/high representative 
SME  Small and medium enterprises 
TACIS  Technical Assistance to CIS 
TAIEX   Technical Assistance Information Exchange  
TIM  Temporary International Mechanism 
TIPH  Temporary International Presence in Hebron 
UfM/BP: UfM  Union for the Mediterranean (or Barcelona process: UfM)  
UN United  Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCO  United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNRWA  United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
UNSC  UN Security Council  
UNSCO  UN Special Coordinator Office 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VAT  Value added tax  
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Glossary of EU Instruments in used in the PT 
Political 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona process) is a multilateral 
framework of cooperation launched in 1995, which brought together all 15 EU member states at 
the time and 13 Mediterranean partners for dialogue and work on political, economic and 
cultural issues. 
The Association Agreement (AA) signed between the EU and the Interim Palestinian Authority 
in 1997 is an Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation under the EMP. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a bilateral and parallel initiative to the EMP, 
launched in 2004 (partly to coincide with the EU’s fifth enlargement). It brought together all 25 
EU member states at the time and 16 neighbouring partners to work together on specific 
political, economic and cultural issues. 
The Action Plan (AP) adopted by the EU and the Palestinian Authority in 2005 falls under the 
ENP and identifies specific bilateral means to materialise strategies. 
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is an update of the multilateral EMP framework, 
launched in July 2008, among all 27 EU member states and 16 Mediterranean partners. Unlike 
the EMP, the UfM focuses on a set of common projects among partners and lacks the 
conditionality attached to its predecessor. It has its own institutional settings, which bring 
together southern and northern partners. 
Economic 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has provided loans to fund development projects in the 
Mediterranean and neighbouring partners since the launch of the Barcelona process in 1995. 
The Mediterranean Assistance (MEDA) financial instrument entails coordinated European 
Community funds and EIB loans to the Mediterranean under the EMP initiative. It was divided 
into two consecutive phases, MEDA-I (1995–2000) and its more tangible version, MEDA-II 
(2000–07). 
The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was created by an 
initiative of the European Parliament to support various democratisation micro-projects in the 
Mediterranean region. EIDHR-I lasted from 2000 to 2006, followed by EIDHR-II from 2007 to 
2013. The latter expands the mandate of the instrument beyond the Mediterranean. The EU 
decided not to include this instrument under the ENPI umbrella. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP) started in 2002 and 
brought together the entire range of services provided by the EIB to assist in the economic 
development of the Mediterranean partner countries. 
The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) replaced the MEDA 
instrument in 2007. It was designed to complement the ENP bilateral track and to bring together 
under one umbrella various economic instruments intended for the Mediterranean and the 
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The Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) was used from June mid-2006 to the end of 
2007. After Hamas’s electoral victory in January 2006, the international community (including 
the EU) completely cut its funding of the PT. When the Palestinian Authority was on the verge 
of collapse six months later, with help of international donors the EU commenced direct 
financial assistance through the TIM to Palestinian families in need and to the Palestinian 
Authority (particularly Fatah officials) to sustain the party and its services.  
PEGASE (Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-Economique) replaced the TIM at 
the beginning of 2008. Like the TIM, this instrument provides direct budgetary support to the 
Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Its assistance, however, is coordinated 
locally with EU member states and other international partners, providing a quicker, more 
efficient and transparent channel of funding. The ENPI and the EIDHR complement the 
PEGASE on certain projects.  
Cultural 
The People to Programme (P2P) began with the launch of the Barcelona process in 1995 to 
foster dialogue among cultures, but was replaced after three years with a more concrete 
instrument.  
The Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) replaced the P2P in 1998. It is designed to work 
jointly with civil society organisations in partner countries and seeks to build confidence and 
‘conflict transformation capacities’ to help create the necessary atmosphere for the peace 
process and provide a solid foundation for democracy and good governance. 
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